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This thesis is the formulation of a theological response to the modern 
economic market.  It argues for a Two Pillars paradigm for the economic market, 
whereby covenant and contract serve together as the two “pillars” that uphold 
economic order.  The modern market is derived and developed upon the legal 
contract that supports and governs economic activities.  Non-contractible assertions 
in the market remain background presuppositions, of which enactment depends 
largely on the individual economic agent.  In the Two Pillars paradigm, I argue that 
the theological covenant and the legal contract are equally significant assertions that 
interact and complement each other to uphold a well-balanced economic market.  
They are both essential in deriving a market that promotes genuine human 
relationship, freedom and economic justice. 
In this study, the covenant foundation of society and its economic 
significance are rediscovered and examined.  The universality and relevance of the 
covenant concept for economic order is explored, and the covenant compared and 
contrasted with the contract to show their distinctiveness, significance and interaction 
in the market.  The Two Pillars paradigm is then presented and illustrated through the 
example of long-term employment arrangements to demonstrate its practicability and 
potential use as a dialogical framework to examine other economic relationships.  
Finally, market fundamentals including market motif, limits, assumptions, morality 
and regulations are explored in dialogue with the Two Pillars response to economics. 
This study should appeal to a wider audience beyond the ecclesiastical 
community, placing it in the arena of public theology.  It draws upon the thoughts of 
economists to examine the Two Pillars paradigm in a wider context.  The result is an 
interdisciplinary study offering a theological-based paradigm that addresses the 
situation of the modern market in a fundamental and practical way. 
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The Covenant Concept as a Theological and Relational Concept  








This study starts from the need for a theological response to modern 
economics.  It examines the interface between theology and economics, and offers a 
comprehensive theological paradigm in response to the modern market.  At first sight, 
the disciplines of theology and economics may appear to have little in common.  In 
fact, the two disciplines share a very fundamental common interest in the nature and 
activities of human persons as well as the interaction among them.  Economics 
places priority on the satisfaction of human needs and wants through resource 
allocation and utility maximization.  Theology is concerned with the human quest for 
the truth and the overall well-being of the human person.  Unfortunately, the 
interface between the two disciplines remains relatively underexplored.  This thesis 
examines the different worldviews and assumptions on human nature of the two 
disciplines, and proposes a paradigm for the economic market that is both theological 
and practical.  It starts with a rediscovery of the covenant concept underlying the 
historical development of political society through the work of Johannes Althusius.  
The scriptural foundation and theology of the covenant concept are then examined to 
reveal its contents and relevance to economic activities.  Its significance having been 
established, the covenant concept is analyzed in comparison with the contract 
arrangement to derive a theological response to the existing contact-based economic 
market.  This proposal, named the “Two Pillars” paradigm, offers a framework for 
illustrative discussion and interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and 
economics.  It also forms the general basis for further discussion of specific 
economic issues.  I shall start my investigation with a brief review of the interface 
between theology and economics, and a layout of the basis of my proposed paradigm. 
 
1.1  The Need for a Theological Response to Economics 
Economic life affects individuals in far greater ways than ever before in this 
modern era.  Participation in the economic market is an unavoidable part of human 
daily life.  No matter how competent a person is in obtaining goods for one‟s own 
needs and desires, the dependence on other people to serve such needs is undeniable.  
Market transactions occur every minute of the day as an integral part of our daily life.  
Modern markets handle the exchange of goods and services by attaching price values 
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to the objects of exchange.  As such, the economy provides a platform for 
cooperative transactions that allow participants to obtain what they need for daily 
living by means of exchange in monetary terms.  Through the economic order, 
human life is preserved within a mutually interdependent community of exchange.  
At the same time, the economic market formed under this process has priorities and 
inclinations within its own structure and mechanism of exchange.  It contains an 
inclination to exclude intangible but vitally necessary items that can be “valueless” 
yet invaluable to human life.  Examples of these are fresh air, loving care, friendship, 
etc.  Attempts to package “love” into sellable services quickly reduce it to something 
other than genuine love.  This means that participants in the economic market are 
served through the market, while in turn moulded and driven by market priorities and 
the assigned values within market exchanges.  It is therefore up to market 
participants to establish and uphold the human values that are unquantifiable yet 
essential to human life.  Accordingly, the task of economics is not simply to 
minimize scarcity or maximize efficiency, but also to help people make the most out 
of the material gifts of nature by creating conditions and opportunities for 
participants to lead the best possible life in relation and cooperation with one another.  
This objective transcends the satisfaction of material needs and wants, to a concern 
for the total well-being of the human person.  A theological response to economics is 
needed to identify and to offer a balancing framework for healthy economic life.  It 
offers a reflection on human nature, a worldview based on truth, and a genuine 
concern for the overall well-being of each human person and of humankind as a 
whole. 
Relatively little has been done on the interface between the theology of the 
human person and market economics in the past.  Those who attempt to integrate 
theology and economics have attempted to draw from a wide range of resources 
including biblical principles, social ethics or radical theological ideologies.  The 
results have either been piecemeal teachings about economics, or unrealistic radical 
conceptions about the economy.  Few attempt to approach economics from a 
theological point of view that emphasizes both a theological ground and realistic 
application.  The reason for a lack of interdisciplinary work on theology and 
economics is partly due to the complexity of the subject, because such interface 
involves a wide range of factors not only concerning theology and economics, but 
also philosophy, politics, sociology and psychology.  In addition, economics is a 
subject that deals with the material aspects of human life, while theology has 
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traditionally tended to develop in the tradition of spirituality, with less focus on 
earthly means and ends.   Nevertheless, material means and ends shape our daily 
lives and significantly affect human capacity for seeking the spiritual truth.  The 
market structure dictates human relationships and imposes its own set of values and 
priorities to humankind.  Continuous reflection upon these market assertions is 
therefore essential to ensure that the market and its functions serve the overall well-
being of society, within their original boundaries and intended purposes.  In this 
regard, theology has a critically important role. 
Economics has a theological dimension that has not received systematic 
exploration in the past.  Many are alert to its significance, but a proper framework 
and structural approach is yet to be presented.  The methodology that is required to 
build a mutually meaningful interface among economists and theologians needs to be 
investigated.  Since the separation of economics as a science in the late 1800s, 
theologians have been trying to build a bridge between theology and economics from 
the viewpoint of ethics and morality.  Unfortunately, the term “ethics” appears to 
have diminishing significance in this postmodern age.  At the same time, in the mist 
of econometrics and scientific pursuit of the discipline, economists struggle with 
underlying assumptions behind their economic models.  The interface between 
theology and economics offers a valuable bridge for the investigation of human 
nature, beliefs, values and choices as these relate to economic life.  These are issues 
fundamental to human living, affecting the total well-being of the human person.  
Recent criticisms of the market and the reconstruction of what is called a “divine 
economy” appear to mark a renewed theological interest in this interdisciplinary 
subject.  A reconstruction strongly rooted in a theological stance is yet to find its 
appeal to the secular audience to whom its proclamation must be directed.   
 
1.2  The Interface between Theology and Economics 
When responding to the economic situation, early Christian scholars focus on 
the relationship between theology and political economy.  Waterman presents two 
possible views between economics and theology, namely “monistic” and 
“pluralistic”.  Before 1890, the “monistic” view takes theology as preceding all 
subjects, therefore economics as merely a branch of it.  From the 1890 to the 1980s, 
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the “pluralistic” view allots independent status to economics, or scientific knowledge 
in general.
1
  Theologians shift from one extreme where clerics and church assemblies 
meddled with economic issues, to the other extreme where analysis and facts become 
distinct from values and prescriptions of the discipline.  From then on, as economics 
takes on its own course of development, Christian scholars embark on studies of 
selected aspects of the interface between theology and economics.  These may be 
classified into three general areas: (i) Socio-theology – theologians‟ work on social 
economics and ethics; (ii) Economics of Religion – Christian economists‟ attempts to 
align faith and economics; and (iii) Divine Economy or Theological Economics – a 
critical approach towards economics, and a subversive theological reconstruction of 
economics. 
In terms of socio-theology and ethics, Catholic encyclicals play a significant 
role in continuing to address socio-economic issues over the years.  Pope John Paul 
II has issued a number of papers examining how economics related to socio-
theological principles.  The encyclicals most relevant to economic concerns begin 
with Rerum Novarum (1891), and continue to Populorum Progressio (1967) and 
Centesimus Annus (1991), among others.  In 2009, Pope Benedict XVI issued the 
encyclical Caritas In Veritate, with a particular emphasis on the importance of truth 
in our understanding of charity and economics.  Together, these papers put forth the 
Catholic Church‟s social doctrines on economics, addressing issues such as 
unemployment, capital, property rights, distribution and planning.  The Catholic 
Church, in its tradition of responding to social issues, mainly focuses on the socio-
economic aspects of societal matters in relation to economics.
2 
Over the years, numerous articles have been written on the ethical aspects of 
economics, many with good biblical references.  There is no lack of discussion on 
the biblical view of economic issues such as stewardship, poverty, materialism, work, 
                                                 
1
 Anthony Michael C. Waterman, 'Economists on the Relation Between Political Economy and 
Christian Theology: A Preliminary Survey,' International Journal of Social Economics 14 (1987): 46-
68. 
2
 A comprehensive exploration of Catholic Social Teachings on economics is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  However, I will draw upon relevant sections of the encyclicals during my discussion, 
especially on concerns over moral aspects of economics.  In particular, Caritas in Veritate is discussed 
in chapter 6.4.  For discussions of Catholic Social Teachings on economic issues, see Philip Booth, 
ed., Catholic Social Teaching and the Market Economy (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 
2007), 27-43.  This book also contains articles about Catholic Social Teachings on some specific 
economic issues that may be of interest to the reader. 
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etc.  In January 1990, the Oxford Declaration on Christian Faith and Economics was 
issued jointly by over one hundred theologians, economists, ethicists, development 
practitioners, church leaders and business managers from around the world.  The 
declaration consists of basic issues relating to economic life from a biblical 
viewpoint.  Christian reconstructionists, as they are sometimes called, have sought to 
fashion a biblical economic epistemology through matters such as theonomy, welfare, 
debts and the Jubilee law.
3
 
In terms of early theological literature, the work and approach of John Calvin 
on ethics are often quoted as references in response to economic situations.  The 
Reformation takes place at a time of inflation in the economy.  While Luther goes 
back to a mediaeval economic order, Calvin attempts to come to terms with the 
realities of economic life.  However, the dynamic changing context across time gives 
rise to new economic situations and issues in the modern world.  The “to be known” 
remains in our understanding of scriptural norms, and the unfolding of world events 
calls for continuous enquiry into God‟s purpose in creation.  Rather than a single, 
ideal normative prescription, the Word of God invites us to enter the world in 
continuous renewal and reflection in discerning the truth.  This discernment applies 
to the economic function, reasons behind its function, and its consequences.
4
  
Without such continuous reflections, economic enquiry remains incomplete.  
From economists‟ point of view, social and ethical concerns have also been 
raised.  For example, Richardson calls for awareness in preventing economics to 
develop as a purely technical discipline.  In particular, he raises concerns over a 
decline in integrity, a narrowing of priorities, and an emasculation of method.
5
  
Besides biblical approaches, much of the socio-economic discussions have 
historically centred upon debates about economic systems such as capitalism and 
socialism.  Although there appears to be a consensus over a modest defence of 
capitalism especially with the decline of socialism in the modern world, it has also 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed evaluation on the views of Christian Reconstructionists, see Edd S. Nell, 'A Reformed 
Approach to Economics: Christian Reconstructionism,' Journal of the Association of Christian 
Economists (1993): 6-20. 
4
 As Sauer concludes, Christian ethics yield knowledge about economics on the “transcendent pole of 
economic enquiry”.  For a discussion on the ethical contribution of theology to economics, see
 
James 
B. Sauer, 'Christian Faith, Economy, and Economics: What Do Christian Ethics Contribute to 
Understanding Economies?,' Journal of the Association of Christian Economists 42 (2003): 17-25. 
5
 J. David Richardson, 'Frontiers in Economics and Christian Scholarship,' Christian Scholar's Review 
17, no. 4 (1988): 1-20. 
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been pointed out that democratic capitalism does not represent the kingdom of God 




In 2005, the Association of Christian Economists gathered for a symposium 
on “Economics of Religion”.  Although the interface between religion and 
economics is seen as equally important and relevant to the study of economics, the 
task on hand takes on a different angle in the hands of the economists.  Economics of 
religion is seen to be distinct from religious economics.  Religious economics is 
social and economic reaction from the perspective of the sacred truth.  Economics of 
religion concerns religion and its consequences from social and economic 
perspectives.
7
  The latter approach applies economics and scientific analysis to the 
study of religion, in order to gain an understanding of economics through an 
investigation of the belief system.  In 1997 the Association of Christian Economists 
published a special issue of the Journal of the Association of Christian Economists.  
The issue contains a comprehensive bibliography on Christianity and Economics 
largely from the viewpoint of Christian economists.
8
  
Besides general and methodological concerns, Christian economists have 
written from a Christian perspective on the economic systems, micro and 
macroeconomics, industrial organization, labour, capital, land, poverty, welfare, 
household, health, education, international economics and economic growth.  A 
couple of the publications have been extensive in discussing major economic sub-
topics.  Hay‟s book Economics Today: A Christian Critique covers many area in 
terms of what Christianity has to say about economics.
9
  Tiemstra‟s work is another 
comprehensive survey of the economic fields from a Reformed Christian viewpoint. 
These studies emphasize the biblical basis of doing economics, particularly on 
                                                 
6
 John P. Tiemstra, 'Christianity and Economics: A Review of the Recent Literature,' Christian 
Scholar's Review 22 (1993): 227-47. 
7
 Laurence R. Iannaccone, 'Economics of Religion: Debating the Costs and Benefits of a New Field,' 
The Economics of Religion: A Symposium (2005): 1-9. 
8
 This publication aims to assist Christian economists to explore economic approaches and issues from 
a Christian point of view.  Accordingly, the bibliography is listed by 16 economic topics including 
microeconomic theory, macroeconomics, industrial organization, labour, land and natural resources, 
economic growth, etc.  See Andy Hartropp, 'Christianity and Economics: An Annotated Bibliography 
by Andy Hartropp ' Journal of the Association of Christian Economists special issue (December 
1997): 1-36. 
9
 Donald A. Hay, Economics Today: A Christian Critique (Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 
2001), 1-340. 
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concepts of stewardship, failure of the scientific methodology, nature of human 
interactions, families and organizations.
10
  The traditional approaches by theologians 
and Christian economists tend to focus on the ethical aspects of economics and 
human life.  While they present valuable insights and contributions to the 




In recent years, some theologians begin to embark on a critique of modern 
economics and propose a subversive reconstruction of the economy.  These 
approaches range from metaphorical assertions of the divine economy, to a radical 
critique and reconstruction of the economy.  Loy finds economics to be the most 
influential of all social sciences in modern times, which has come to fulfil a religious 
function for men.  In particular, the market has become “a vicious cycle of ever-
increasing production and consumption by pretending to offer a secular salvation”.
12
  
Hill argued that Adam Smith's economics is inherently theological and dependent on 
the notion of God's action in nature.
13
  In 2001, Nelson‟s book Economics as 
Religion: From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond finds modern economics “the 
most powerful set of religious beliefs of the modern era”.
14
  Functionally, economics 
is found to dominate modern culture as it was during the early days of Christianity.  
                                                 
10
 John P. Tiemstra, ed., Reforming Economics: Calvinist Studies on Methods and Institutions (New 
York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 1-344. 
11
 This is by no means an exhaustive list of materials in this interdisciplinary area.  For example, Latin 
American economists and theologians including Franz Hinkelammert, Hugo Assmann and Jung Mo 
Sung have published on this subject in Portuguese and German.  See Joerg Rieger, No Rising Tide: 
Theology, Economics and the Future (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 5. 
12
 Loy traces the development of the market as a religion that increasingly penetrates and transforms 
human life by commodifying the world.  He asserts that the market takes on a religious dimension by 
attempting to satisfy our spiritual needs through our secular obsessions.  This leads to environmental 
catastrophe and social deterioration.  The solution needs to come from a struggle against the false 
market religion and a redirection of spiritual concerns towards religious truth.  See David R. Loy, 'The 
Religion of the Market,' Journal of the American Academy of Religion 65 (1997): 275-90. 
13
 Hill‟s work contains a good overview of the hidden theology behind Adam Smith‟s work.  Her 
article contains evaluations of Adam Smith‟s thoughts from the viewpoints of a natural theology, a 
“scientific” religion, a teleology, a psychology, and an evolutionary system.  See Lisa Hill, 'The 
Hidden Theology of Adam Smith,' The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 8 
(2001): 1-29. 
14
 Nelson‟s work presents a comprehensive view of the gradual penetration and domination of 
economics in the development of modern culture.  See  Robert H. Nelson, Economics as Religion: 
From Samuelson to Chicago and Beyond (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 
xxv; and Robert H. Nelson, 'What is "Economic Theology"?,' (paper presented at the Second Abraham 
Kuyper Consultation on "Theology and Economic Life: Exploring Hidden Links" Princeton 
Theological Seminary, Princeton, New Jersey, March 22, 2003). 
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Economic progress is seen to be a new form of secular religion which has been 
developing since the early days when social scientists made their way from the 
Protestant ministry to economics and other related professions. 
Following this line of critique, some theologians formulate theological 
reconstructions of economics.  Oslington calls for a “theological economics” by 
which theologians discuss theology implicit in contemporary economics.  He 
advocates that the classical theological heritage commends itself and finds its full 
meaning in relation to economics.
15
  Along these lines comes Milbank with the 
argument for a radical orthodoxy, positioning theology as a meta-discourse in 
postmodern terms.  Taking the radical orthodoxy approach, Long published the 
Divine Economy that traces three strategies for theology to respond to economic 
questions.  These include the early tradition of respecting economics as an 
independent science, a later tradition of social-theological approach, and a third 
tradition that draws on ancient understanding of a functional economy.  Long argues 
for the latter approach in asserting theology as the essential participant in 
economics.
16
  This view requires theology to assert and inform economic debates.  
The concept of divine economy is further explored by Grau in a more recent 
publication, Of Divine Economy: Refinancing Redemption.  Using the theological 
doctrine of redemption as a metaphor, economic subtexts of Christian tradition and 
their formation by society‟s economic constructions are examined.  Grau points out 
that the proponents of liberation theology and radical orthodoxy identify neoclassical 
economics as a problematic outgrowth of modernity.  Accordingly, her work 
attempts to map a “third space” – a theology of counter-economy, between 
neoclassical economics and theological discourse.
 17
  While these critiques of the 
economy are theologically based and helpful reflections, they tend to lack realistic 
applicability.  They present assertions and ideologies that are considered a kind of 
“theological imperialism”, especially to the non-believing community that forms a 
significant part of society and therefore a major group of economic participants that 
any theological paradigm must take account of. 
                                                 
15
 Oslington argues that a separation of theology and economics is neither desirable nor possible.  He 
sees theology as taking an implicit place in modern economics, and that it is necessary for orthodox 
Christian teachings to take primacy in economics.  See Paul Oslington, 'A Theological Economics,' 
International Journal of Social Economics 27 (2000): 32-44. 
16
 D. Stephen Long, Divine Economy: Theology and the Market (London: Routledge, 2000), 1-336. 
17
 Marion Grau, Of Divine Economy: Refinancing Redemption (New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 1-255. 
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Another theological alternative to the economic system that has received 
much attention is Kathryn Tanner‟s Economy of Grace.  Tanner attempts to take up a 
semantic linkage between money and grace within the economic structure.  The 
economy of grace differs radically from the competitiveness and self-interest of the 
market economy.  Under the grace of unconditional giving, God‟s gifts to humankind 
lay the foundation of the theological economy on earth.  Tanner lays out the 
theological economy of grace by taking God as an economic concept.  Accordingly, 
God‟s free giving and lack of needs are taken as the basis for economic endeavours.  
God‟s giving as Creator is universal and ever-sufficient.  As a result, competition is 
unnecessary and we can always give freely out of our own “fullness”.
18
  
Unfortunately, how this fullness and lack of need can be achieved by any given 
individual is unclear in Tanner‟s model.  In principle, God is abundance and grants 
sufficiently everything for everyone‟s needs.  Therefore we can give freely all the 
time.  In reality, when one is faced with poverty and hunger, this principle appears to 
lack practicality.  In fact, the principle of the creation and providential order appears 
to be a transcendent and overriding provision, not to be taken as a practical tool, but 
a collective provision that should be worked out collectively by all humankind.  This 
means that God does create and provide, but human stewardship and effort to strive 
against sinful self-interest for equality and solidarity are necessary to preserve the 
original purpose of creation.  Taking such theological concepts and applying them 
directly to individual acts of giving would reduce the underlying principle to a level 
deceptive of its original meaning.  Consequently, one ends up with practical 
suggestions that appear unrealistic in given circumstances.  Tanner‟s economy of 
grace presents a radically different proposal based on principles that are entirely in 
opposition to various assumptions of current economics.  Unconditional giving runs 
against self-interest, and non-competition against competition for profits.  In her 
opinion, applying minor changes to the existing system appear to be a compromise 
more than transformation because the resulting effect is bound to fall short of the 
radical ideal proposed.
19
  I shall argue in chapter 3 that the theological notion for an 
                                                 
18
 Kathryn Tanner, Economy of Grace (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 1-158. 
19
 Weingartner finds Tanner‟s work engaging because she is not calling for a new economic system 
but a transformation of the existing one.  See Robert J. Weingartner, review of Economy of Grace, by 
Kathryn Tanner, Missiology, 34 (2006): 262-4.  Unfortunately, this argument is self-conflicting in 
itself because Tanner‟s economy of grace challenges the very fundamental structure and monetary 
exchange mechanism in the modern market.  The only possibility for realizing the gifting notion 
asserted by the economy of grace is a subversive abandoning of the exchange concept and 
transformation of the monetary notion as the basis of value measurement. 
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economy of sharing and grace based on gifting is meaningful in terms of divine truth, 
but such an ideal economy can only be realized in the end of time when all creation 
is renewed and restored to perfection in the kingdom of God. 
 
1.3  Theological Concepts as Heuristic Tools for Economic Life 
Along the continuing quest for a theological response to economic life, 
Meeks‟ God the Economist is taken by some theologians as the best work to appear 
in many years on the theological end of the chain of knowledge about economic 
life.
20
  Meeks employs oikonomia as a metaphor for the household, of the divine 
agency within creation.  This reconstruction then stands in critical dialogue with 
neoclassical economics, pushing towards a broader scope of the term “economy”.   
He thinks that the problem with the market is that God has been taken out of the 
economics arena, such that the plenipotent being became functionalistic and then 
nihilistic.  The concepts of God as the promiser and covenanter no longer reside in 
daily economic life.   To reintroduce the concept, Meeks presents God in the 
metaphor of the economist with respect to His work as the Torah keeper, as the 
Creator, of creating human persons in His image, and of the resurrection.
21
  God‟s 
sovereignty over His household is also revealed in the death and resurrection of Jesus.  
Scarcity should not be an assumption of God‟s household because of the freedom 
and dominance over the means to livelihood by the householder.  Accordingly, 
Meeks calls for a broader meaning of property and property rights to include all 
those who are called to be God‟s economist and disciple.
 
 
 Meeks sees work as a central theological issue because of the relationships of 
authority and subordination that it contains.  This falls into his concern of domination 
and exploitation within human relationships.  He points out that work should not be 
degraded to suffering or valued as the ordering and self-justification of life.  Instead, 
it is the revelation of one‟s inner self, in parallel to God‟s work and His rest.  God 
redeems the household from dehumanizing work through redemption from the power 
of death and sin.  Work is therefore a right that leads to personal dignity and 
                                                 
20
 J. Philip Wogaman, review of God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy, 
Theology Today, 47 (1990): 201-2. 
21
 M. Douglas Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1989), 83-92. 
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inclusion in the community, rather than a commodity to be defined by efficiency.  It 
serves the communal needs of the person so that one may belong to, share in and 
contribute to the community.  Similarly, human needs are distorted by sin and require 
the realization of divine sovereignty and divine infinity to set us free.  Meeks asserts 
that God is willing to provide for everyone.  Although shortages are not illusions, 
they are attributable to human insatiability rather than the economists‟ definition of 




Meeks‟ work offers some insightful metaphors through the use of theological 
concepts as heuristic tools.  Unfortunately, his discussion lacks a workable 
framework through which Christians may respond to contemporary economic 
principles and powers.  The political democracy that Meeks affirms often leads to 
economic distortions in his theological analysis.  Meeks criticizes a reliance on 
market forces as mechanistic and unintended.  This is indeed the case but the market 
has a lot more to offer than Meeks presents.  Although the market is built on free 
choice and individual interests, it is also a combination of what each individual 
jointly makes out to be.  While Meeks is correct in pointing out that freedom is not 
merely free choice, this argument needs to be further explored.
23
 
 Meeks finds vast similarities between the economic languages of debt, trust, 
fiduciary, redemption, confidence, etc., with the biblical uses of the same words.  He 
therefore goes on to correlate God and economy through the term oikos.
24
  However, 
such rhetorical uses of the words do not necessarily support a correlation between the 
actual issues to hand.  Whether the household of God represents the meaning of the 
economy willed by God on earth is yet to be argued.  In addition, Meeks finds that 
the economy of the church has been corrupted by contemporary market logic such 
that justice and stewardship have been set aside.  While it is true that Christians are 
to seek the realization of the kingdom of God “on earth as it is in heaven”, does this 
mean that favourable circumstances must exist for exhibition of such justice and 
stewardship on earth?  Biblical teachings do not appear to presuppose a “workable” 
environment.  Rather, the church is to stand against the tides of the secular waves to 
                                                 
22
 Ibid., 127-55. 
23
 The concept of freedom as a covenant characteristic and how it relates to economic life are 
discussed in chapter 3.4. 
24
 Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy, 33-7. 
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witness its justice and stewardship for Christ.  While market logic may be distorted 
and deficient in itself, it does not claim to exhibit justice in distribution, or to act as a 
way of organizing human behaviour.  The market‟s formation is based upon natural 
exhibition of human behaviour and circumstance, not vice versa.  To this end, Meeks‟ 
understanding of the market requires some modification.   
Metaphors and theological concepts are helpful in illustrating theological 
truth, but the concepts deployed need to be relevant and practicable for economic life.   
To derive a theological response to economic relationships, it is necessary to start by 
questioning the market presuppositions concerning human nature and the way human 
relationships are structured and driven in the market.  This can then be compared and 
contrasted with the theological stance on human nature and relationships.  My 
findings reveal the significance of the covenant way of living that the believing 
community has long held.  The significance of the covenant lies in its relevant 
application not only as a theory or theology, but as a practical reality of relational 
order and fundamental structure for society and human life.  It is not merely a 
theological metaphor but a relational concept and way of life deeply rooted in 
scriptural narratives.  The covenant concept has been the basic paradigm for 
relationships and community life since the times of the Old Testament.  It embraces 
the morality, responsibility and commitment to economic order that have been 
eroded as the market economy develops.  Covenant encompasses sacred promise, 
oath, contract, bond or troth.  The richness and universality of the covenant concept 
are embedded in the special disclosures of God – “in the covenant with Moses that 
forms Israel, in the new covenant in Jesus Christ that forms the church, and in those 
wonderful and rare friendships, marriages, and work teams or voluntary associations 
we sometimes experience”.
25
  As Stackhouse points out, “it was in the very nature of 
God, and thus of those made in the image of God, to be covenantal”.
26
 
 The covenant as a theological concept has been subject to a number of 
explorations from different angles throughout theological scholarship.  It has formed 
the basis of biblical studies, theological frameworks, as well as sociological concerns.  
In particular, Weir identifies the distinction between the covenant concept, covenant 
theology and federal theology.  The covenant concept itself is a broad series of 
                                                 
25
 Max L. Stackhouse, Covenant and Commitments: Faith, Family, and Economic Life (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 145. 
26
 Ibid., 150. 
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theological thoughts based on scriptural narratives.  This concept is used as a 
framework to derive a system of theology that is known as covenant theology.  
Federal theology places the covenant at the core of an entire theological system 
starting from a prelapsarian covenant with the first Adam, to the postlapsarian 
covenant with the second Adam Jesus Christ.
27
  In Europe, federal theology was 
developed in the sixteenth century by Reformed Protestant theologians who 
struggled for church reformation and political liberty.
28
  They see the biblical 
covenant concept not only as a metaphor but as a means of shaping reality.  
Accordingly, they applied the federal or covenantal principle to political society, 
leading to the gradual development of a federal political structure and the various 
types of modern federalism. 
In this thesis, I identify the covenant as a concept that reveals the intended 
way of human community life and relational order embedded in the creation and 
providence of God.  It is God‟s chosen way of relating with Israel, later on renewed 
through the relational order established by the redemptive work of Christ.  As such, it 
is also the authentic way of relating among human persons, and serves as the 
foundation of human relationships in community and the wider society.  The 
covenant is therefore applied in this thesis as an ethical-practical concept, rather than 
in the form of a covenant theology or a doctrinal concern.  The covenant concept is 
revealed through scriptural narratives, explored through covenant or federal theology, 
grounded within the doctrine of creation, and part of a Christian theological 
worldview.  Theology has much to contribute in terms of the appropriate definition, 
characteristics, content and application of the covenant concept.  The covenant 
concept itself is not limited to a theology or a particular doctrine.  It is a fundamental 
way of being that is contained in a theological anthropology about authentic human 
relationships.  Accordingly, covenant characteristics must be identified and enacted 
in human life and economic activities for the benefit of human well-being.  These 
characteristics are inherent in the goodness of human persons since their creation by 
                                                 
27
 David A. Weir, The Origins of the Federal Theology in Sixteenth-Century Reformation Thought 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 3. 
28
 In particular, federal theology was taught and developed further by Johannes Althusius and his 
colleagues during the sixteenth century at the University of Herborn into a system of social-federal 
covenant that became the foundation of common sovereignty and governance.  See Thomas O. 
Hueglin, Early Modern Concepts for a Late Modern World: Althusius on Community and Federalism 
(Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999), 57-8.  Chapter 2 of this thesis examines the 
development and application of the covenant concept to society in further details. 
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the Divine.  In analysing the covenant concept, comparing it to the modern contract-
based market arrangements, and exploring the place of covenantal elements in 
economic activities, we rediscover the route to a well-balanced economic market for 
the total well-being of the whole person. 
 A number of scholars have applied the covenant concept to various spheres of 
human life.  Allen puts it in a straight forward manner.  He sees covenantal 
relationships to involve a sense of faith and belonging with respect to a moral 
community.  Within this moral community, each person is uniquely valuable while at 
the same time participates by entrusting oneself to the others.  Accordingly, 
participants in the covenant community are mutually responsible to each other.
29
  
Sacks describes the act of covenant as one requiring both parties to respect each 
other‟s integrity as free agents.  The key element here is not power or history, but a 
verbal declaration that is mutually binding.  Covenant binds the parties involved 
under an open-ended bond of mutuality and loyalty.
30
  Horton identifies the specific 
praxis throughout redemptive history of the covenant as the culture of the people of 
God.  The believing community incorporates the covenant as part of its own cultic 
culture, through which it interprets the secular world.
31
  Although the covenant 
concept has been widely discussed as a relational concept and in the form of 
covenant or federal theology, it has not been examined in the context of a 
comprehensive approach to economic life.  This thesis fulfils this important task 
through an appropriate deployment of the covenant concept in a comprehensive 
paradigm that offers a universal framework to economic life.  As the divine way of 
relational order, the covenantal economic life extends into the end of time, when the 
people of God shall be redeemed and reside in common allegiance to the Creator 
within the economy or household of the Triune God.  It is the mission of the 
believing community to articulate and practise this covenantal way so that economic 
life can be humanized and restored to its original truth intended by the Creator. 
                                                 
29
 Allen‟s application of the covenant concept emphasizes the moral and relational aspects of 
community life.  See Joseph L. Allen, Love and Conflict: A Covenantal Model of Christian Ethics 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1984), 17. 
30
 As a Jewish Rabbi, Sacks advocates the covenant concept as a fundamental basis of societal, 
political and human living.  See Jonathan Sacks, The Home We Build Together: Recreating Society 
(London: Continuum, 2007), 109. 
31
 Horton extends the covenant concept to examine its basis and implications in salvation, redemption 
and eschatology.  See Michael S. Horton, Covenant and Eschatology: The Divine Drama (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 13. 
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1.4  Towards a Theological Paradigm for the Market 
Humanization of life is the rediscovery and enactment of the truth and 
goodness within human nature that is embedded in creation.  Such truth and 
goodness reside in the authenticity of humankind as originally created by God in its 
perfect form.  In the beginning God sees “goodness” (bAj) in His creation, where all 
things created are pleasing to His eyes.  Human sin leads to a dehumanization of 
human life, causing distortion and distress to the original intention of creation.  A 
theology of economics neither stops at a theological reflection on economics, nor is it 
merely a social ethical view of economics.  It offers a theological worldview that 
starts from truth and authenticity, deriving a framework for examining the economic 
activities that make up a vital part of human life.  It is a public theology that responds 
to contemporary economic situations, calling for reflective examinations and a return 
to the truth and goodness of creation.  The knowledge of God and divine acts shape 
not only the morality of Christian life, but offer universal truths that are highly 
relevant to secular life.  The God of creation sets no boundaries between secular and 
spiritual as the Creator embraces and upholds the whole cosmos.  In the economic 
arena, material needs and desires cannot be separated from spiritual needs and the 
quest for authenticity in human living.  These include the need for relationship with 
others from the level of intimacy to casual social encounters.  In this regard, a person 
acts and in turn reacts in association with others.  The economic market is a platform 
for exchange relationships and cooperative measures.  As economic agents 
participate and act within the market, market norms are formed within the boundaries 
of contractual arrangements.  These norms, together with the underlying assumptions 
of the market, in turn shape and steer the participants within it. 
In this study, I derive a theological response to the market economy by 
examining the covenant concept in contrast and comparison with the contract 
arrangement that makes up economic market exchanges.  Since society and 
economic activities have undergone drastic changes throughout history, I shall focus 
on the modern context rather than on the alternative forms of economic structures in 
the past.  While I draw upon certain historical roots in discussing the development of 
concepts and formation of the modern economic order, my primary concern is to 
formulate a workable and relevant economic paradigm for the modern market.  
Accordingly, detailed historical explorations and study of alternative forms of 
economic structures are beyond the scope of this thesis.  The thesis explores the 
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following questions:  What are the foundation and assumptions of the modern 
economic market?  What do theological insights offer in terms of responding to the 
need for a market that promotes the well-being of the whole person?  How does the 
covenant concept contribute to and interact with the contract in the modern contract-
based market?  I argue for a Two Pillars paradigm asserting that both contract and 
covenant concepts are essential to a harmonious functioning of the economy on earth.  
A purely contract-based market deteriorates to an egocentric individualism while a 
completely covenantal society resides in eschatological hope.  The two concepts 
need to act and interact in complementary ways with each other to uphold a well-
balanced economic market.  Accordingly, I define and apply the concepts of 
covenant and contract within a theological paradigm in response to the economic 
market in a relevant and realistic way. 
This thesis is interdisciplinary in scope but primarily theological in nature.  It 
affirms the importance of the discipline of economics while at the same time presents 
theological truth and insights concerning the unquantifiable, human characteristics 
that are easily overlooked in economic analysis.  Accordingly, this study is directed 
towards an audience from the disciplines of both theology and economics, as well as 
the wider public interested and participating in economic activities.  Theology offers 
a view of human nature that reminds humankind of the relational nature of human 
activities as well as the distorted sinfulness of human desires.  It also offers a 
worldview based on creation that responds to the economic concerns of the modern 
times.  Rather than taking the traditional socio-ethical approach that offers a 
narrower response to particular economic issues or principles, I work towards a more 
fundamental and comprehensive framework.  At the same time, I avoid the 
overwhelming assertions of a subversive theological reconstruction that tends to 
remain an ideology.   
This thesis is divided into two parts.  Part I starts the formulation of a 
theological response to the economic market by identifying the covenant concept as 
the foundation of society and the economic order.  Its goal is to derive a theological 
concept that is both relevant and practical to economic activities.  Starting from a 
historical study on the development of the polity, the theological covenant is 
identified as the underlying concept for the development of federalism.  Chapter 2 
studies the covenant concept as the basis of early federalism through the work of 
Johannes Althusius.  It shows the historical significance of the covenant concept in 
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the development of political society and the economic order, and argues for a 
rediscovery of covenant roots, awareness, understanding and enactment in the 
modern market.  Chapter 3 follows with a discussion on the significance of human 
nature on economic activities, and the place of the covenant concept as an essential 
part of human nature under the doctrine of creation.  It introduces the covenant as a 
concept deeply rooted in scriptural narratives and highly relevant to relational, 
societal and economic order.  The result is a call for the need to rediscover covenant 
characteristics in society, and to find a way for covenant characteristics to penetrate 
the existing economic market. 
 Part II of this thesis presents and illustrates the Two Pillars paradigm that 
results from the theological formulation in Part I.  The covenant concept is 
rediscovered and reintroduced in the modern market as an essential pillar that 
upholds economic life in a complementary way to the contractual arrangement.  
Chapter 4 presents the Two Pillars paradigm as a realistic alternative for a paradigm 
shift of the economic market.  It contains a conceptual analysis of the contract and 
covenant concepts.  The Two Pillars paradigm is then presented in respect of its 
impact on productivity and possessions in the market.  To demonstrate the Two 
Pillars paradigm and the interaction between covenant and contract within this 
framework, chapter 5 examines its application to long-term employment 
arrangements.  This specific illustration further clarifies the interaction and 
complementary nature of covenant and contract when applied simultaneously to 
economic arrangements.  Chapter 6 then places the Two Pillars paradigm in dialogue 
with the work of various economists.  It identifies the boundaries and limitations of 
market models, and points towards continuous reflection and renewal of the 
underlying motif and assumptions of economic life. 
Chapter 7 contains a final summary of my findings and conclusion.  For the 
believing community, this thesis rediscovers the significance of the covenant as a 
scriptural and theological resource relevant to economic and community life.  It 
reiterates the importance of covenant awareness and shows how covenantal living 
can be practicable and enacted in the contract-based modern market.  For the non-
believing community, it offers “covenant” as a distinct and practicable theological 
concept that carries rich insights relevant to economic life.  It contains an apologetic 
call for the rediscovery of and reflection upon the essential covenant characteristics 
that must interact with the contractual arrangements for the well-being of the whole 
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person.  To retain a proper focus for this study, the discussion of political order and 
civil society is limited to that of the application of the covenant, with an intention of 
identifying the implications related to a covenantal economic order.  Discussion of 
the contract and its development is limited to those aspects that are relevant to 
development of the economic market.  Areas relating to the development of political 
order such as the social contract, civil society, political contractual arrangements, or 
development of later forms of federalism, are beyond the scope of this study. 
This thesis takes an ethical-practical approach.
32
  It involves exploring 
application of the covenant concept to the economic order in critique of the contract-
based market order.  A conceptual analysis of the covenant concept in comparison 
and contrast to the contractual approach will be included to derive the Two Pillars 
paradigm that emphasizes the importance of simultaneously applying covenant and 
contract to economic activities.  I will interact with the work of economists Adam 
Smith, Amartya Sen, Gary Becker and others; as well as theologians Johannes 
Althusius, Karl Barth, Herman Bavinck, Jürgen Moltmann and others.  For a 
discussion of the covenant concept and its application to economic life, I will engage 
with the work of Jonathan Sacks, Max Stackhouse, Eric Mount, among others.  I will 
also draw upon the work of legal scholars and sociologists.  The philosopher and 
economist Smith is selected for his pioneering role in economics, and for a study of 
his moral philosophy that serves as presupposition to the Smithian economic system 
and modern day economics.  Amartya and Becker are Nobel Prize Winners in 
economics with rather different views and approaches towards the market.  Althusius 
is selected for his application of the covenant concept to a system of political and 
economic order.  A specific example of the practical insights presented using the 
Two Pillars theological framework will be demonstrated through interaction with the 
modern economic concept of relational contracts as applied to long-term 
employment situations. 
 My argument for a theologically based ethical-practical paradigm to 
economic order is grounded upon a conviction in the doctrine of creation.  
Exploration of the economic order must originate from creation because of its 
relational nature, and the fundamental cosmic nature of its material content.  The 
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 This approach is described in Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1: Prolegomena (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003), 536.  It is discussed in further details in chapter 2.1 of this thesis. 
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existence of humankind depends on the cosmic creation in the absolute sense.  One 
cannot survive in the world without this cosmic creation.  This is also the reason why 
economics appears as a paradoxical problem that is both unimportant to spiritual 
reflections yet highly significant to human concerns.  Our ontological existence 
depends upon it.  Its significance is captured in the assertion that creation “is an 
incontestable and unshakeable sign of the real grace of God addressed to him that the 
cosmos is a home prepared to satisfy his own and his fellow-creatures‟ needs, to 
nourish him and them, and in this way, when existence has been given to them, to 
assure their continuation as the presupposition of the activity assigned to them”.
33
  
Therefore creation is a divine blessing freely given to humankind, granting the 
possibility for us to become God‟s covenant partners.   
Applying the covenant idea to society and polity is not a new idea, but the use 
of the covenant concept in deriving a comprehensive market paradigm has not been 
fully explored in the past.  As I shall demonstrate in chapter 2, the covenant concept 
serves as the foundation in the early formulation of the federal political structure.  
The economic structure is part of this political order in society.  Being a fundamental 
element of relational order, the covenant does not stop at a structural level.  Covenant 
characteristics need to penetrate every aspect of societal living to cultivate the norms 
necessary for authentic human living.  This authenticity resides in the original 
intention of creation by the divine Creator.  Accordingly, a detailed exploration of 
the covenant in respect of economic relationship is vital for our understanding of the 
missing authenticity in modern economic life.  The use of the covenant concept in 
parallel with the contractual basis of the modern market reveals a new paradigm that 
contributes to our understanding of what the economic market should be and how a 
well-balanced market can be formulated.  The following chapter starts my 
formulation of a theological response to the modern economic market from the 
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Chapter 2 
Rediscovering the Covenant in Society and the Economic Order:  
The Covenantal Federalism of Johannes Althusius 
 
 This chapter studies the historical roots of political society and rediscovers 
the significance of covenant as a fundamental concept underlying the development of 
society and as the basis of federalism.  Economic activities denote the cooperation 
and interaction of individuals in society to satisfy the material needs and wants of 
each other.  In the modern era, this is done primarily through increasingly global and 
complex markets that govern the economic order.  Such economic order in turn falls 
under the political society that determines and governs it.  Accordingly, the structural 
foundation of the polity lays the context and fundamentals for the political and 
economic activities within it.   
The work of seventeenth-century Reformed theologian and philosopher 
Johannes Althusius is selected for this study because he pioneered the application of 
covenant and federal theology to the development of the polity.  To the seventeenth-
century theologians, theology is not merely an intellectual pursuit but a reality that 
penetrates all aspects of human life.  The covenantal way of relating is thus taken as 
a reality that offers insights into the actual formation of society and political structure.  
Althusius‟ work shows that the economic order is embedded within a universal, 
covenantal polity that has become the foundation of federalism.  Accordingly, the 
covenant concept is rediscovered as a relevant, practicable and essential notion 
known to underlie the formation of the Western society.  This covenantal polity 
becomes the context of the economic activities within it.  The place of the economic 
order in Althusius‟ polity is examined through a comparison of the covenant concept 
with notions of contractual arrangements developing around his time.  The result is a 
rediscovery of the covenant concept as a significant theological notion essential for 
proper functioning of the economic order. 
 
2.1  An Ethical-Practical Approach to Covenant Theology 
In modern society, the contractual structure is backed up by law, enforced 
through the legal system, and clarified in written documentation.  The contract is 
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used daily in written and unwritten forms as a readily understood means of 
transactional exchange.  In contrast, the covenant that remains in the background or 
as an underlying subconscious assumption is not easily identifiable.  Where it is 
considered, its origin and meaning can easily be distorted or rendered similar to that 
of the contract.  This lack of conscious awareness and enactment of the covenant 
concepts tilts the balance of the economic market towards an unhealthy over-reliance 
on the contract.  Examining the application of the covenant concept and its 
implications for economic order helps to rediscover and clarify the meaning and 
reality of the covenant concept in society.  The development of covenant theology in 
history brought about a strand of covenant theology known as federal theology, 
which in turn developed into fundamental notions of federalism for a covenant-based 
polity. 
 The argument in this thesis follows the ethical-practical theological approach 
identified by reformed theologian Herman Bavinck.
1
  It is developed based on the 
emphasis of ethical self-assertion.  Because of the universal nature of economic 
relationships, the theological response to economic order must be able to speak to 
both believers and non-believers.  It is the formulation of a public theology that 
speaks to authentic human nature as well as the needs and desires of the human 
person.  The ethical-practical method does not start with the Christian doctrine or 
historical fact, but a religious-ethical power within the human heart and conscience.  
It leaves space for diversity in the process and decision of religious inclinations, but 
demands from human persons an antecedent moral state, a capacity for the good, and 
the need for redemption.   This approach does not take theology as a state of the 
subject to be justified to the human intellect or to be analyzed, but as “an objective 
historical power corresponding to the moral needs of human beings and finds its 
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 Bavinck asserts that human persons live before philosophizing.  The way that human persons 
connect to the world and each other affect their capacity to receive the truth as revealed to them.  
Accordingly, he identifies four groups of theological approaches during the development of 
theological methods from an apologetic point of view.  These are historical-apologetic, speculative, 
religious-empirical, and ethical-psychological.  The historical-apologetic approach sought historical 
proofs for the truth of revelation.  Examples include natural theology, the history-of-religion 
movement, scientific theology and the historical-critical method.  The speculative approach, such as 
the mediating theology of Schleiermacher, emphasizes the dominance and autonomy of the subject.  
The religious-empirical approach infers religious content from experience and epistemology.  The 
ethical-psychological approach accents ethical self-assertion with a religious-ethical power addressed 
to the human conscience.  Within this last group of approaches, the ethical-practical method sees 
Christianity as a spiritual and moral religion focusing on redemption and the kingdom of God.  See 
Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, vol. 1: Prolegomena, 497-559. 
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proof and justification in those needs”.
2
  Rediscovery of federal and covenantal 
origins for the polity represents a rediscovery of the objective historical intentions for 
the covenant to serve as an essential foundation of society and the economic order. 
 Historically, covenant theology has taken covenant as the core organizing 
theme of Christian theology.  In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, covenant 
(foedus) developed as a core dogmatic concept in federal theology by Ulrich Zwingli.  
From the middle of the sixteenth century, views of the covenant as an alliance with 
God began to emerge.  Theologians distinguished between the covenant of works 
(foedus operum) or covenant of nature (foedus naturae) before the Fall, and the 
covenant of grace (foedus gratiae) in Christ.  In the Summa doctrinae de foedere et 
testamento Dei by federal theologian Johannes Cocceius, the covenant is identified 
with the nature of God himself, while the covenant of grace refers to the eternal 
redemption through the Son in the Father.  Salvation history is therefore considered 
to be characterized by God‟s act in the covenant of works and grace.  During that 
time, controversial discussions continued around Cocceius‟ approach and John 
Calvin‟s doctrine of predestination.
3
  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
debates among Reformed theologians have increasingly showed that this segregation 
of the covenant into works and grace is problematic.
4
  Because of the richness and 
variations in application of the covenant concept to different relationships and 
contexts, attempts to use the covenant as a core anchor for a system of dogmatic 
theology give rise to many controversial debates concerning double covenants and 
predestination.  While such discussions contribute to theological understanding, they 
attenuate the scope of covenant theology by only insisting on its place as a doctrinal 
concern.  Covenant theology is better reconceived as involving both the doctrinal 
relationship between God and humankind, as well as the relational order of societal 
living among human persons.  Its application to economic order is an ethical-
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4
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practical concern beyond doctrinal implications that capitalizes upon the intended 
covenantal way of life prescribed in the order of creation. 
Every theological method has its own shortcomings.  The ethical-practical 
approach faces drawbacks when used apologetically.
5
  It presupposes the 
significance of the moral needs of human persons and that those needs correspond to 
spiritual desires.  Unfortunately, human nature does not necessarily incline towards 
the truth.  The gospel contains messages that are contradictory to the natural liking of 
human nature.  Thus there is always danger for the truth to be deformed to suit 
human tastes.  A solid theological understanding must be developed to ensure the 
covenant concept retains its theological root and meaning when placed in the public 
spectrum.  I shall proceed to show that the federal form of political structure is 
deeply rooted in a covenant theology that contains implications for the economic 
order within the polity. 
 
2.2  Development of Federalism from the Covenant Concept 
The word for the political pattern “federalism” comes from the word foedus, 
the Latin word for “covenant”.  These words were often used interchangeably in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  Karlberg finds that political covenants formed 
the foundation of civil order in many places under the Reformed faith, but the 
relationship between the theological covenant concept and the covenant as a political 
theory is not easily determined.
6
  In spite of such complexities, the connection 
between covenant theology and the rise of federalism is undeniable.   
 Early ideas of the federalist state started to develop in the sixteenth century, 
when the covenant concept was applied to politics by the Monarchomachists, a group 
of Calvinists resisting absolutism in France.  Their theory of resistance against 
tyranny is based on the Old Testament theology of the double covenant.  In the first 
covenant on Mount Sinai, the Decalogue serves as the law between God and Israel.  
There has been no king other than the Divine.  In the second covenant, Israel 
transfers their sovereignty to the king before God.  Therefore they argue that when a 
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king breaks the covenant, sovereignty should revert to the people.  In the case of a 
tyrant or when the king breaks God‟s own covenant with His people, the people are 
thus bound to resist under God‟s will.  This means that in a covenantal nation, the 
people have the authority to act against rulers who breach the covenant.
7
 
 Klempa points out that although the different forms and meanings of 
covenant in the Bible were not recognized by theologians before the advent of 
modern critical study of the Bible, earlier theologians already noticed the 
pervasiveness of the covenant idea in the Bible.  A number of them in the 
Reformation and post-Reformation period even constructed their dogmatic systems 
upon it.  The two most influential theologians with regard to covenant theology in the 
1500s were Caspar Olevianus and Zacharius Ursinus.  Around the same time, 
corresponding developments of covenant theology took place with treatises written 
by Dudley Fenner and William Perkins in England, and Robert Rollock in Scotland.  
Later on, covenant theology took the name of federal theology under John Coccejus 
and Herman Witsius, among others.
8
   
 In the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, use of the covenant in political 
thought took on the name of federalism.  Federalism originates from the federal 
theology presented by Swiss reformed theologian Heinrich Bullinger in De 
Testamento seu Feodere unico et aeterno (The One and Eternal Testament or 
Covenant of God) published in 1534.  It becomes a form of political pattern, while 
federal theologians continue their attempts to deal with both political and 
ecclesiastical issues.  Other early exponents of the federal polity include Caspar 
Oelvian in Heidelberg and Johannes Althusius in Herborn.  This covenant-based 
system of political prototype is brought into New England and American through the 
Puritan emigration.
9
  McCoy and Baker point out that “federalism understands the 
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relationships between God and the world and among humans as based on covenants 
among their members, some tacit and inherited from the past, others explicit and 
made or renewed in the present”.
10
  Scholars find that in the Bible, the covenant 
shapes economic, political and familial relationships, as well as the relation between 
God, creation and humanity.  Federal theologians affirm that God has established His 
covenant with all nature and humans in creation.  Subsequent covenants continue, 
renew and respond to the original covenant by which the world was created.  
Accordingly, the nature of and relationships within social groups are covenantal by 
sovereign design.  Continuous renewal of the covenant affirms that humanity is 
developing towards greater fulfilment within the unfolding economies of God‟s 
covenant.  This is a dynamic process heading towards ultimate justice and love.  
Federal theologians hold a strong hope for the future in spite of their 
acknowledgement of human sinful nature because of this development towards 
original goodness that is shaped and committed through the covenant.
11
  Under 
federalism, covenant is the basis of a political-civil society, developing from private 
to public associations, forming cities, provinces and commonwealth.  Without 
covenant, society is merely a crowd or a collection of beings.
12
  Federal theology 
soon passed from the scene, but it left a meditational role in restating the biblical 
covenantal concept within historical circumstances.
13
 
There are fundamental confusions between the system of covenant theology 
and the biblical idea of the covenant concept during their development.  As Weir 
asserts, federal theology is a specific type of covenant theology in that the covenant 
concept holds together every detail of the theological system, and is characterised by 
a covenant scheme centred on the first and second Adam.  He traces the development 
of the covenant concept as follows: 
[T]he covenant with Adam comes out of the thought patterns and manner of 
argumentation of the second half of the sixteenth century.  Once the prelapsarian 
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covenant had developed into a theological commonplace, it was utilized further in 
the scholastic debates, disputations, and discussions of theology of the period 
between 1560 and 1600.  Once this novel idea entered into the theological systems 
of the time, it quickly assumed a powerful and prominent place in the structure of 
Reformed dogmatics, for it was one of the bases of the theology of nature, which in 
turn was the framework and foundation for the theology of grace.
14
 
Attempts to apply the covenant concept to systematic theology face a number 
of drawbacks.  Covenant theologians identify two main covenants – the covenant of 
works and the covenant of grace.  This double-covenant scheme is criticized for a 
lack of solid biblical basis.  A greater difficulty lies in the notion of God dealing with 
humanity in distinct ways of works and grace.  This leads to the question of two 
salvations.  In spite of such difficulties, covenant theology has made some positive 
contributions.  It sought to base itself on scriptural revelation and to provide an 
inclusive and universal understanding of salvation.  More importantly, the covenant 
concept takes on a significant role in shaping the early forms of federal order with its 
evangelical interpretation and practical application.  Covenant holds together the 
sovereignty of God and human responsibility, presenting the rightful claims of God 
and human freedom.
15
  The covenant is therefore an important concept alongside 
others in a theological system.  However, it does not necessarily take a doctrinal or 
central role within the theological system, but provides a focal awareness of 
theological relationships and integrating structures.
16
  In particular, the covenant 
concept presents the prescribed and revealed structure for practical earthly order that 
is relevant and applicable to all arenas of living, including political, familial and 
economic life. 
Elazar‟s work offers some clarification of the complexities in terms of the 
application of the covenant concept to politics.  He identifies a bridge from the 
theological covenant concept to its political definition, as follows: 
Theologically, covenant embodies the idea that relationships between God and 
human are based upon morally sustained compacts of mutual promise and obligation, 
as in the covenants with Noah, Abraham, Moses, and, for Christians, the New 
Testament or Covenant.  Politically, covenant expresses the idea that people can 
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create communities and civil societies through such compacts (whether religious or 
secular), thereby establishing enduring partnerships.
17
 
For over twenty five years, Elazar has endeavoured to show the impact of the 
political theology of federalism on modern federalism.  Taking this work one step 
further, Baker connects covenant theology and federalism by suggesting several 
layers of political federalisms in the stream of thought from the early Protestant 
Reformers to the founding fathers of America.  The fundamental assertion 
underlying these scholarly endeavours is that the covenant theology of early 
Protestantism lays the basis for modern federalism.  Modern political theorists then 
borrow the concept, embrace the covenant idea and secularize it.
18
   
The covenant concept was developed and applied to society during the 
seventeenth century in the Netherlands, England, Scotland and America.  Its scope 
extends from the social compacts of the early Israelites, to a broad understanding of 
the cosmos and the relationships within.  It takes on a form of unity expressed as a 
divine commonwealth.  It is not a family, company or democracy, but an ordering 
principle of loyalty to the fundamental law of reason and revelation.  The ultimate 
covenantal society involves the maturity of free and responsible citizenships 
embracing and participating in its law and order.
19
  Torrance points out that the 
ancient coronation oaths and the practice of contracts in feudal society in Scotland 
and France clearly indicate a long history of contractual government arrangements.  
The doctrine of social contract goes back to Plato‟s Republic.  Contractarian forms of 
society start with feudalism and continue to exert significant influence in modern 
democracy.
20
  Nevertheless, there are important differences between contracts and 
covenants, or contractarian communities versus covenant consociations.
21
  These 
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differences must be properly distinguished for a clear picture of the covenantal 
society.  
 
2.3  Johannes Althusius and His Method 
 In spite of the wide applications of the covenant concept to theology and 
hermeneutics, the most significant use of the covenant is in its application to society.  
Since covenant is the way of relating among human persons by divine creation and 
design, it is the most authentic way for building political and economic society.  This 
can be demonstrated through the work of seventeenth-century philosopher and 
Reformed theologian Johannes Althusius.  Althusius is known as the intellectual 
“father of federalism”.  His work demonstrates application of the covenant concept to 
a federal or covenantal political system embracing both ecclesiastical and secular 
communities.  Althusius‟ political philosophy is built upon the Reformed Calvinistic 
view of human nature and application of the covenant concept.  His work draws on 
the covenant tradition of the Reformed Protestant faith as well as a range of other 
sources including the Bible, history and political philosophy, the Roman law, his 
experience with the sixteenth-century political structure, and other writers of his 
times.  For the federalists, God‟s covenant is the basis of the order of creation.  Being 
the authoritative sources of covenantal elements and conditions, divine 
commandments permeate nature and set out the necessary moral order.  This 
approach stands in contrast to the rational or natural approaches to reality.  Since 
creation is in covenant with God, society is also based on covenantal arrangements.  
Therefore application of the covenant concept penetrates politics, family, church, 
economic relations and all aspects of human relationships.  Human communities are 
often represented by particular persons in the biblical covenants.  Examples of these 
are Abraham representing the people of Israel, and Christ representing humanity 
under sufferings and redemption.
22
  Based on a Reformed view of sinful humankind 
after the fall, federalists set limits to human power because of the necessity for 
checks and balances to restrain evil and to direct humankind towards goodness and 
justice.  Under the covenant between God and His creation, God‟s creative acts  
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continue in human history until the consummation of all things.
23
 
 Althusius (1563-1638) received his doctorate in civil and ecclesiastical law in 
1586 at Basle, and published his first book Jurisprudentia Romana in the same year.  
During 1586 to 1604, Althusius was a member of the faculty of law at the Reformed 
Academy in Herborn.  He became the rector of Herborn in 1597, and published 
Civilis Conversationis Libri Duo in 1601.  In 1603, Althusius published his most 
successful work, the Politica, in which the first systematic philosophy of political 
federalism is developed based on the covenant concept.
24
   Skinner describes the 
Politica as “the most systematic statement of revolutionary Calvinist political 
thought”.
25
  To explore the application of the covenant concept and Calvinistic 
human nature to society, I shall focus specifically on the political and economic 
order demonstrated in the Politica.   
The initial publication of Politica attracted significant interest and secured for 
Althusius the position of chief magistrate of Emden, an imperial city of the new 
Dutch Republic.  Althusius held this position for the next thirty-four years until his 
death.  During the seventeenth century, Emden was a wealthy city known as the 
“Geneva of the North”.  It was engaged in religious conflict and struggle over control 
that was typical, and a garrison was put to arbitrate between religious opinions and 
decisions of the imperial authorities.
26
  Emden was also a city that embraced the 
Reformed faith with a strong Calvinist spirit, often known as the “alma mater” of the 
Dutch Reformed Church.  This was the environment where Althusius tested and 
elaborated his Politica.
27
  Revised extended versions of the Politica were 
subsequently reissued in 1610 and 1614.  In 1617, he published another book on a 
system of juridical law based on biblical law, Roman law and various customary 
laws. 
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German historian Otto von Gierke points out that Althusius‟ work was largely 
forgotten until it was rediscovered in the nineteenth century.  He identifies Althusius‟ 
Politica as “the earliest attempt at a strictly systematic and complete exposition of 
what is called Politics”.
28
  Indeed, the political framework in Politica turns out to be 
practical, logical and complete especially when viewed within the context of the 
1600s.
29
  The Netherlands was claiming its own independence by the end of the 
sixteenth century.  The Dutch were consolidating victory of their revolutionary move 
to establish the Dutch Republic (1581-1795).  Although Althusius was not Dutch, he 
resided in the territory and was confronted with the political scenes before him.  He 
advocated the idea of establishing an ordered and harmonious society through mutual 
agreement.  This notion later develops into the single social contract concept 
presented by Rousseau.  However, Althusius‟ covenantal “contract” differs from the 
social contract in that it resides not only between persons but also in multifaceted 
capacities among rulers, community and people.
30
 
Althusius organized the Politica according to Ramist logic, a humanist 
method of using syllogisms and propositions to derive clear and persuasive 
arguments.  This is a popular method in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, also 
used by Protestant Reformers to help believers understand Scripture and theological 
arguments.  Ramist logic is based on “invention” and “disposition”.  Through 
invention, we determine the materials that belong to the subjects of scholarly 
disciplines.  Through disposition, we organize the materials appropriate to the given 
discipline in a structured manner.  As a result, logic is applied to organize not only 
the propositions but the entire field of study.
31
  Although Ramist logic was later on 
refuted by modern scientists, it is highly relevant at a time when new scholarly 
disciplines emerge.  This is because the idea of invention in Ramist logic promotes 
creative formulation of a new discipline, while the idea of disposition helps to 
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organize the new discipline.  Through careful assimilation of universal versus 
particular propositions, Althusius‟ work clarifies the scope for politics and law in a 
structured manner.   
Although much of Althusius‟ thinking is influenced by Calvinistic concepts, 
his treatise presents an exclusively political system without imposing religious duties 
to the secular.  Skinner asserts that Althusius had the ambition of emancipating 
politics from the confines of theology and jurisprudence.
32
  In fact, the absence of 
theological language and religious concerns in Althusius‟ work allows it to possess a 
universal nature whereby the underlying theological presuppositions can be 
embraced by the secular discipline of political philosophy.  A strong Reformed 
theological stance can be found in the Politica although the use of theological 
language is skilfully avoided.  Hueglin identifies Althusius‟ approach in terms of the 
presentation of political theory as a normative theory based on the factual 
observations of social life.  Both theory and practice are emphasized in Althusius‟ 
work.  At the same time, Althusius is committed to a synthesis of Calvinism, 
Aristotelianism, and Germanic corporatism.  Comparing Althusius‟ method with that 
of Bodin, Hueglin points out that Bodin starts from sovereignty to deduce the nature 
of social life, while Althusius starts from social life to determine the general 
principle of sovereignty. Therefore sovereignty is the dependent variable of the 
nature of social life.
33
  This is an approach that starts from the very nature of 
humankind rather than attempting to fit society into presumed principles or norms. 
 In the preface to the third edition of Politica published in 1614, Althusius 
states that he has revised his book into a new political work and “have returned all 
merely theological, juridical, and philosophical elements to their proper places, and 
have retained only those… essential and homogeneous to this science and 
discipline”.
34
  This shows his intention for Politica to stand independently as a 
complete work for a political system of universal association.  Rich insights are 
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embedded in Althusius‟ assimilation of theological thoughts with practical 
implications of the times.
35
  A thorough investigation of Althusius‟ concepts of law, 
sovereignty and political structure is beyond the scope of this thesis.  The following 
exploration focuses on the covenant-based ideas of consociation and symbiotics in 
the Politica, with a view of drawing out the underlying implications on economic 
order. 
 
2.4  A Polity of Symbiotics and Collegia 
 Althusius‟ primary concern is the extent to which associations fulfil their 
purposes in society.  He defines politics as “the art of associating (consociandi) men 
for the purpose of establishing, cultivating, and conserving social life among 
them”.
36
   This association or consociation is known as “symbiotics”.  Those who 
live together are known as “symbiotes”.  The symbiotes “pledge themselves each to 
the other, by explicit or tacit agreement, to mutual communication of whatever is 
useful and necessary for the harmonious exercise of social life”.
37
  Within such 
symbiotics, symbiotes live together happily and comfortably in a holy and just 
manner.  Since no individual person is entirely self-sufficient by nature, everyone 
needs to depend on others to live a comfortable and holy life.  Therefore, it is 
necessary for people to live harmoniously together, especially when it comes to the 
material codependency of goods and services.  In this regard, Althusius recognizes 
the necessity of economic order and interdependence at the very start of his political 
system. 
 Althusius defines the polity with three principal connotations: the 
communication of right or citizenship, the manner of administering and regulating 
the commonwealth, and the form and constitution of the commonwealth by which all 
actions of the citizens are guided.
38
  This definition is wider in scope that that of 
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Aristotle, who understands polity only by the last of these three connotations.  Within 
the polity, consent, agreement and communication among the citizens are critical 
elements of association. 
The formal cause is indeed the association brought about by contributing and 
communicating one with the other, in which political men institute, cultivate, 
maintain, and conserve the fellowship of human life through decisions about those 
things useful and necessary to his social life.
39
   
Accordingly, the symbiotes work together for a comfortable, useful and 
happy life with piety towards God, justice within the society, and peace against other 
nations.  The role of communication is central to realizing these as things, services 
and rights are brought together for fair distribution and common advantage. 
 Althusius is concerned not merely with associations and functions, but the 
community in totality.  Accordingly, he builds an entire system of political 
association from the individual and family units to the mega political community.  
He asserts that “the community is an association formed by fixed law and composed 
of many families and collegia living in the same place”.
40
  At a time when the 
political realm is generally understood to belong to the monarch and the 
commonwealth as being polyarchical, Althusius presents a structure in which the 
realm belongs to the people and the administration belongs to the king.  This is the 
concept of popular sovereignty.  The rights of the realm do not reside with its 
individual members but are owned jointly by members of the entire association 
within the realm.  Such a political structure is built upon a solid application of the 
covenant concept, whereby individuals are bound closely to one another without 
exception.  To Althusius, this universal symbiotic communion is both ecclesiastical, 




 When compared with other forms of politics and federal structures, Hueglin 
and Fenna identify Althusius‟ political process as bottom-up rather than top-down.  
Consociations are the most general and basic principle of political organizations, 
through which families and guilds act as building blocks of society.  Interests of each 
consociation within the community must be represented and taken care of in the 
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universal assembly of the commonwealth.  This arrangement enables participation by 
the people, where Althusius‟ sense of “the people” is not individual citizens but the 
organized bodies of interacting collective entities.  Faced with notions of monarchy 
and shadows of feudalism during his lifetime, Althusius‟ work inclines towards 
diversity rather than unity.  Hueglin and Fenna suggest that the reason for Althusius‟ 
polity being largely neglected during his time is because of its emphasis on 
consensus and compromise among the consociations of popular sovereignty.  This 
structure is dismissed as anachronistic and inefficient in his time.  Nevertheless, as 
the modern world develops into a globalized era of pluralistic culture and religious 
compositions, Althusius‟ system becomes more and more appealing as it allows for 
harmonious coexistence among different interest groups.
42
  Althusius‟ work shows 
that the covenant concept is fundamental to the way of human bonding, allows for 
diversity, and is applicable to pluralistic societies. 
 In Althusius‟ polity, different units of collegium or private association link 
together through the law of nations to establish an inclusive political order called a 
community or political association.  The need for good order, proper discipline and 
communication of things increases with the size of the community, yet the 
fundamental association remains unchanged.  Althusius defines political order as 
“the right and power of communicating and participating in useful and necessary 
matters that are brought to the life of the organized body by its associated 
members”.
43
  Citizens of the community communicate and relate in a similar manner 
to those within collegia, for the same purpose of self-sufficiency and symbiosis of 
things, services, right, and mutual benevolence.  Accordingly, Althusius applies the 
covenantal way of association to the various spheres and levels of symbiosis in 
society from the basic family unit to the administrative order of public duties. 
 In later editions of Politica, Althusius includes a discussion of the 
ecclesiastical versus secular order of the Province.  He lays out the various levels and 
different objectives of ecclesiastical, political and economic order as follows: 
As the ecclesiastical order of the province will bring forth pious, learned, wise, and 
good men, so the political and secular order of the nobility will be concerned to 
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bring forth for the province strong, militant, and brave men who are ready with arms 
and counsel, and are experienced in military matters.  So also the order of burghers 
and agrarians – the commons – will strive to produce and bring forth for the 
fatherland merchants, farmers, and workmen who are skilled, industrious and 
distinguished.  By the service, labor, and industry of these orders, self-sufficiency 
can be obtained in association and symbiosis.
44
 
 Althusius sees the prince or supreme magistrate as the steward and 
administrator of political rights that originated through the people and are returned to 
the people upon retirement or death of the ruler.  He asserts that administration of 
such rights has been granted to a ruler by a “precarium or covenant”.  Within the 
polity, associations are bonded together by consensus and trust.  Althusius describes 
this bond to be “a tacit or expressed promise to communicate things, mutual services, 
aid, counsel and the same common law (jura) to the extent that the utility and 
necessity of universal social life in a realm shall require”.
45
  The power for the 
people to establish the right of jurisdiction and to bind the participants to it is 
essential.  The existence of symbiotic life depends on it.  This universal association is 
not constituted by one member, but jointly by all the members.  According to this 
bond, members share ownership and responsibility of the polity.  Althusius‟ assertion 
of the concept of popular sovereignty is depicted in his saying that, “the right of the 
realm, or right of sovereignty, does not belong to individual members, but to all 
members joined together and to the entire associated body of the realm”.
46
 
 An obligatory and binding covenant relationship is established between the 
people and the governing authorities, as follows: 
There is no doubt that this covenant, or contractual mandate (contractum mandati) 
entered into with the supreme magistrate, obligates both of the contracting parties, so 
much so that it is permitted to neither magistrate nor subjects to revoke or dishonor 
it.
47
   
The obligation of the magistrate comes first, when he binds himself to the 
mandator – body of the universal association.  The obligations of the people then 
follow as part of the nature of the mandate, to be obedient and compliant to the 
magistrate and prescribed laws.  Accordingly, power is circumscribed by laws and 
remains with the people, preventing degeneration into absolute power or tyranny. 
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 Symbiotics and collegia are fundamental units of the covenantal society.  
Symbiotic associations can be either private or public.  The simple or private 
association is a symbiosis or society initiated by a special covenant (pactum) among 
the members.  It brings the members together to hold a particular interest (quid 
peculiare) in common to each other.  This is the primary basis of all associations.   
The efficient causes of this simple and private association and symbiosis are 
individual men covenanting among themselves to communicate whatever is 
necessary and useful for organizing and living in private life.
48
   
The act of covenanting is essential to the symbiotes.  It represents the way 
through which individuals and groups are bound together, i.e. the way political and 
economic relationships are carried out in communication of mutual benefits within 
the society.  This relationship is as close and intimate as the metaphor of the private 
association described as “one person”, i.e. one body with each part carrying out its 
designated function by nature, communicating in good order, structure and consensus.  
These private associations include natural symbiotic association such as family and 
friends, as well as civil associations organized by groups of individuals for social 
interests or specific purposes.
49
 
The covenantal essence of the symbiotics is clearly depicted in Althusius‟ 
definition of the consociation in the communication and commitment of the 
symbiotes to each other, both explicitly and implicitly.  The symbiotes are committed 
as co-workers who communicate among themselves in cooperation and in search for 
a comfortable life of both body and soul.  Mutual communication and contribution 
mark the essence of symbiotic social life, together with the benefits and 
responsibilities required of the participants within each particular association.
50
  To 
Althusius, an association is initiated and maintained through a covenant among the 
symbiotes, setting forth their common agreement about the necessary and useful 
purposes to be observed by the association, and the means appropriate to fulfil these 
purposes.  Even if no explicit covenant is in place, an implicit one is assumed in the 
continuing consent of those who live together in association with each other.
51
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The symbiotes form collegia.  Althusius defines collegium as a civil, private 
association of colleagues, associates or brothers coming together for a joint profess 
such as duty, way of life or craft.  The commercial organization or corporation in the 
modern sense is essentially of such nature.  The framework of the modern corporate 
takes shape as Althusius considers the collegia to be one single legal body with 
separate ownership and independent mandate.  Through participation in a corporate 
body, all colleagues are bound within a common legal structure.  The colleagues are 
thus called into session to contribute their services to the collegia, just as the modern 
day individual enters in upon signing of an employment contract.  Similar to the 
symbiotics, Althusius‟ collegia maintain an implicit covenant that draws the 
participants into a body of association, not only legally but as “one body” in 
solidarity and in relation to one another.
 
 
For both the symbiotics and collegia, communication is a cooperative process 
whereby individuals assist one another to uphold the covenanted agreements in social 
life.  These covenants and laws are written in each collegium‟s corporate book, and 
act to uphold the collegium of association.  They involve communication pertaining 
to things, services, rights and mutual benevolence.  For the symbiotes, 
communication of things brings useful and necessary goods to the symbiotic for both 
individual and collective advantage.  Communication of services represents the 
labour and occupation contributed by symbiotes for social life.  Communication of 
rights is the process by which the symbiotes live and are ruled by just laws in a 
common life among themselves.  In order to communicate things and services among 
the symbioties, common laws and proper laws are prescribed.  Common laws, such 
as governing rules, are natural and unchanging to every type of symbioses.  Proper 
laws, such as association charters, are particular to each consociation.
52
  Accordingly, 
the communication of things and services refers directly to the economic dealings 
that are to be carried out among symbiotes in a covenantal manner.  The common 
rights and related laws provide the basis by which proper communication of goods 
and services can be carried out.  For the collegia, things such as money, consumable 
items, seals or records represent mutual contributions and acquisitions according to 
the laws of the collegia, aim at common purposes and are owned commonly.  
Services such as crafts, professions or vocations are mutually determined and carried 
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out according to the manner tacitly or explicitly agreed upon.  Rights involve the 
liberty and equality for everyone to live and be ruled by the same laws.  Mutual 
benevolence is the affection and love of individuals to others.  Since the associations 
exist under harmoniously willed common utility, benevolence is nourished, sustained 
and conserved through public banquets, entertainment and love feasts.
53
  These 
elements explicitly laid out in Althusius‟ political system closely resemble the 
covenantal community of the Israelites in the Bible.  In particular, the manifestation 
of mutual benevolence through love feasts and sacraments is a unique characteristic 
of the Israelite covenantal commitments. 
 
2.5  Althusius on Human Nature and Benevolence 
 Baker identifies Althusius as a bridge between the sixteenth-century federal 
thinkers, and philosophical thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke on the matter of 
human nature.  Hobbes and Locke are of the view the “state of nature” necessitates 
government and laws.  While covenant theologians such as Bullinger explain this 
necessity through sinful human nature, Althusius presents this warning in non-
theological terms.
54
  In particular, because of sinful human nature after the fall, 
Althusius asserts that “the pride and high spirits of man should be restrained by sure 
reins of reason, law, and imperium less he throw himself precipitously into ruin”.
55
 
 Althusius‟ description of the nature of the symbiotes portrays an explicit 
undertone of a Calvinistic theological anthropology.  He states that when the human 
being is born, he is “destitute of all help, naked and defenceless, as if having lost all 
his goods in a shipwreck”.
56
  The misfortunate of fallen humankind is described 
vividly at the very beginning of Politica, in support of the human being‟s 
helplessness and need for codependence.  The human person is unable to provide for 
all his necessities on his own.  Therefore cooperation and sharing are necessary for 
comfortable living.  The emphasis on satisfaction of human needs and wants 
identified by Althusius yields an underlying concern for the functioning of the 
                                                 
53
 Ibid., 34-7. 
54
 Baker, 'Faces of Federalism: From Bullinger to Jefferson,' 31. 
55
 Althusius, Politica, 26. 
56
 Ibid., 17. 
   40
economic order as part of political concerns – an important consideration often 
missing from political philosophy theories. 
 The symbiotic human nature is fundamentally covenantal and inevitably 
social.  Through different spheres of social consociations, human persons interact, 
relate and seek fulfilment.  Skillen points out that Althusius does not merely 
construct society out of contracts among individuals.  Althusius accounts for the 
diversity of communities, associations and relationships that constitute society, with 
considerations for the proper laws that may differ among associations according to 
their unique natures.
57
  Indeed, Althusius‟ work is an admirable demonstration of the 
application of fundamental theological reflections to practical living that is not only 
limited to the particular political concerns on hand, but a mega and universal 
worldview of community and functioning of humankind.  Although Althusius is 
concerned with the ecclesiastics, he does not look to the church to mediate all the 
divine laws or rely entirely on grace.  Instead, the Word becomes the source of life 
and provides the law for social life in the different spheres of association.  Skillen 
notes that Althusius‟ notion of a just public life is based on God‟s covenant with 
creation, a covenant made by God “with human creatures who were made, from the 
beginning, to associate in political communities according to God‟s laws for political 
symbiosis”.
58
  According to this assertion, the covenant basis of society reflects 
God‟s original design for creation and the true essence of the relationships among 
God and human persons embedded in human nature.  Since this societal structure is 
based on the fundamental human element of creation, it is also universal. 
 Medieval thinkers have generally taken the community as a hierarchy of 
smaller communities.  Althusius takes this view further and traces the development 
of the family units to the city, province and state, through federal bonding.
59
  A 
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crucial presupposition of the political covenant is the exercise of freedom and 
solidarity.
60
  The covenant binds these multi-levels of interconnected units together 
to yield a picture of Althusius‟ carefully worked out structure of covenantal 
relationships from the smallest association between two symbiotes and within the 
symbiotics, to that among symbiotics and with the ruler. 
 Carney points out that early Calvinists conceive of associations as faithful 
ways of life that fulfil various aspects of human living such as glorifying God and 
attending to the welfare of the neighbour.  Accordingly, such associations are 
teleological.  They are natural in terms of God‟s creation, and voluntary within the 
boundaries of human finiteness and sinfulness.  Carney identifies Althusius as a 
Calvinist for whom the canon law serves as foundation of the expression of law.  To 
the Calvinists, the law represents an objective rightness that is to be discovered and 
affirmed about human associational experience.  It is also the natural tendency of 
human persons and their association to be constitutionally oriented through legal 
expression.  They are motivated to live an associational life according to the 
primordial essence of particular associations.  Obeying the law therefore represents a 
response to God‟s command and an understanding of divine authority.  Carney 
differentiates the social covenant, political covenant, and religious covenant within 
the covenant concept.  These are relationships pertaining to societal living, mode of 
government, and association with God.  He points out that the interpreters who relate 
concepts in the Roman law to the early Calvinist writers are mistaken.  In fact, the 
nature of society or associations in Calvinistic thought is rooted in the very nature of 
things as social endowment.  Every human person must participate in these societal 
associations in order to be truly human.
61
  Indeed the covenant is different from the 
contract in Roman private law.  The social and political covenants are commitments 
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to conform to the rules and regulations that are designed to express and fulfil the 
common law of the consociation.  The religious covenant shares a similar social 
basis as that of the social and political covenants because it is the agreement of 
human persons to live authentic communal lives just as the agreement with God 
requires. 
 The socio-ethical element of the covenant is one of the core differences 
between the covenant and private contract.  This aspect is presented vividly within 
Althusius‟ political philosophy.  Mutual benevolence, compassion and loving-care 
are clearly depicted within the description of roles and ranks.  Althusius asserts that 
administrations should have both love and ability.  Ephors should act as custodians 
of the public welfare with great love, concern and care.
62
  Communication takes on a 
dominant social dimension in Althusius‟ political system.  While Althusius 
acknowledges uneven distribution of natural gifts and degrees of social status, he 
asserts that natural inequality guides humankind towards social communication and 
cooperation.  This implies a natural concern for a high degree of social equality 
within the system.  Hueglin finds that in Althusius‟ system, politics as a process of 
communication is not primarily a problem of power and governmental authority, but 
of mutual assistance, cooperation and trust.  It emphasizes coordination over 
subordination, although it acknowledges the need for the government and its 
necessary role in handling social conflict.
63
  The city is to establish statutes 
concerning the private functions of the community.  Included in such statutes are 
important characters of mutual benevolence or accord.   
Enthusiasm for concord is the means of conserving friendship, equity, justice, peace, 
and honor among the citizens, and of overcoming strife… whatever cultivates love 
among the citizens and conserves the common good is to be nurtured, and the causes 
of discord among citizens and neighbours are to be guarded against.
64
   
To illustrate this, Althusius quotes the Old Testament example of Abraham 
and Isaac living in unity and overcoming differences together.  A covenantal way of 
life that models the divine commandments for the Israelites in the Old Testament is 
clearly depicted. 
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 The Israelites requested a king in the Old Testament.  During the process 
when Israelite kings are chosen and anointed, the people are always involved in the 
approval and designation process.  Althusius constructs the polity based on this 
hierarchical covenant concept.  Rectors and administrators are constituted by the 
commonwealth itself on the notion that all are equal.  The Supreme magistrate 
appointed by the people exercises not his own power but that of the realm of which 
he is minister.  Althusius asserts that constituting the supreme magistrate is the 
process by which the people and the supreme magistrate faithfully extend and accept 
oaths from each other, entering into a covenant concerning certain laws and 
conditions that set forth the form and manner of imperium and subjection.  This 
covenant or contractual mandate obligates both of the contracting parties so that 
neither the magistrate nor the subjects can revoke or dishonour it.
65
  By applying the 
covenant concept and structuring the polity on its basis, Althusius addresses the 
problem of absolute power.  He points out that absolute power destroys justice, steers 
attention away from utility and welfare, and leads to the indulgence of private 
pleasure.  In an economic sense, absolute power leads to an imbalance that turns 
power into robbery.  Althusius‟ polity recognizes the diversity of abilities, 
preferences and status of the participants, yet remains inclusive of different 
associations with a platform that allows equality and freedom.
66
  It is within such an 
environment that the economic order is embedded and allowed to flourish. 
 
2.6  Economic Order within Althusius’ Polity 
 Economic order resides within the political structure of a society to form an 
essential part of community life.  Althusius puts forth the federalistic concept and 
connects it with the medieval theory of community life.  To Althusius, the smaller 
unit of associations within society, such as the family, is anything but economic in 
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the functional sense.
67
  Thus the material exchanges of things and services are 
essential and embedded in relationships that exceed mere functionalities.  Althusius 
asserts that it is God‟s will to distribute earthly gifts unevenly, so that there is a need 
for human beings to communicate necessary and useful things.  As each person 
serves the other and in turn receives help from others, each will find value in the 
other and in the self, and be bound together in friendship.  In this way, no one lives 
alone.  Our needs draw us together to form different institutions, work communities 
and social groups.  These interrelate to form societies as well as a public body of the 
commonwealth.  He states that “need” induces association, and “want” conserves life 
because such wants are acquired and communicated through mutual cooperation with 
one another.
68
  According to this codependence, human being by nature strives for 
association.  The commonwealth by mutual aid devotes to the general good and 
welfare of its body.   
 Economic order is fundamental and vital to human survival in Althusius‟ 
communal political system of codependence.  He points out that we cannot live our 
lives conveniently without commerce.  The arrangement for procuring the material 
necessities of life, hence the arena for economic cooperation, is a special right that 
should be equitable, good, useful and adapted to place, time and persons.  This is 
under the civil law and can be peculiar to each polity.  It involves commercial 
regulations, monetary system, common language, public duties, and privileges and 
titles of nobility.  The consociation is given the task of the “care of goods”, a concept 
termed as stewardship in biblical covenant language.  The care of goods involves 
diligent and faithful conversation of things and services necessary and useful to the 
commonwealth, as well as the augmentation and extension of such things.  In laying 
out the economic order within the consociation, Althusius essentially places 
commerce and market exchange activities within the boundaries of the covenant and 
covenantal practices.  He sees communicating and exchanging goods and services 
with one another as a fundamental necessity and utility of life.  The universal 
association also consists of the proper administration of taxes, public welfare, and 
donations.  The council of the polity is therefore charged with the duty to examine, 
discuss and make decisions on benevolence and distributive measures.
69
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Accordingly, the covenant community is administered with a view towards achieving 
the common good. 
 Althusius finds all associations essentially political in nature, making political 
consociations the foundation of private economic associations.  He differentiates 
between economics and politics by identifying economics as the skill of conserving 
and attending to household goods and the family.  In contrast, political activities are 
public in nature and separate from household economic functions.  Nevertheless, 
economic activities of the primary private unit of kinship serve the very fundamental 
unit of society and must be treated differently. 
I concede that the skill of attending to household goods, of supplying, increasing, 
and conserving the goods of the family, is entirely economic, and as such is correctly 
eliminated from politics.  But altogether different from this is association among 
spouses and kinsmen, which is entirely political and general, and which 
communicates things, services, rights, and aid for living the domestic and economic 
life piously, justly, and beneficially.
70
 
Here he draws the line between politics and economics.  While economics 
deals with the furnishing, augmentation and conservation of household goods, 
politics teaches what the participants may contribute and communicate among 
themselves for a pious and just life.  Private or particular associations that follow 
economic interests differ from political consociations in terms of purposes and goals.  
Nevertheless, these private associations such as families and collegia together form 
the basis for public or general associations, and are attributed to politics.  
 Althusius sees economic inequality as part of natural economic order 
intended by the Divine to promote social unity and harmony.  The diversity of wealth, 
skills and talents are similar to lyres of diverse tones that give rise to pleasant 
harmony when properly tuned.  He quotes Petrus Gregorius in pointing out that “if 
all were truly equal, and each wished to rule others according to his own will, discord 
would easily arise… equality itself would be the greatest inequality”.
71
  Accordingly, 
diversities in professions, roles for services and leaders, etc., are essential to political 
and economic order.  Such order is part of divine providence.  The covenant concept 
supports a hierarchical structure of political and economic order that enables 
distribution based on capabilities and needs.  In a perfectly covenantal community, 
such a hierarchical structure will not lead to exploitations and inequality from the 
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misuse of power and resources, because of perfect covenantal love and justice under 
divine authority. 
The Jewish political scientist Daniel J. Elazar has been studying extensively 
the application of biblical covenants to systems of law, society, justice, and systems 
of economic distribution.  He sees Althusius‟ federalism as a grand design that is 
general to all of politics and not only to federalism.  The biblical design for 
humankind is federal in its basic design of interwoven webs of covenant 
relationships, yielding a classic biblical commonwealth of a federation of tribes.  
More importantly, Elazar points towards the biblical vision for the messianic end 
times when there will be a restoration of Israel‟s tribal system as well as a world 
confederation.  The nations will come together under a common divine covenant 
while preserving their own unique integrity.
72
  Trimiew asserts that Elazar shows the 
function of group rights in ancient Israel, especially in regard to economic rights.  
Within the biblical system of economic distribution, community and group rights 
play a central role.  The moral foundation of Israel is the covenant of God and His 
people in a communal sense, rather than the moral unit of the individual in modern 
Western culture.  The claims for public welfare and economic justice are in fact 
group duties and covenantal obligations.  Accordingly, the misunderstanding of such 
obligations is the primary moral problem in modern society.  A renewed 
understanding of the covenant concept would be useful to the proper assimilation of 




2.7  Covenant versus the Social Contract and other Critiques 
 The covenant concept in political thought faces certain criticisms.  Walzer 
identifies Puritanism as the earliest form of political radicalism.  He describes 
medieval society as composed largely of non-participating, inactive people.  The 
Calvinists are the first to switch the focus of political thought from “princes” to 
“saints”, therefore allowing justification for political actions by the believing 
community.  Walzer asserts that the collapse of the universal sovereignty of the 
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empire shatters politics of the philosophers, subjecting people to make private 
arrangements.  This is when the feudal system substitutes family and kinship with 
formal, impersonal, legal and functional ties.  Consequently, “ordinary men lived in a 
narrower world, tied to family, village and feudal lord, and forgot the very idea of 
citizenship and the common good”.
74
  According to Walzer, free persons are 
“masterless”.  He views Catholics as those striving to combine morality and salvation, 
and Protestants as those pushing morality and salvation further apart.  Walzer finds 
that as the Lutherans experience personal faith and salvation through justification, 
the invisible church becomes an increasingly sharp reality to them.  This gives rise to 
a multitude of pietistic sects that focus on cultivating personal spirituality.  On the 
other hand, Calvinism directs believers‟ energies to public disciplines, therefore 
focusing on the visible church in an attempt to take the world and transform it.  As a 
result, Walzer sees Protestantism either as a privately cultivated communion with 
God or a social religion.
75
  Walzer‟s classifications appear to be rather simplistic 
because pietism certainly appears in the Calvinistic tradition, while social 
participation is not missing from Lutheranism.  However, the more striking part of 
Walzer‟s argument lies in his assertion of the subversive nature of Calvinistic 
political thoughts. 
 Walzer sees Calvin‟s political thought as a demand for politics to be bent to 
serve a religious purpose within a view of politics that is excessively realistic.
76
  This 
is due to the Calvinistic assertion that authority is recognized only in the divine Word.  
As such there is no discussion of the forms of authority or the law, resulting in a 
detached and pessimistic acknowledgement of worldly methods.  He identifies 
Calvinism as individualistic and restraining because in “obedience to God”, everyone 
must wrestle with their own individual problems.
77
  Walzer‟s opposing view to the 
covenant concept is clearly presented as follows: 
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The covenant emphasized once again the abolition of the older connections founded 
upon created love, filial humility, and the merciful intercession of saints and angels.  
An agreement between God and man whose terms were supposedly written out in 
Scripture, it symbolized perfectly the artificial nature of all relations.  Through the 
covenant men became the „bondsmen‟ of God – not the children – and the image 




 It appears that Walzer has missed the significance of relational bonds and 
mutual benevolence that are core elements of covenants.  Instead, he seems to be 
commenting on purely functional and obligatory contracts.  This is an unfortunate 
misunderstanding because as Meilaender points out, Walzer‟s work contains a 
commitment to a pluralistic world of particular communities and to the individuals 
who form these communities.
79
  A proper understanding of the covenant as a 
relational concept may find common ground for a more constructive dialogue 
between Walzer‟s work and Calvinism.  Walzer‟s attack on the covenant concept is 
also based on a rejection of the Calvinistic view of sinful human nature.  In fact, 
modern political society is deeply rooted in covenants, but the original form of 
covenant-based federalism has since developed into many different types of 
federalism and contractual arrangements over the years.  Coupled with the 
complexities of modern society, the confusion of what the covenant concept 
encompasses is further extended. 
Gierke points out that Rousseau‟s social contract has a remarkable 
resemblance to the politics of Althusius in fundamental ways that have not appeared 
in previous scholarly work.  Yet Rousseau‟s work is based on the older doctrine of 
popular sovereignty and the doctrine of the law of nature.  In contrast, a stern 
Calvinistic spirit appears in all Althusius‟ work.
80
  Essentially, Gierke sees Althusius 
as the real creator of the social contract, dissolving all public law into private law.  
This view is challenged by Hueglin, who asserts that public law could not have been 
reduced into private law when a state in the modern sense has not existed.  The 
distinction between public and private spheres had not been made in Althusius‟ time.  
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Hueglin points towards the interpretation by Joachim Fredrich in that Althusius had 
included all private functions within a hierarchy of groups that is more or less public 
in nature.  A pact that can be either explicit or tacit appears fundamentally different 
from a social contract in the private and legal sense.  Rousseau locates virtue, liberty 
and reason exclusively in the individual self.  In contrast, the individual in Althusius‟ 
polity is at the same time private, social and political; participating in the state 




 Natural law has an important role in the development of the contract as a 
departure from the covenant concept.  During Althusius‟ time, the new scientific 
focus has been the discovery of the laws of nature.  This preoccupation with 
unveiling the regularities of universal functions has marked every political system 
developed during that time.
82
  Karlberg finds the covenant concept in political 
philosophy distinctively different from the Reformed ecclesiological covenant idea, 
at least until the latter half of the seventeenth century.  He asserts that the theological 
bridge connecting these two concepts is the medieval doctrine of natural law.  
Natural law reveals the human moral debt of obedience to God, which constitutes the 




 As the concept of the covenant, pact or contract develops into various 
different forms, it becomes more and more important to differentiate between 
covenantal and contractual arrangements.  When discussing the various forms of 
federal systems, Riley points out that federalism quickly reduces to the idea of an 
easily breakable contract because its covenantal nature is misunderstood and 
overlooked.  “If federal systems were to be mere treaties, and treaties mere contracts, 
then breach of contract of course involved the breach of treaty, and a breach of treaty 
released the remaining parties from their obligations.”
84
  As a result of these 
abstractions, the essence of federal systems as a public form of order is reduced to 
the form of an agreement in private law. 
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 In contrast to Althusius‟ political covenant between the people and the ruler, 
Hobbes‟ contract is one that makes the ruler the recipient of power.  The people do 
not enter into covenant or contract with the ruler, but are considered an aggregate of 
individuals subject to the ruler.  Hobbes limits the concept of the contract to that of 
the individual with one another, which is only enforceable when the individuals 
surrender their liberty to a common sovereignty.  This is based on Hobbes‟ view of 
human nature as being selfish and timorous.  As a result, people can only be driven 
to obedience for self-preservation.  Rousseau shares Hobbes‟ view of the individual 
being led to submission under the quest for self-preservation.
 85
  These notions of 
self-interest and self-preservation are later on elaborated by Adam Smith.  Although 
Smith does not describe social or legal contracts directly, there is an implied 
contractual notion in the division of labour and the codependency process for wealth 
creation, for the individual to contribute and exchange goods and services for mutual 
interest and preservation.   These concepts of the contractual arrangement differ 
greatly with Althusius‟ federal arrangement.  As Moltmann points out, Hobbes‟ idea 
of the state as a Leviathan is a negative anthropology that legitimates power, 
authority and sovereignty based on human sinful nature.  It is an anarchical 
justification of state power.  In contrast, the covenant presents a positive 
anthropology of equality that legitimates power and democratic institutions for the 
control of power.  This is a covenant of free citizens participating in the design of a 
commonwealth in anticipation of heavenly citizenship in the kingdom of God.
86
 
 Not all scholars identify Althusius as a Federalist.  Although Riley 
acknowledges Althusius‟ system of universal symbiotic association united by 
communicative pacts, he identifies this as a system of medieval constitutionalism 
rather than that of modern federalism.  This is because Althusius presents a hierarchy 
of autonomous political units rather than a federal state in the modern sense.  He 
finds no mention of international federalism, idea of a federal world-state, or leagues 
of sovereign powers in the work of Althusius.
87
  Indeed Althusius has not developed 
                                                 
85
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the modern federal system, nor has he intended to do so.  Rather than modern 
concerns with regard to federalism, confederalism, decentralization, devolution, 
corporatism, pluralism, etc., Althusius is primarily concerned with a polity for 
harmonious and covenantal living among the symbiotic participants in relation to 
each other.  He lays the foundation of a system of symbiotic polity that contains the 
fundamental presuppositions of the covenant concept.  This polity is federal in the 
true sense.
88
  Although some of his late-medieval thoughts may not apply in the 
modern era, the covenantal foundation of Althusius‟ system provides timeless and 
valuable insights, and merits careful exploration. 
Carlyle and Carlyle point out that the concept of a contract between the ruler 
and the people was common and important in the sixteenth century when Althusius 
laid out the “contract” principle.  Althusius identifies it in elective or hereditary 
forms in France, England, Sweden, Spain and Germany.  It can also be identified in 
relation to the oath taken by princes on their accession.
89
  In effect, Althusius‟ work 
contributes to the understanding and distinction between contract and covenant in 
their societal application.
90
  Unfortunately, the covenant concept gradually erodes 
and changes shape as contract theory develops.
91
  Calvin‟s covenant turns into a 
contractualist interpretation mainly from the writings of the Monarchomachs, the 
Calvinist-Huguenot publicists defending themselves against the French Catholic 
monarchy.  The covenant concept is extended to a “double covenant” – that between 
God and his people, as well as that between the ruler and the people.  This doctrine 
of double covenant becomes the core of federal theology.  It aims at the lawful 
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regulation of plural communities through mutual obligations.
92
  Under the political 
system of Althusius, the covenant extends further to that among the people and 
among different groups of people.  The original intention clearly exceeds a 
contractual interpretation. 
Allen points out that the contract is a human contrivance that differs from the 
covenant.  A political community is a special covenant that recognizes the voluntary 
and social aspects of the participants, with a special kind of belonging and mutual 
ownership of the association.  A covenant is rooted in historical events and 
exchanges among the participants that lead to implicit promissory commitments.  
Therefore political obligations are never simply general, but reflect the promises, 
uses of power, entrustments and interactions of the political community.  Under a 
contract, the basis for political obligation is a duty of fair play from past actions.  
However, the argument based on fair play is deficient since it deals only with part of 
the political obligation.  Where a certain participant disrupts the fairness of the 
system, this duty no longer applies.  On the other hand, the covenant offers a broader 
interpretation of such political obligations.  Not only does fairness play a part in the 
participants‟ choices and actions, the participants are also entrusted with political 
power over their fellow citizens.  Through mutual participation, citizens accept each 
others‟ entrustment and obligate themselves even though others have not acted fairly.  




Social contacts are similar to the covenant in many ways.  Yet they are at 
most, partial covenants.  Within the structure of human polities, constitutions and 
contractual formats are necessary for setting proper constraints and procedures.  
Laws and written commitments are fundamental and essential even in the biblical 
Israelite tribes in the form of Commandments and Torah.  Nevertheless, as Mount 
points out, “Israel‟s constitution comes off less as absolute rules than as an 
expression of a more basic set of relationships.  Identity, participation, responsibility, 
and respect for diversity are all present to some degree.”
 94
  No written rules can fully 
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contain the essence of societal covenant.  Accordingly, all constitutions are partial.  
Any effort to hold laws and constitutions absolute will break down.  The covenantal 
community, including its legal rendering, must be a dynamic reflection of the 
participants‟ interactions and experiences.  Only a recognition of such covenantal 
aspects of human community yields freedom, equality, and respect for diversities. 
 
2.8  Rediscovery of the Covenant Foundation for Society 
 Althusius is the pioneer for a comprehensive system of a polity that is deeply 
grounded in the covenant concept.  His use of non-theological language demonstrates 
the highly accessible and universal nature of the covenant concept as applied to 
societal order.  The greatest contribution of Althusius lies in his ability to achieve 
this goal, making his work timeless and necessary for understanding the essence of 
the relational order in society as intended in the order of creation.  As Elazar asserts, 
the Calvinist, Althusian model of the religiously homogeneous polity is unlikely to 
be revived in the postmodern epoch.  However, we are beginning to rediscover the 
old understanding that all civil societies require some basic norms for survival.  
These norms are needed to obligate and bind the citizens, and to provide the basis for 
trust and communication.
95
  Human beings are essentially relational by nature.  The 
intrinsic yet essential notions of bonding, love, trust and communication are 
universal and fundamental to authentic living and must be restored in the postmodern 
political and economic society.   
Althusius‟ form of federal political thought is deeply rooted in the Reformed 
theological concept of the covenant, which in turn is based on a Calvinistic view of 
human nature.  His work shows that the covenant does not remain merely an 
ideological concept, but contains a highly realistic and practicable application to 
human life.  Unfortunately, as political systems developed over the centuries, certain 
elements of the covenant concept become eroded and reduced to functional use.  
Things, services and rights are considered from the viewpoint of satisfying individual 
wants, rather than from a view of mutual cooperation and communal effort.  Mutual 
benevolence has a lower priority when compared to individual advantage.  The 
essence of covenant communities and relationships is understood more and more 
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from a contractual point of view in the modern world.  Its detrimental effects are 
penetrating every aspect of contemporary life, extending from politics to welfare and 
social life.  A rediscovery of the structure, emphasis and implications of the covenant 
foundation is urgently called for. 
We have seen that in Althusius‟ polity, consociations reside at different levels 
with differing purposes and goals.  Covenants are present from the family unit, 
corporation, society, community, etc., up to the mega level of the nation and 
humanity.  Such variations and divergence support the functioning of a pluralistic 
society, while consociations converge at a higher level to a common humanity to 
form the polity.  Participation and exclusive communities provide a sense of identity 
that is sought by the modern individual.  At the same time, humankind strives 
towards a common nature and destiny, no matter how diverse individual beliefs may 
be.  The different levels of commonality serve different common goals.  Freedom 
and individualities are preserved while society converges to an overall covenant of 
the polity.  Within this covenantal polity, the same covenant essence penetrates every 
sphere of human society, ensuring the authentic and organic functioning of the 
economic order.  Such a covenantal society provides the guidance and boundaries for 
a covenantal exchange of goods and services in the economic market.  This gives rise 
to a universal marketplace that promotes genuine human relationship, individual 
freedom, communal living and economic justice.  In the next chapter, I shall draw 
upon scriptural and theological resources to examine the fundamental nature and 
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Chapter 3 
The Covenant Concept in Response to the Economic Order:  
Universality, Content and Relevance 
 
In the previous chapter, we found that the covenant concept has long been 
established by early theologians and political philosophers as a fundamental means 
that upholds societal order.  This chapter explores the contents of the covenant 
concept and discusses its relevance as a theological response to the modern economic 
market.  To formulate a theological response to economics, we need to discern the 
intention of authentic economic life as originally created by the Divine.  Although 
economic life relates to the material life on earth rather than spirituality, the well-
being of both the body and the soul is vital to the overall well-being of the human 
person.  Theological concerns over spirituality cannot be segregated from decisions 
about daily life.  Accordingly, this chapter starts with a discussion on human nature 
and economic activities, and proceeds to a rediscovery of the covenant concept as the 
original intended relational order within the doctrine of creation.  In doing so, I draw 
upon theological interpretations and scriptural narratives to demonstrate the 
characteristics of the covenant concept as a relational order.  Since the covenant is a 
rich concept that can take on different forms and can comprise a number of 
characteristics pertaining to society and human life in each of the scriptural 
narratives, I shall not exhaustively explore the contents of the covenant.  My focus is 
on covenantal elements such as relational order, freedom, morality and personal 
agency that are fundamental to the economic life. 
The objective of formulating a theological response to economic life is not to 
assert a subversive view of Christian ideology, but to rediscover the truth and order 
of creation that enables authentic economic life.  To achieve this, I examine whether 
and how the covenant appeals as universally applicable to economic order.  After 
establishing its universality, I further analyse the relevance of the covenant concept 
over the issues of personal agency and human freedom in the market.  The potential 
for a covenantal economy is then explored in comparison with the economy of grace 
or gift in order to find a proper balance between theological ideology and realism.  
The results point towards a rediscovery of the significance of the covenant concept 
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for society and the economic order, and the call for reintroducing the covenant to 
balance the modern economic market that has become increasingly contract-based. 
 
3.1  Human Nature Determines Economic Activities 
 Before we have a chance to give it any thought, we are engaged in the 
economic order of the market.  The market influences our daily decisions and actions, 
shaping the life of the community.  In the market, human persons interact with 
partners and strangers alike, contracting to exchange goods and services implicitly 
and explicitly.  Choices are made within the market, not only with respect to goods 
and services, but also in terms of ethical priorities and methods of dealings.  The 
market carries its own inclinations that interact with inert human nature to derive a 
structure of tendencies and priorities.  It is up to the participants to become aware of 
the ways through which they interact within the market, whether they choose to be 
driven by market priorities or to become master of a market that contains humanizing 
values.  What is the authentic way of human interaction within the economic market?  
The answer to this question points us towards identifying a theological anthropology 
relevant to economic life.
1
  Although a comprehensive discussion of theological 
anthropology is beyond the scope of this thesis, basic views regarding human nature 
are fundamental to the formulation of the economic market.  These must be 
considered when deriving the conditions necessary for an authentic market. 
In fact, enquiries about human nature mark the birth of the discipline of 
economics.  Moral philosopher and father of economics Adam Smith starts with a 
philosophical enquiry into human nature.  In his early years, he holds an anxious 
curiosity about the design or blueprints of order that underlie the naturalistic 
approach implicit in his later work.  To explore the universal design of the deity, 
Smith takes an interest in astronomy, moving on to moral philosophy during his 
years of professorship, before applying his inquisitive and observant method to  
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 As Atherton suggests, the pursuit of human well-being in modern economics and other secular 
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political and economic matters.
2
  Following a strand of Smithian thinking, free 
market advocates over the past decades have advocated a natural evolution of the 
economic interaction between human persons.  This natural evolution under an 
unidentified “invisible hand” becomes a natural development of economic activities 
based on human nature.  While human persons form the market, the market left to its 
natural evolution in turn shapes the mindset and culture of the economic persons.   
 Many people know Adam Smith according to the “Chicago school” of 
economics, which begins with the assumption that human persons are driven by the 
motive of personal utility maximization.  According to this homo economicus 
argument, the Smithian view of human nature is the pursuit of self-interest under 
competitive conditions.  This individualistic construct forms the basis for allocation 
of resource in the market economy.
3
  Unfortunately, such an understanding of 
Smith‟s system is a misreading of his self-interest concept.  Smith‟s vision of the 
liberal society comprises self-commanding individuals working together in a 
cohesive society, with government institutions that enforce justice and freedom.  
Starting from a natural description of human nature, Smith observes human 
behaviour and the underlying sentiments of such behaviour.  He then develops a 
system based on his observations, and advocates that institutions enhance the 
opulence of the system aiming towards a society of justice and freedom.
4
  This 
Smithian system of human nature, and its later version of egocentric self-interest, 
both differ from the view of human nature offered by theological anthropology. 
Theological anthropology offers a view of human nature based on creation 
and the sinful distortion of the order of creation when the first Adam turns away from 
the commandment of God.  It points out the dangerous tendency of dehumanization 
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 Adam Smith never completed his comprehensive work on “history of the astronomical systems”, but 
his interests and intentions are expressed in his correspondence with his long time intellectual 
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in a market that relies solely on individualistic constructs of human nature, and offers 
a relational view of human nature that promotes genuine economic relationships.
5
  
From an egocentric self-interested point of view, greed is the human motive that 
overwhelmingly drives human history and economic activities.  There is little hope 
for genuine human relationships if the only concern is egocentric self-interest 
because virtues are assumed to be non-rewarding.  Theology points out the sinfulness 
and finitude of humankind, and the need to rediscover the true and good nature of 
human persons within the order of creation.  Virtues that cannot be adequately 
quantified and represented in economic models retain their characteristics and values 
in this quest for human goodness. 
From a theological point of view, human persons are created in the imago Dei 
(image of God), after the likeness of God, and as creatures of God.  One would not 
be a human person if not created in His image.  Therefore the human person reflects 
the nature of the triune God with His will for human persons to be capable of relating 
to each other as well as to God Himself as covenantal partners.  This relational 
characteristic is central to the covenant implications on economic order.  Only Christ 
is the One not distorted by sin and maintaining all original goodness of creation.  The 
way He relates to us is covenantal, as He comes before humankind in the fullness of 
His humanity as a gift.  The covenantal way of relating is demonstrated in the 
ultimate manifestation of God‟s act through His Son in the narrative history of the 
covenant.  In this same narrative history, humankind is elected and called into 
personal responsibility in a societal and economic order that mirrors the covenantal 
assertions of the Creator.  The contract-based market encourages independence and 
disassociation of human persons by focusing on choices that benefit the self.  An 
emphasis of the covenantal nature of authentic human interactions injects human 
relational qualities of trust and care into economic behaviour.  It gives the economic 
participant a personal identity of the self and in relation to others. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Botman appropriately points out that the covenant serves a crucial role in theological anthropology.  
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generations.  Covenant is the most universal and proper theological category for a theological 
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3.2  The Covenant Concept 
 The word “covenant” originates from the Hebrew ּברית, and corresponds to 
the Greek diaqh,kh6 and Latin foedus.7  The richness of the covenant concept and its 
development throughout history lead to different understandings and confusion 
among the various definitions of covenant and contract forms.  While the covenant 
tradition has commonalities with the development of social contract, legal contract 
and commercial contract, it is essential to distinguish between contract and covenant 
in order to grasp the essence of the two distinct ideas.
8
  A covenant is a promise with 
one or more counterparties under common pursuit of shared values for long term 
cooperation and the well-being of the community.
9
  Contracts form the basis of the 
market while covenants form the basis of community.
10
  Awareness and enactment of 
the covenant must precede that of the contract since the covenant forms an essential 
and fundamental basis for society and the economic order.  The Covenant-God is a 
God of grace whose acts must not be reduced to legalistic contractual terms.  As 
Torrance points out, “the fallacy of legalism in all ages – perhaps this is the tendency 
of the human heart in all ages – is to turn God‟s covenant of grace into a contract… 
In the Bible, the form of the covenant is such that the indicatives of grace are always 
prior to the obligations of law and human obedience.”
11
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 The translation of ּברית into diaqh,kh is contested because diaqh,kh usually means last will or 
testament in classical and Hellenistic Greek.  However, many New Testament Scholars takes covenant 
as the true meaning of diaqh,kh.  In every reference to diaqh,kh in the New Testament, God‟s saving 
work is prominent.  The word is used in the Eucharist to take up the meaning of the new covenant of 
God with His people through the reconciliation of Jesus Christ.  See Hűbner, 'Covenant,' in  710-3. 
7
 The Latin foedus becomes the origin of the word “federal”, which in turn develops into “federalism”.  
This implementation of the covenant concept to political society is discussed in chapter 2. 
8
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9
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definition.  Mount defines contract/covenant by stating that “a contract constitutes an alliance of 
individuals for the satisfaction or guarantee of mutual interests; a covenant unites people with 
common allegiance to shared values or norms in a commitment to the long-term well-being of the 
community members”.  His definitions tend to limit a contract to mutual interests, and a covenant to 
community bonding and alignment of values.  However, the contractual mechanism does not 
guarantee mutual interests.  It is subject to the threats of coercion and inequality.  The development of 
neo-classical contract law is based on the necessity of arbitration and safeguard against such threats.  
On the other hand, while the covenant emphasizes communal relationships and bonding, it also 
contains an understanding of cooperative responsibility for the attainment of the common good.  See 
Mount, Covenant, Community and the Common Good: An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 21. 
10
 Development of the legal contract and contract law, and the formation of the contract-based market 
are examined in chapter 4.1. 
11
 Torrance, 'The Covenant Concept in Scottish Theology and Politics and Its Legacy,'  230. 
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Theologically, the covenant concept has been placed at the core of a 
conscious covenant or federal theology, which reduces this concept to dogmatic 
terms.  In fact, the covenant concept is a broader concept that underlies the 
foundation of human society with practical applications beyond dogmatic concerns.  
It is a relational concept that reflects the imago Dei in terms of the intimate and 
multifaceted means of relating among different parties.  The value of the covenant 
paradigm therefore resides in the ways and means of societal living.  As Mount 
asserts, “covenant is a distinctively, though not exclusively, Hebraic metaphor and 
model that locates the relational self in a community of identity, promise, and 
obligation with God and neighbor”.
12
  The covenant is the major form of providential 
order that provides a model for the formation of societies derived from the Divine-
human relationship.  Since it is given in the possibilities of creation, it is a basic 
feature of human life that surpasses contractual voluntarism to retain the sense of 
community.  The economic order, among others, is thus subject to God‟s will and 
care within the covenantal arrangement.
13
 
 The covenant of humanity resides within the covenant of God.  The covenant 
concept is based upon God‟s creation of human nature in covenantal interdependency.  
This covenantal interdependency implies that human nature is inevitably social and 
relational.  Humankind finds its fulfilment in the family, voluntary groups, religious 
associations, and political entities as ordered in federal or covenantal ways.
14
  
Covenant is also a way of dealing with plurality, through which unique persons can 
be responsive to God‟s covenant and fit into the creative, ordering and redeeming 
governance of God.  Although human persons have fallen into sin and have become 
unfaithful to the covenant, nature and humanity can be continuously renewed in the 
covenantal process towards consummation in God.  Accordingly, virtue in society is 
not mere goodness, but the social achievement from covenantal interaction of human 
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The covenant concept takes up multiple dimensions of societal life involving 
friendship, marriage, family, tribe, kingdom, nation, employment, teaching, law and 
the Divine in the Bible.  Scriptural narratives reveal the multifaceted nature of the 
covenant concept and its characteristics.  The covenantal way through which God 
relates to individuals such as Noah, Abraham, Moses and David in the Old 
Testament points towards a meta-narrative of covenantal history in the relationship 
between God and Israel.
16
  This meta-narrative extends into the new covenant 
between Christ and His people in the New Testament.  The covenant is thus revealed 
as the intended way of relational order with fundamental significance embedded in 
human nature, inclusive of the ethical characteristics common to humankind.  
Stackhouse asserts that “the common feature of these is that each may represent an 
ethical outworking of the divine-human relationship, for each not only is constituted 
but may be measured by a God-given framework and purpose for human life”.
17
  
Since it is such a fundamental and rich concept, the ethical assertions of the covenant 
can be further explored from many angles.  For example, Niebuhr uses the covenant 
concept as a symbol to define moral relationships in terms of the responses of the self 
in the community.  His concept of “responsibility” places the person within the 
covenantal structure rather than in the aspiration for goodness or obedience to laws 
and duties.
18
  Similarly, Stackhouse traces the renewal of covenant to the Mosaic 
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 Covenant theologian Cocceius takes a view of human nature that is strongly rooted in such 
covenantal interdependencies.  He asserts that humans are covenantal by nature.  The covenant 
characterizes a human social context whereby the human person emerges, becomes self-aware and 
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 An exhaustive examination of all covenants and their related characteristics in the Bible is not 
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days and asserts that covenant renewal confers moral identity and calls each person 
to responsibility and public integrity.
19
  
 Covenant involves simultaneously a passive and an active element whereby 
the relationships formed are based on active and autonomous free will, yet passively 
bounded by extrinsic orderly moral constructs that the parties adhere to.  It entails a 
moral and legal association that can be pluralistic, federated or hierarchical.  The 
primitive ritual of cutting a covenant in the context of the sharing of material 
resources in a sacrificial and celebrative rite invokes the presence or witness of 
God.
20
  It is enacted within a framework of duties and rights that form a system of 
justice.  A covenant is not casual but based on enduring law and purpose established 
by a higher authority.  It shifts the focus of domination and control from within the 
particular dealings to the incorporation of shared duties, rights and higher meanings. 
Covenant entails responsible human association rooted in human nature, with 
a relational rather than self-interested focus.  The Calvinistic concept of the covenant 
differs profoundly from the secularized individualistic liberal contractarianism.
21
  
Human persons do not exist in neutrality but are granted the choices and 
responsibilities that come with life on earth.
22
  To participate as a covenant partner of 
God is part of human nature and its necessity.  Humankind does not hover infinitely 
over its creatureliness, but must rediscover its humanity through participation in 
God‟s covenant.  This covenant order must in turn become the free choice of human 
participation.  As the relational order of the covenant is rediscovered, it is naturally 
manifested in societal relationships and market interactions.  Such a decision is not 
neutral but intentionally determined through the freedom to act.  The economic 
person thereby takes on a covenant awareness that induces freedom in the trust and 
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care that transcend mere contractual obligations.  For the non-believer, this 
covenantal desire remains throughout the quest for truth as a hidden need for 
reconciliation with the Creator.  This desire is reflected in the need for relationship 
with fellow human persons, whether the individual is a believer or not. 
After the sinful distortion of human nature, human persons exert a degree of 
self-interest that naturally precedes self-giving love for the other.  As a result, human 
bonds and relationships cannot be taken for granted but need to be nurtured.  As one 
human person is confronted with an absolutely different person who stands in the 
same brokenness of sin, self-contradictory acts and human finitudes repeatedly 
prevent authentic fellowship and cooperation.  Accordingly, natural development of 
the economic market without protective measures for covenantal concerns gradually 
leads to dehumanization.  Forrester asserts that sin in theological anthropology 
avoids overemphasis on human goodness and prevents the tendency to believe that 
true humanity can be fully understood through empirical observations.  Accordingly, 
the actuality and potentiality of human nature do not reside with the social sciences 
but with the order of creation and eschatological reality.  In a fallen, sinful world, the 
perfect human nature that reflects the imago Dei is hidden and distorted.  As such, a 
proper functioning of economic order cannot rely entirely on empirical observations.  
The brokenness of the human condition means that selfishness, manipulation, 
legalism, exploitation, etc., continue to obscure the original intention of creation.
23
 
 The humanizing of the market is essential to the well-being of humankind, as 
human persons must act in accordance with their authentic human nature for them to 
be complete.  Human persons are intended to be in relationship with one another.  
Hence a person in isolation or neutrality is inclined towards inhumanity, placing 
oneself in a self-contradictory state.
 24
  The encounter among human persons 
involves seeing through each other‟s eyes, reciprocity and mutual assistance.  The 
humanity of the person depends upon the awareness that we are in necessary 
assistance of one another.  To act humanly is to be human, and to be determined as a 
human person with gladness.  This humanity is not an ideal or virtue, but an order of 
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creation to be actualized.
25
  The economic market is one of the platforms for 
actualizing this mutual dependence.  An inhuman market is contradictory to the 
original humanizing intent of mutual assistance. 
Relational order in the imago Dei is further revealed through the intra-
relationship of the Trinity.  The doctrine of the Trinity establishes that God‟s inner 
life and His ways of relating to the world involve both diversity and unity.  The result 
is a coherent, integrated diversity that embraces a plurality of consociations.  It is a 
conviction that the world is created by an ultimate reality that governs history, 
comprising inextricably bound persons in their respective vocations, forming a 
covenantal community that is cosmic in scope.
26
  These elements embedded in the 
structural composition of economic life mean that the clue is a rediscovery of the 
intricate relationships of community that have been overlooked.  The meaning and 
characteristics of the covenant as relational order are contained in scriptural 
narratives throughout the New and Old Testaments.  Ecclesiastical communities 
involve human persons living together in covenantal relationships with a view 
towards God‟s kingdom where God‟s justice reigns.
27
  This covenantal way of life 
offers a prototype for economic relationships both within and beyond the 
ecclesiastical community.  I shall proceed to establish the universality of the 
covenant concept for both believers and non-believers by examining the Noachic and 
Abrahamic covenants. 
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3.3  The Noachic and Abrahamic Covenants: Universality versus Particularity 
The concepts of creation, providence, redemption and ecclesiastical order are 
fundamental to the origin of the covenant.  However, they appear in the first instance, 
concepts that belong exclusively to the ecclesiastical community.  In order for the 
covenant concept to be applicable to economics and market order, it must not be an 
exclusive notion.  The covenantal community, while bounded together by a common 
and exclusive set of values, means and objectives, must at the same time remain open 
to participation.  If God‟s relational covenant is only intended for an elected few and 
necessarily excludes the others, it cannot be applied to the economic order that serves 
all humankind.  Therefore in the midst of theological languages and articulation of 
covenant economic implications, we need to establish that the covenant concept is 
relevant to and inclusive of all humankind.  The paradox between particularity and 
universality in the covenant concept is revealed in the Abrahamic and Noachic 
covenants.  The Noachic covenant is a universal covenant between the Divine and 
the whole cosmos, while the Abrahamic covenant depicts a particular covenant 
between God and Israel. 
The word ּברית (covenant) first appears in the Old Testament when God 
announces to Noah His decision to destroy the corrupted world.  God establishes a 
covenant with Noah and promises to spare all that enters the ark (Gen.6:18-19).  
After the flood, God establishes a covenant under the sign of the rainbow, promising 
not to repeat this destruction of the world as long as the earth remains (Gen. 8:22).   
Before the flood, humankind is so corrupted that “every imagination of the thoughts 
of its heart was only evil continually” (Gen. 6:5).  After the flood, “the imagination 
of humanity‟s heart is evil from its youth” (Gen. 8:21).  Putting these clauses 
together shows that before and after the flood, the evil inclination of human nature 
remains unchanged.
28
  The biblical narratives quote the same reason of corrupted 
human nature for God‟s destruction of the world, and for the covenant never to 
destroy the world again.  Therefore the divine promise is entirely based on God‟s 
grace without any regard for change of the evil inclination within human nature.  The 
specific way by which God chooses to assert this grace is through the promise of the 
covenant.  Although the covenant can be bilateral, it also contains the unilateral 
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capacity for exerting grace and mercy on the counterparties.  It supports the 
participants‟ willingness of self-giving love and compassion.  God confirms that He 
will not bring a flood to destroy living creatures on earth again (Gen. 9:8-11).  The 
Noachic covenant presents the divine prescription for a relational order that embraces 
the capacity of free participation in a promise of grace.
29
  It is a universal covenant 
with the whole cosmos, based on a universally applicable form of relational order. 
God‟s promise to Abraham is first recorded in His call for Abraham to leave 
his father‟s land to go to the promised land, where Abraham will be blessed a great 
nation (Gen. 12:1-3).  This promise is repeated as Abraham proceeds through his 
journey (Gen. 18:17-19), taking the literal form of a solemn oath (Gen. 22:15-18), 
and named as a covenant (Gen. 15:18).  Similar to the promise to Noah, God‟s 
promise to Abraham contains no particular conditions, except that it assumes 
Abraham‟s faithfulness and obedience to God.
30
  In contrast to the Noachic covenant, 
the Abrahamic covenant appears at first glance to be an exclusive one between God 
and the nation of Israel.  Its particularity resides in the fact of Abraham being the 
elected one, whose name will be great and whose sons will become a great nation 
(Gen. 12:2).  Nevertheless, the scope of this covenant, commencing with a nation of 
the elected people of Israel, extends to an inclusive nation of the people as all people 
on earth will also be blessed through Abraham (Gen. 12:3).  Accordingly, the 
Abrahamic covenant is a covenant based on a faith that lies within the paradox of 
inclusiveness and exclusiveness.  Indeed God calls upon a single person and his 
descendants to come under His special providence.  From Abraham comes a new 
nation of Israel that is the chosen people of God.  The fundamental notion of the elect 
and covenant carries an exclusiveness that limits its membership and benefits to a 
single nation.  This covenant is then extended as Israel serves as a light of all nations, 
a nation from which the Messiah shall come to redeem the entire humankind.  The 
Abrahamic covenant is inclusive of all the elected people of God.  With the 
redemptive work of Christ, this election is made available to all those who believe.  
The universality of the covenant applies not only to salvation, but to the capability of 
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the covenant concept to be applied to the whole cosmos because of its essential place 
in the creation and providential narratives.  It is universal as it is the original and 
authentic way of relationships freely entered into by all humankind.  This 
universality is revealed in Scripture as the mega-narrative continues to the climax of 
the coming of the Messiah and into His second coming at the end of time. 
The Jewish scholar Jacob Agus asserts that an exclusive view of the covenant 
is contrary to the liberal and open-ended understanding of revelation that 
characterises the modern Jew.  Israel, the chosen people, is “called upon to act as an 
example to other individuals and nations, not as an exception”.
31
  The universality of 
the covenant is similarly affirmed by Brueggemann who sees the covenantal 
paradigm as a subversive one that relates to the world beyond the believing 
community.  As such, it is also the basis for mission in a world that is yet to be 
liberated.
32
  A rediscovery of covenant language in the human hearts is at the same 
time a rediscovery of the authentic way of building fundamental human 
relationships.
33
  The characteristics of the Abrahamic covenant point towards 
universality within its own particularity.  It is a coherent development from the 
Noachic covenant, serving as a continuation of the progressive covenantal 
relationship of God with humankind and the cosmos. 
Hueglin points out that in Calvin‟s Geneva, those who departed from the rigid 
path of prescribed morality were excommunicated.  The covenant between God and 
His people was therefore rather exclusive to the believing community.  It was 
Althusius who proposed that faith be persuaded rather than commanded, and taught 
rather than ordered.  As an orthodox city politician and church elder, he held that 
those who err in religion are to be ruled by the sword of the Spirit.  The magistrate in 
his administration is not to impose a penalty on them.  This means that the covenant 
does not require the exclusion of non-believers from the political community.  By not 
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putting God‟s grace into human hands, Althusius was able to promote the idea of 
symbiosis as the fundamental of “living together”.
34
  Accordingly, the universality of 
the covenant as a relational concept is advocated in society for both believers and 
non-believers. 
The covenant is universal because its concept and characteristics are offered 
to all humanity, with a capacity of unity in diversity.  It allows for multilevel of 
associations, across different purposes and religions.  The covenantal structure 
supports commitment according to individual quests for purpose and truth by both 
believers and non-believers.  Stackhouse points out that “the first element of an 
authentic covenant defines the parties who are in the relevant community of social 
interaction, now under global conditions offered not to one people or one faith, but to 
the world”.
35
  In the light of differences in historical development, political system, 
societal culture, economic growth, market functions, etc., humankind shares a wide 
range of commonalities including intellect, reason, conscience, sense of guilt, as well 
as the longing for freedom, justice, love and many other virtues.  The unity of 
humankind is claimed through faith and morality.  As Bavinck asserts, “the solidarity 
of the human race, original sin, the atonement in Christ, the universality of the 
kingdom of God, the catholicity of the church, and the love of neighbour – these all 
are grounded in the unity of humankind”.
36
  Within this unity and diversity, the 
covenant concept remains universally applicable owing to its fundamental roots 
within creation as the divine way of relationship and societal order. 
The covenant concept is both paradoxical and rich in content in terms of 
inclusiveness and exclusiveness.
37
  The inclusive covenant acts as the overall basis of 
moral choices.  Specific covenants of various natures are entered into under this basis.  
Contracts are negotiated and derived from this overriding understanding.  Covenants 
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are continuously entered into and renewed as we construct a set of relationships 
which bind us with one another within the covenantal community.  Special covenants, 
such as marriage vows, involve intimate relationships that are long-lasting and loving.  
These involve more than respect for rights and duties.  Daily contracts, such as 
purchases from a local store, involve just and fair dealings within the structure of an 
ethical covenant of economic order.  Inclusiveness is the very first characteristic of 
covenantal love.  Allen points out that “one of the most serious failings of any 
government occurs when it rules on behalf of some but not all its citizens: when it 
excludes from its concern or neglects the poor, the powerless, dissenters, the 
unpopular, the different”.
38
  While the legal contract is an essential tool for governing 
and safeguarding the society, it must be complemented by a covenantal basis for 
human relationships.  The understanding and use of the covenant are not limited to 
an understanding of biblical concepts or a relationship with the Divine.  It embraces 
all humanity.  The very foundation of human society and the economic order 
depends on the enactment of covenantal ethics.  Because of its forgiving and 
continuing nature, the covenant transcends material considerations in satisfying 
human desires.  With covenantal love, believers are able to relate to all humanity 
despite the sinful nature of humankind.  In modern society, these covenantal virtues 
of love, trust and sharing are in turn safeguarded by the legal contract. 
The modern day individual is involved in multiple daily activities with 
different roles and identities, each involves potentially covenantal relationships.  One 
needs to be “an integrating center of identity”, with a sense of divine call and 
empowerment.
 39
  Otherwise the activities become meaningless drudgeries.  Each 
covenant is a means of grace from the point of view of divine creation.  Marriage is a 
sacred moment, political oaths are solemn promises.  Hospitals and schools represent 
the covenant commitment to serving the community, while cultural events mark the 
celebration of life.  Corporations are covenantal communities dedicated towards 
economic means.  When the contract is used in business transactions, the covenant 
underlies corporate and societal relationships to ensure that covenantal characteristics 
of trust, commitment, cooperation, honesty, etc., lay a proper foundation for mutual 
benefit.  When covenantal love and commitment may be distorted because of human 
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sinfulness, the contract protects the covenantal parties from exploitation.  Both 
covenant and contract are therefore universal, relevant and essential to economic life.  
A lack of awareness of the necessary covenantal nature of human relationships 
means that the economic market can gradually be reduced to mere contractual 
arrangements and lead to deconstruction of societal relations. 
 
3.4  The Mosaic Covenant: Human Freedom in the Market 
As the intended way of relating between God and His people, the various 
covenants in the Bible reveal different forms and elements of the covenant concept.  
Another covenantal element that is significant to the economic order is on the issue 
of human freedom.  Freedom in the economic market is often taken to be freedom of 
individual choices to satisfy needs and desires.  This brings about the wider issue of 
just distribution and potential exploitation of resources.  Accordingly, there is a need 
for theological interpretation to provide insights into the genuine meaning of human 
freedom in the market.  I shall draw upon another important covenant narrative – the 
Mosaic covenant, to explore this matter. 
The Mosaic covenant made at Mount Sinai contains a different pattern than 
the preceding covenants with Noah and the patriarchs.  Rather than a promissory 
covenant, it contains a binding obligation for the Israelites to obey the divine 
commandments under threat of penalties.  The Israelites are delivered from the 
bondage of slavery in Egypt, and are on their journey to the promised land.  This 
celebrative narrative of freedom and deliverance at the same time contains strong 
demands for obedience to the divine laws.  Covenant ceremonies and renewals 
continue to remind the people of Israel of the promises and obligations contained in 
the Mosaic covenant (Deut. 6:20-25, 26:5-10; Josh. 24:1-28).  At this point in history, 
Israel was a covenant society with no king, no army and no administrative 
government.  God‟s people depended entirely on divine provision and protection, 
under the call for allegiance to their God Yahweh and obedience to the Torah.
40
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The Mosaic covenant contains a paradox between obedience to the Torah and 
the freedom to do as willed.  It reveals the importance of human freedom to enable 
voluntary participation and commitment to the covenant.  The necessity and 
significance of human freedom are seldom disputed across intellectual disciplines.  
Yet the understanding of what is meant by freedom often varies.  What is freedom 
and how does it relate to the economic or market order?  What does it mean to say 
that freedom is one of the most important aspects of the covenant?  Elazar points out 
that the Torah uncovered in the Mosaic Book of Covenant begins with a primary 
concern for freedom.  Israel is reaffirmed a free people, with slaves freed after a 
seven-year bondage.  Other laws follow on from this first pronouncement.
41
  In the 
Exodus narrative, Israel is freed from the bondage of slavery in Egypt, and called 
into a journey to the promised land of Canaan.  During this journey, God‟s people 
enter into freedom within the limits of the Torah that teaches obedience.  The Mosaic 
covenant reveals the nature of the true human freedom that resides not in the freedom 
of choice but the freedom in obedience.  Human freedom is essentially a freedom in 
limitation.  Authentic freedom resides within the boundaries of obedience and 
morality.  The paradoxical nature of freedom is captured within the ability of 
decision and choice versus the limitation of such choices.  Such theological 
understanding provides insights into the economic market that offers choices to 
satisfy needs and wants in the name of human freedom. 
The almighty God capable of over-ruling human freedom summons 
humankind into free decision and responsibility.  This human freedom is the most 
important basis of the covenant since it enables the capacities of decision, 
commitment, responsibility, justice, love, compassion, stewardship, etc., everything 
essential to the enactment of the covenant.  It also includes the freedom to participate 
in the eternal covenant and to return to the eternal love of the Creator.  Freedom is 
granted by God to humankind as a gift.  Whether one belongs to the believing 
community or not, the significance of freedom as the essential basis for economic 
acts can easily be recognized.   
The notion of freedom has been allotted various meanings throughout the 
intellectual history of many disciplines including philosophy, politics, sociology, 
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economics, etc.  It is seldom disputed that freedom is fundamental to the functioning 
of the modern market.  Bader-Saye points out that the moral discourse of modernity 
takes freedom as an unquestioned good that holds together differences by affirming 
personal choices.  However, such freedom is a freedom of choice that has led to the 
breakdown of relationships and misuse of resources.  The Christian faith challenges 
the construction of freedom as abstract personal choice by proposing the alternative 
of freedom as the capacity to live faithfully.  God‟s election of Israel comprises a 
faithful participation in the communal covenant.  In such covenant community, 
freedom is both a gift and a calling, both a given and a goal.  It is “freedom from sin 
and self-determination and freedom for risky engagement with the reign of God”.
42
  
The Mosaic covenant is a covenant of the priestly tradition.  In the New Testament, 
the priestly tradition extends to all people of God in Christ, who are called to 
sanctification and service of the eternal God.  Accordingly, the people of God are 
called to act in obedience within the exercise of the human freedom originally 
granted by the Creator.  Such acts on earth represent priestly service to one another 
and therefore to God. 
 Freedom as defined by the freedom of choice holds “choice” to be the 
ultimate good.  In a free market sustained purely by the priority of liberal personal 
choice, goods are produced and distributed according to customer preferences 
without concern for societal goods or minorities‟ well-being.  Ironically, consumer 
preferences and commodification of the means and ends of life create boundaries and 
limits to the freedom of choice.  These boundaries are represented by allocation of 
monetary values to any possibility of commodification in terms of wealth and profit 
creation.  A choice-based freedom is therefore reduced to a contractible or 
measureable freedom in terms of monetary utilities.
43
  In the biblical narratives of 
Israel, the covenant embraces God‟s electing grace and human freedom of voluntary 
participation in obedience.  Freedom is embedded in the identity acknowledged and 
discovered as God‟s faithful and obedient covenant partner – a people elected by 
divine grace.  In turning away from God by breaking the covenant through 
disobedience, the Israelites fall into a destructive autonomy where they lose their 
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identity and turn from freedom to slavery.  The Mosaic covenant presents God‟s 
faithful work in liberating His people, freeing them from the bondage of slavery and 
granting the Torah to renew the eternal covenant with His people.  As Brueggemann 
points out, participants in the covenant have “dangerous freedom in the presence of 
the other one”.
44
  They grant freedom to each other based on faithful trust, affirming 
the identity and personhood of the others. 
 In contrast to covenantal freedom, the modern free enterprise system is 
developed based on the freedom of contract.  As Kessler points out, a highly elastic 
legal institution is necessary to reasonably safeguard the exchange mechanism of the 
market.  This need prompted common law lawyers to expand the use of the contract 
so that it becomes an indispensable, rational instrument of the entrepreneur.  The 
contract protects the reasonable expectations created by the participants through a set 
of laws that deal with the formation, performance, impossibility and damages of 
contracts.
45
  To some extent, this mechanism allows the participants to enter freely 
into transactions, and thus promotes economic freedom.  Nevertheless, the freedom 
of contract remains a partial freedom that can only be partially governed by law.  A 
fundamental covenantal freedom is essential to complement it.  This is because it is 
impossible for the law of contract to anticipate the form and content of all contractual 
transactions, or to ascertain the specific contracting intentions of all participants.  
Since a contract is made primarily through the bargaining process, the freedom of 
contract necessarily carries the possibility of exploitation.  Its proper enactment 
depends on underlying covenantal characteristics such as mutual responsibility, 
equality, commitment, trust, cooperation, etc.  For example, big enterprises often 
have strong bargaining power because they hold the goods or services that the 
weaker party needs.  They often offer to the weaker party, standard contracts with 
clauses that aim to protect their own interests.  It therefore becomes necessary for the 
law of contract to safeguard against such inequality of power.  Legislations that 
protect the consumers can be established to tackle these issues.  However, such 
legislations cannot anticipate an exhaustive set of infinite possibilities.  The 
establishment and implementation of each additional law involve social costs and 
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may in turn limit the freedom of contract.
46
  There will always be a fundamental need 
for covenantal norms to balance the freedom of contract. 
The modern economic market embraces a set of faulty anthropological 
assumptions and erroneous definition of freedom that requires redirection.  Human 
freedom embraces much broader and richer contents then the economic freedom of 
choice.  Preston points out that economists move too quickly from efficiency to 
freedom, with freedom interpreted in a very individualistic sense.  Individuals in a 
contract-based market develop in isolation, competition and distrust, away from the 
social relations and interdependence that are in fact fundamental to the core of 
human living.  “A narrow view of freedom takes individuality (or personhood) as 
given, and ignores the social institutions and traditions within which persons relate to 
one another and arrive at what their social relationships enable them to be.”
47
  
Human persons are born into communities and interdependent relationships.  To 
nurture and develop these bonds requires the covenant concept.  The covenant is 
required to work simultaneously with contractual arrangements to ensure that the 
moral and relational aspects of human nature are upheld under the pursuit of 
efficiency and growth.  The ecclesiastic community necessarily values human 
freedom as the gift granted by God, to be exercised in obedience to the Word of God.  
The human person voluntarily confesses the commandment of God and internalizes it 
as the prescribed action.  Accordingly, the freedom to act is not only to choose or to 
realize, but to realize oneself in the act.  This freedom is a freedom for God, a 
freedom to obey Him.
48
  This freedom is at the same time a freedom in relation to  
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God and to fellow human persons.
49
  Since we have established that theologically, 
human freedom is freedom in obedience, we need to further establish the basis for 
such authority within the economic order.  In particular, this authority that summons 
freedom in obedience needs to accommodate both believers and non-believers in a 
pluralistic society in the modern era.  Accordingly, the next theological task is to 
seek an authoritative measure of economic order that enhances morality and governs 
against exploitation through both personal agency and law enforcement.  I shall 
examine the Davidic covenant for this purpose. 
 
3.5  The Davidic Covenant: Authority, Morality and Personal Agency 
The Davidic covenant gives a broader perspective of the covenant society as 
it marks a promissory gift of the kingdom (2 Sam. 7).  After two hundred years of 
tribal confederacy, the Israelites lost their battle to the Philistines, their Ark captured, 
their priests slain.  Their land is filled with idols and shrines of foreign gods.  At this 
time of emergency, a young hero David united Israel within a few years, broke the 
Phillistines, and took Jebusite in Jerusalem to be his capital.  Under David‟s reign, 
the land of Canaan is recaptured, extending the Israelites‟ domain as far as the Gulf 
of Aqabah, the Sinai desert and Syria.  A new dynasty is formed, with the 
replacement of Judges by Kings and the passing on of power under kinship.  The 
Davidic covenant follows the pattern of the patriarchal covenant with added elements 
of obligations on the recipients.  The king is commanded to do justice and follow 
Yahweh‟s covenant law, but the divine promise remains everlasting even in the event 
of disobedience (2 Sam. 7:15; Ps. 18:21, 89:30-37).
50
   
The Davidic covenant is a covenant of kinship and kingship because it is 
relational in mutuality within a familial and communal bond, yet also hierarchical in 
the form of a constitutional monarchy.  It involves both bilateral and tripartite 
covenanting.  A covenant relationship is established by God with David, whereby 
David is anointed king of Israel.  This relationship extends to covenants between 
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David and the people of Israel.
51
  Elazar identifies this new regime as one combining 
monarchic and federal institutions.  Chronicles further affirms this kingship by 
asserting that David‟s son will be the indirect means of God‟s sovereign rule in Israel 
(1 Chron. 17:14, 29:23; 2 Chron. 9:8, 13:8).  The king establishes a government to 
defend the needy (Ps. 72), and exercises sovereignty over other nations (1 Chron. 
29:11).
52
  Both kinship and kingship are essential for the authentic relationship that 
starts between God and the person, and extends to that among human persons.  The 
relationship between God and His people involves both the sovereign kingdom of 
God and kinship of His people.  God is both the King and the Father.  At the same 
time, human persons relate to each other in various spheres comprising kinship and 
hierarchical structures.  The market is a sphere of communal exchange upon the 
foundation of community and kinship.  A regime of law and order acts as the written 
authority to ensure justice within this sphere.  At the same time, individuals act as 
personal agents in a call to exercise stewardship and uphold morality.  In the 
economic market human persons can thus relate freely to cooperate and interact 
responsibly. 
Moltmann points out that besides being imago Dei, human persons are also 
imago mundi.  They stand before God as “image of the world”, representative of all 
creatures.
53
  As a result, “the human ownership of God‟s creation can only be 
recognized as just by the use of it in solidarity”.
54
  This means that there is a duty 
attached to ownership, whether under divine authority for the believer or in the 
conscience of the non-believer.  Within the covenant, all human persons are at the 
same time personal agents for stewardship of the world and its resources.  As such, 
Christians are directed towards the world with a comprehensive mission in history 
for the kingdom of God.  Moltmann identifies the economic process as one of the 
three major world processes of economics, politics and culture where the church 
must enact its mission.  In economics, the church should liberate humans and nature 
from exploitation.  It is where faith means the courage to affirm life and be loyal to 
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the earth.  The hope for the coming kingdom is vital because the contemporary world 
crises – economic, political and cultural, are shaking humankind to the depths of the 
will to live.  Christians do not merely offer ethical commitment to society, but the 
liberation and redemption that come from the presence of its faith.
55
   
 The covenant assertion of divine authority over personal agency faces some 
difficulties in a pluralistic world.  While the scriptural covenants presuppose one 
divine Creator, the covenantal way of life does not.  Those things that remain 
common to believers and non-believers alike are the capacity for personal agency, 
morality embedded in human conscience, and the freedom to search for the truth.  In 
a multilevel and multi-faith society, covenantal associations are offered time and 
space to search for their own truth.  Accordingly, there will always be a tension 
among different interest groups in a pluralistic society.  Continuous dialogue among 
these associations is an essential part of a covenantal polity.  This difficulty is 
coupled by the problem of human sinfulness that remains a reality even among 
believers.  The church on earth in this temporality does not reflect the kingdom of 
God.
56
  In an economic market driven by legal laws and contractual obligations, 
Christians strive to live with the identity and characteristics of covenantal 
relationships.  However, they do not always succeed.  At the same time, contractual 
laws are necessary to govern their voluntary participation in the economy and to 
regulate the interaction among all the market participants.  Divine authority, personal 
agency and morality all play their respective parts in a pluralistic society that 
attempts to unite diversified beliefs and interests in one harmonious societal and 
economic order. 
Althusius uses the covenant concept to coordinate political participants so 
that each party is attributed original political rights.  He emphasizes that justice is 
embedded in the divine plan for human existence, therefore adding a moral 
dimension to the polity.  His message is that the rational logic of justice is identical 
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with divine law, and that it must attach itself to the higher principle of mutuality, the 
categorical imperative of the covenantal society.  Such a covenant is by no means a 
contractual one among autonomous egocentric individuals.
57
  Legal rules and order 
provide a framework for human functions that needs to reside upon the covenantal 
way of relating.  Both the contractual economic order and covenantal 
interdependence of human persons in the economy are essential to uphold market 
functions.  These universal concepts must coexist and interact to promote healthy 
market norms.
58
  Law is necessary because of sin and is not needed in the state of 
perfection.  In the ideal economy of perfection, the household of God rests upon 
covenantal relationships in perfect bonding and cooperation.  In the interim reality on 
earth, contracts and contractual law are necessary to govern and enact household 
rules because of fallen human nature. 
 There will always be a conflict of interests whenever economics denies the 
universal household of God, and remains unaware of the ways by which deformed 
theological concepts dominate the economy.
59
  At the same time, Christians are often 
unaware of the distortion of religious notions brought about by dehumanized 
economic relationships.  The Old Testament prophets‟ repeated call for repentance 
and justice presents a continuing demand for commitment, as well as the capacity for 
renewal of the covenant.  It is the nature and will of God to remain perpetually 
steadfast as a party to the eternal covenant that He has initiated.  After Israel anoints 
earthly kings to govern them, the kings are equally subject to the divine law as 
participants in the divine covenant.  Accordingly, God‟s covenantal love towards His 
people continues, interacts with and works through the earthly kingdoms as they are 
established.
 60
  Laws and contractual order do not negate the covenantal essence of 
divine authority, but extends it to a providential care that allows plurality and the 
continuing quest of each individual for the truth.  Morality and personal agency work 
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in every human heart as originally intended in creation.  Under the primary and 
unconditional covenant with Israel, God acts to bring His people out of Egypt.  The 
Decalogue articulates Israel‟s response to God‟s faithfulness towards this covenant.  
Upon the basis of the covenant, the obligations and law of the Torah are thus also 
sustained by God‟s unconditional faithfulness.
61
  The ultimate goal is a covenantal 
renewal that unites all consociations under the divine authority of the Creator. 
 
3.6  The New Covenant: From Scarcity to Satisfaction and Thanksgiving 
 The New Testament offers a renewed, covenantal ecclesiology with the 
coming of Christ.  This new covenant builds on the worldview of creation in the Old 
Testament, and extends it to present an ideological order with the redemption of 
Christ and the kingdom of God to come.  In this temporal life on earth, a fully 
covenantal society will always remain an ideology because of human sinfulness and 
finitude.  The kingdom of God, and therefore the perfect form of the covenantal 
ideology, is only realizable at the end of time.  I shall examine the new covenant not 
to promote it as an ideology for life on earth, but to examine what it offers in terms 
of our understanding of the content of the covenant and what the covenantal way 
encompasses. 
 Most philosophers hold a teleological worldview proceeding from the order 
and beauty of observable things in the world.
62
  As a moral philosopher, Adam 
Smith‟s concept of the “invisible hand” asserts the teleological argument that there is 
an order and harmony with observable purpose underlying the free economy.  It 
assumes at most a designer behind all things, rather than a creator.  It presupposes an 
unconscious motive working behind the free market that contains more wisdom and 
certainty than conscious reflection.
63
  Contradictory to this teleology, materialism in 
fact presents no purpose in things and objects.  As natural evolution takes humankind 
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towards an increasing focus upon materialism, the teleological view of invisible 
harmony is quickly taken over by the mechanical structure that resides upon 
unconscious functionality.  The doctrine of natural law and natural religions that 
arises from the human quest for self-realization finds the human person autonomous 
and independent from God.  The individual person develops the tendency to see 
oneself as the central focal point of perfection in his own end.
64
  The familiar 
covenant concept and its intended relational order can easily be distorted to serve the 
interest of the individual through legalization and quantitative analysis of personal 
gains.  In contrast, the covenant permits a new ecclesiology that show God‟s 
intention for a society that values all its participants, brings them together to form a 
common community of work and joy, and distributes its produce equally.
65
 
Perceiving the world as creation implies a particular worldview towards the 
existence of human persons and an embodiment of individuals into a wider 
fellowship under the Creator.  Barth offers a critique of the covenant concept as it 
places an ontological and epistemic priority on creation, making the grace of 
salvation in Christ secondary to the gift of creation.  This is not the case because the 
entire covenant tradition puts a soteriological priority on Christ.  The gift of creation 
does not diminish the significance of grace as creation is a historical necessity prior 
to redemption, being restored into the original goodness through the covenants that 
embody the order, purposes and grace of God.
66
  The understanding of an order of 
creation draws an attitude of thanksgiving in light of the charity of gift and self-
giving love.  It is the recognition of what has been received as gifts and blessings to 
be shared and cherished.  Without such awareness, possessions and rights can be 
taken for granted.  Stewardship and thanksgiving notions can be ignored.  Human 
persons should not dominate and use the world as they wish, but discern the world as 
God‟s creation.
67
  God creates human persons to be rational and moral beings, and 
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thus maintains them in such ways.  Accordingly, He grants freedom without coercion, 
relating to His people through counsel, admonition, warning, invitation and petition 
in the covenant.  It is the way of gifting that induces gratitude without duress, and 
embraces universality without exclusion.
68
  It is the way that provides true human 
freedom in the midst of decisions and choices in economic life.  Through enacting 
covenantal initiatives within contractual boundaries, humankind receives the divine 
gift of creation with responsibility and thanksgiving.
69
 
 Creation, providence and redemption appear to be assets of the ecclesiastical 
community, yet they are theological articulations that affect the whole cosmos.  The 
covenant of salvation embraces the whole human race as Abraham and Israel are 
elected out of the bond with humanity that remains intact.
70
  The covenant between 
God and humanity extends from the universal Noachic covenant with nature and the 
covenant of grace with the elect to the eternal covenant of salvation for all humanity.  
This reflects a covenant among the three persons in the beings of the divine trinity 
itself, known as the pactum salutis (counsel of peace, covenant of redemption, or 
intratrinitarian pact of salvation).
71
  The pactum salutis reveals the covenantal 
relationships and life of the trinity in consummate self-consciousness and freedom.  
Within this Trinitarian covenant, the covenant flourishes to its fullness.  This 
covenantal way of relating is reflected with the character of a sovereign grant 
between God and humanity.  The redemptive work of Christ resides at the climax of 
salvation history in the eternal covenant of grace granted by God as a gift to all  
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humanity.
72
   
The ultimate concern of the pactum salutis is all humanity, through a renewed 
covenant of grace in Christ.  However, living out the covenant concept alone is by no 
means the way into the covenant of God, because the covenant way of life can take 
on any object or ultimate concern.  It is the believers‟ response to the covenant of 
grace in Christ that makes the participants children of God.  Nevertheless, the 
covenant way is available to believers and non-believers alike because it is part of 
the fundamental truth embedded in authentic human nature.  It is an apologetic 
assertion and duty of the church to proclaim the authentic way of human living in 
societal and economic life.  In Christian worship, the Eucharist stands at its core 
ritual of covenantal realization that anticipates the eschatological community in the 
kingdom of God.  It points towards the hope for an authentic household and 
economic order that represents the ultimate manifestation of the covenantal 
relationships in its perfect form. 
There is a remarkable parallel to be drawn between the use of the Old 
Testament Law, the Torah, as a call for obedience and societal order for maintaining 
the covenant with God, and the use of the New Testament salvation, through grace, 
as redemption of all humanity in Christ.  The covenant of grace presupposes that the 
Old Testament Law is inadequate because of humankind‟s fallen nature, and moves 
it to its fulfilment through the work of Christ.  Use of the contract to govern societal 
and economic order provides a set of fundamental rules with covenantal intentions.  
Unfortunately, these intentions are often lost in the midst of exploitation of law and 
order through coercion, individualism and the like.  Humankind has thus forgone the 
essence of the covenant that underlies contractual guidance.  Nevertheless, God 
continues to uphold His eternal covenant with divine grace and providence.  It 
remains the key to fulfilling the emptiness in human hearts through reconciliation 
with the Creator.  The covenant of salvation is actualized through the redemptive 
work of Christ.  In the economic household of creation, the covenant fulfils the work 
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of the contract by preceding it as the underlying reality of all economic and societal 
relationships. 
 In the New Testament, the Trinitarian narrative of the Son marks an open 
invitation to the communal relationships of God.  This divine community, the unity 
of the Triune God, is open for humankind, for the whole cosmos, and for the future.  
It reveals the nature of the eternal, covenantal bond.  The entire creation shall find 
space and time in God under the unity of love in the Father, through the Son, and in 
the fellowship of the Holy Spirit.
73
  Redemptive power within the relational nature of 
the Trinity has significant implications to economic order.  It places the economic 
distribution process in community and relationships as opposed to individualistic 
satisfaction and selfishness.  It means that human freedom is neither a licence of 
autonomy to do as one wills, nor the protection of an individual‟s independence from 
interference.  Positive freedom is properly developed and exercised in fellowship 
through the proper distribution of resources and the empowerment of human persons 
to flourish within the fabric of a community.
74
   
 The New Testament presents us with a very different social context from the 
Old Testament.  The gospel of the kingdom of God is for “the poor”.  These include 
justice to the exploited and good news to the hungry.
75
  With the emerging churches 
in numerous localities and across cultures, covenantal communities are in diversity 
as well as unity.  The ecclesiastical community is expecting an imminent end of the 
present order that takes them closer to the realization of the covenantal economy.  
Such an apocalyptic worldview testifies to the finality of the existing order of things, 
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and nourishes a confident hope of eschatology.
76
  The ecclesiastic community is the 
economy of God‟s household.  Therefore the church‟s oikonomia necessarily 
includes Christians‟ relationship with society and economy.  In the modern context, 
the church works in the presence and power of the Holy Spirit in solidarity with the 
world.  It seeks to live for the transformation of the world into a household of God in 
constant strive and hope.
77
 
The imago Dei places the human person in community.  It is a gift that 
embraces the whole of humanity through time and space in all dimensions and 
characteristics.  As such, the cosmos is a unity with humanity to be conceived as an 
organism that comprises of one household and family.  This notion takes humanity in 
its historical meta-narrative that serves to unfold God‟s revelation towards fulfilment 
of the whole cosmos as both a gift and a mandate.  The church is thus the bride of 
Christ, the temple of the Holy Spirit, God‟s dwelling and the new Jerusalem in all its 
glory.  Its fulfilment is the kingdom of God where the human destiny is found in 
community and perfect unity.
78
  Restoration of humankind to the imago Dei is 
achieved through the messianic redemption by which believers become imago 
Christi.  In the new creation believers become “conformed to the image of the Son” 
(Rom. 8:29).  This salvation is completed through the work of Christ, who redeems 
all His followers through calling, justification and sanctification.  God reveals His 
faithfulness to the covenant through His eternal salvation plan.  The covenant is 
therefore both an indicative gift and an imperative charge.  It is promise, hope and 
glory in the echaton.  At the same time, it resides in a continuing mode in history 




The ideal divine covenant community is one in which participants are in 
perfect communion with God and others.  Within such community there is no 
scarcity or competition.  Fear and coercion are replaced by complete trust, 
commitment and respect for each other.  Interests and benefits are shared with 
common allegiance to the divine law and grace.  Complete obedience to the divine 
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governing allows the full realization of the covenant society.  Unfortunately, this 
perfect covenant society cannot be realised within life on earth.  It can only be 
realized eschatologically, when the heavens and earth are renewed by the Creator 
God in the redemption of Christ.  In this already-but-not-yet temporality, covenant 
living is a target to work towards.  It complements the earthly governance of 
contractual regulations to set the boundaries for humanizing market relationships.  
This prototype requires a balance between individual responsibility for the self and 
collective responsibility in relation to each other in the wider community. 
If private interest and individual economic calculation – even if guided by the most 
enlightened personal motivations – are accented rather than social harmony, 
economic chaos results.  If the accent falls entirely on collective action and class 




Accordingly, the covenant as a fundamental reality in the original intent of 
creation must be balanced with individual freedom and protective justice to ensure 
harmonious social and economic order.  This balance requires appropriate interaction 
between covenant and contract in a complementary manner.  Chapter 4 presents a 
conceptual analysis of the two concepts, and derive the Two Pillars paradigm that 
provides the framework for maintaining a well-balanced economic market.  Before I 
proceed to present this paradigm, our final step is to critically evaluate the ideology 
that may result from a pure theological understanding of economic order, so that a 
realistic theological response can be formulated without falling into idealism. 
 
3.7  Economy of Grace, Gift or Covenant? 
We have seen that early Christians in the New Testament hold a distinctive 
eschatology that shapes their daily living.  The central focus is for Christ to come 
again during their age, and therefore the new age is considered to be taking shape.  
They live together in a kind of eschatological community that is largely covenantal.  
Jewish Christians and Gentiles are bounded together to form a people of Christ.  In 
this early Christian community, wealth and family are secondary to the 
eschatological community.  Their covenantal community is united by a common 
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faith and eschatological hope, inclusive of any race and social class.
81
  To the 
believers, the practices of almsgiving and communal property are responses to the 
call of the kingdom of God.
82
  Through individual and communal commitments, they 
redistribute their resources by participating in shared values for the well-being of the 
community.  The divine law reigns with the greatest commandment of loving God 
and neighbour as oneself (Matt. 22:34-40).  The patterns and boundaries of 
properties ownership are demolished, giving participants the security and freedom 
with respect to possessions and their distribution.
83
  This is not to say that the 
eschatological ideology of an ultimate covenantal community of mutual sharing is 
the blueprint of life on earth.  In reality, the early Christian community is a unique 
covenantal association that continues to relate to non-believers in mission.  This no 
doubt involves ordinary economic dealings to purchase daily necessities in the form 
of contractual exchange.  An economic order relying entirely upon covenantal grace 
and sharing is the ultimate hope that is realizable only in the end of time.  In the 
temporality of life on earth, the believing community strive to enact the covenantal 
order within the limitations imposed by human sinfulness.  Accordingly, a balance 
between covenant and contract is necessary for a harmonious society that enables 
cooperation among all the participants, regardless of their ideological or religious 
beliefs. 
 The covenant community of the early Christians is built based on the 
teachings of Jesus Christ.  Ogletree identifies two important characteristic of Jesus‟ 
teaching based on the Gospel of Matthew.  First, obedience of the divine law 
involves devotion of the self rather than mere acts.  This means that intentions, 
attitudes and feelings are significant, contrary to the assumptions of abstract 
relationships in contract law.  Second, obedience also involves radical vulnerability 
to adversaries.  Jesus and His disciples are often at odds with the social order.  Under 
the new covenant, they submit to the authority of earthly governance, while at the 
same time refusing to compromise to its violence in a community of love.
84
  This 
                                                 
81
 Thomas W. Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions of Moral Understanding (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 130-3. 
82
 The practices and narratives of almsgiving and communal property in the early Christian 
community are described in Acts 2:43-47; 4:32-37; 5:1-11; 6:1-6. 
83
 Ogletree, Hospitality to the Stranger: Dimensions of Moral Understanding, 143. 
84
 Ibid., 134. 
   87
covenant community presupposes a strong common allegiance of all participants to 
the divine law in submission and obedience.  Even then, perfection cannot be 
attained in this already-but-not-yet temporality on earth because of the corrupted 
nature of humankind.  The narratives of this early Christian community contain 
incidences that point towards the need for reprimand and enforcement of the 
covenantal order.  Some examples include the narrative of Ananias and Sapphira 
who lied about their property (Acts 5:1-11), and the need for appointing seven men 
to handle the conflict about daily distribution of food between Grecian Jews and 
Hebraic Jews (Acts 6:1-7).  Such situations suggest that there are times when rules 
and regulations need to be clarified and upheld.  The contract provides a valuable 
complement to the covenant in these circumstances by safeguarding economic 
functions.  It helps to clarify and enforce laws and economic order within the 
covenantal community. 
The covenant way of economic life in its eschatological stage contains certain 
similarities with the economy of grace advocated by theologian Kathryn Tanner.  
The economy of grace is based on unconditional giving in a structural sense.  It is 
built upon social relationships with the motive of giving.  Tanner attempts to define 
unconditional giving as a social and economic matter without consideration of 
feelings or returns.  Hence an economy of grace is depicted to reflect the 
characteristic of God‟s unconditional giving in creation and redemption.  This 
unconditional giving is universal because God gives to everyone.  The resulting 
economy operates in a community of noncompetition for the benefit of all.
85
  The 
unconditional aspect of this economy is in line with the covenant concept of shared 
possession and redistribution.  Tanner goes further to point out that the values of 
materially different things are in fact too abstract to compare for exchange in the 
market.  Setting a price value is an attempt to set a common norm for incomparable 
things.  In a simple example of barter whereby one party prepares dinner while the 
other offers a haircut in return, the transaction is based on values more abstract than 
measurable costs.  Money makes these abstract notions of value explicit and 
regulates them by external norms.
86
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While Tanner is correct in pointing out the abstract incomparability of values, 
the convenience of money as the measuring unit has its own benefits.  The use of 
money as a measuring unit enables multiple market transactions and cross-market 
exchanges.  Commodities are given monetary values so that contractual 
arrangements can become unambiguous.  The use of money as exchange unit allows 
for wider trades and cooperation.  This need not be detrimental.  What Tanner should 
be arguing against is the lost of the transcendent and ordering of values when 
monetary units are involved in transactions.  The ideal arrangement based on gratuity 
and abolishment of monetary units can be attained in the eschatological covenant 
community, but not the already-but-not-yet temporality.  In this earthly market, the 
solution is not to abolish monetary units, but to properly balance relational covenant 
concepts with the contractual exchange of material commodities.  The use of money 
is to serve the market of exchange within its own functionalities and limits.  At the 
same time, unquantifiable nonmarket values must be properly acknowledged and 
enacted.  Two friends who exchange their services in terms of cooking dinner and 
performing haircuts can and should continue to do so without excessive concerns for 
the accuracy of monetary unit involved.  This relational act is carried out under the 
concept of sharing and covenantal love.  Two strangers on the streets, one requiring 
dinner while the other needs a haircut, can satisfy their respective needs through 
mutually beneficial contractual market arrangements.  In such case, the covenant 
concept allows the strangers to give and receive services in an ethical manner.  In 
reality, people do start to build relationships as they interact.  A satisfied customer 
who gives a tip to a hairdresser or waiter may do so beyond mere contractual 
requirements.  Why do people dine out or shop?  The standard economic answer is 
for a satisfaction of needs and wants.  In reality, such market exchanges and 
interactions are part of society and community living.  These seemingly generic 
activities can come from a range of motivations.  While shopping is considered a 
leisure activity by some, others shop for expensive items to show their social status.  
Still others shop on a need basis only.  Some people buy gifts for others out of 
appreciation, while others find it an undesirable obligation.  Similarly, money may 
become the mammon of human lives, but can also be used appropriately to serve as 
units of exchange to facilitate communal living. 
 Another similar alternative to the economy of grace is the economy of gift 
advocated by a group of radical orthodox theologians including John Milbank, 
Catherine Pickstock and Stephen Long.  The economy of gift is marked by the nature 
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of gifting in its market exchange.  In such markets, participants are bonded together 
politically and socially by the obligation and indebtedness of reciprocal gifts.  These 
obligations remain in perpetuity.  Unfortunately, the mechanism of reciprocity in 
gifting reduces the essence of gifting to an obligation of gifting in return.  “Gifts” as 
defined in these markets are therefore not free but obligatory because they demand 
something in exchange.  Participants are required to be both donors and recipients as 
part of mutual ties.  Obligations become the essence of relationships in contrast to the 
independence provided by contractual arrangements upon completion of the contract.   
In a gift exchange, gifts are never unconditional or disinterested because the 
demand for reciprocity is the necessary element that binds the participants and sets 
them free at the same time.  Nevertheless, the notion of gifting presents some 
advantages over the use of monetary measurement.  Long and Fox assert that “a gift 
from another and the consequent return leads us more fully into the life of the other 
while also fulfilling my own life.  For this reason, a gift economy is a virtuous 
economy.”
87
  They challenge traditional economic views of value by asserting the 
theological view that value cannot be produced but can only be discovered by 
seeking God above all things.  Therefore the reception of gifts cultivates the 
reception of virtues.  They point out that public goods have been left out of the 
economic models not only because of a focus on the calculation of individual interest, 
but also because of the economic conception of value.
88
  The market essentially 
focuses upon commodities and their value in exchange.  As a result, the first attempt 
is to commodify everything in sight for assigning a relative value.  These include 
commodification of abstract concepts such as labour hours, risks, property rights, etc.  
Further attempts in commodification penetrate human relationships in the form of 
caring or marital contracts.  Once the item in question is commodified, a value in 
exchange can be assigned for it to be tradable in the contract-based market.  However, 
this value in exchange often differs from the value in use.
89
  For example, basic 
necessities such as air and water have significantly higher value in use then 
jewelleries and rare antiques that have high value in exchange.  The market then 
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attempts to maximize value in exchange by creating commercial norms and lifestyle 
urges that speak to the human desire.  As the market structure is deeply embedded in 
daily living, these value measurements from the market in turn drive human lives and 
eventually become their master. 
While these criticisms of the monetary market contain some truth, non-
commodity gift exchanges also have serious shortcomings.  In models of non-
commodity gift exchange, possessions are shared to meet needs in an imitation of 
Trinitarian love.  Such gift exchanges are markets for exchange of alienable things 
motivated by reciprocal expectations.  While commodity exchanges are based on 
reciprocal independence, gift exchanges involving non-commodities are simply those 
of reciprocal dependence.  These gift exchanges promote trust and interdependence, 
focusing on relationship building rather than individual needs.  In such markets, 
social status increases with the increase in material possession given away.  
Accordingly, the priority is to maximize net personal outflow in order to attain 
maximum prestige.  With gift exchange as the community‟s fundamental organizing 
principle, social relations continue through an obligation to give.  The exchange of 
money completes and breaks off a transaction cycle, but gift relationships are self-
sustaining through a continuation of indebtedness.  Gifts can circulate in similar 
ways as money to become capital.  The arrangement involves goods or services in 
exchange for consideration of different kinds which is essentially contractual in 
nature.  As a result, gift exchanges also have a competitive tendency in terms of 
social status and reciprocity.
90
  Gifting eventually deteriorate into exchanging and 
contracting with calculated indebtedness.  Therefore, gift exchanges are implicitly 
contractual by virtue of their conditions involving reciprocity and imposing 
obligations.  At the same time, contractual terms that are implicit and vague in the 
non-commodity exchange lead to misunderstanding and breakdown of trust.  Once 
the contractual terms become explicit again, one returns to a market that is contract-
based. 
 As Tanner asserts, what gives the gift exchanges their unique form is the 
charitable giving aspects whereby gifts meet the needs of the recipient.  A true gift 
has to be free from any tit-for-tat attachment.  This means that the gifting is not 
circulating and reciprocal, but settled in the hands of the giver and the needy.  The 
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act of giving is without self-concern and solely for the others.  In reality, donors 
seldom build a continuing relationship with the recipients.  Therefore in a market of 
grace, the goal is not to maximize benefits or relationships, but to focus on charitable 
giving.  Since no personal obligations or pressures are attached to the recipient, status 
concerns need not infiltrate the giving of gifts.  This allows the giving to be purified 
of motives that draw the market towards commercial exchanges.  Purely disinterested 
gift exchanges stand in contrast with purely interested market exchanges.
91
  An 
economy of free gifts, however, does not resolve all the problems.  Reliance on 
charitable giving does not build relationships or encourage cooperative production.  
It cannot form the basic structure of economic order because gifting needs to be 
voluntary and disinterested.  Eventually, personal motives and preferences enter into 
the decisions of free giving, and a lack of self-interest cannot be sustained.   
A covenantal market embraces the unconditional giving notion of the 
economy of grace, as well as a redistribution of resources described as extension of 
benefits in the economy of grace.  The priority of extending benefits maximizes 
aggregate utilities to all recipients, without consideration of reciprocity or exchange.  
This extension of benefits is inclusive of oneself, meaning that disinterest is no long 
the norm.  Since participants are free of the danger of losing what they have, they can 
be freed to give to others.  When gifting freely and unconditionally, the participant 
also receives freely and unconditionally.  The elimination of scarcity and fear are 
theologically attractive and feasible under the reign of the Divine.  However, such an 
economy of grace presupposes a people of God not only comprised exclusively of 
believers, but also one that is sanctified and redeemed in its entirety.  The finitude 
and sinfulness of human persons become fully cleansed and renewed through the 
coming of Christ.  This is the believers‟ eschatological reality.  In the meantime, 
while residing on earth in anticipation of the second coming of Christ, modern 
believers are called to live in communities that comprise pluralistic values and 
beliefs.  In such reality, believers continuously encounter the paradox of striving 
towards a covenantal eschatology while maintaining a market order that is inclusive 
of both believers and non-believers.  The challenge of the church in this temporality 
is to enact its mission of covenanting and continuous covenant renewal with this day 
and age.  To allow for a relevant and realistic theological response to the economic 
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market, insights from theological concepts need to be placed within a practicable 
paradigm universally applicable to believers and non-believers alike.  This will be 
the focus of my study in part II of this thesis. 
 
3.8  The Quest for a Theological Response to the Market 
 The theology of the covenant provides a view of human nature in finitude and 
sinfulness that explains the inadequacy of contractual arrangements based on natural 
evolution of legal concepts.  It also reveals that the covenant is rooted in genuine 
human nature, creation, freedom and divine authority.  Scriptural narratives offer 
resources for understanding the contents of the covenant to be universal, relational 
and redemptive.  These resources offer valuable insights and reminders for the 
continuing quest towards a theological response for the economic market.  Reformed 
theologians speak of the covenant as God‟s plan that spans the economy of salvation 
from creation through redemption and consummation.  Covenantal thinking affirms 
God‟s sovereignty, His relationship with creation, and the freedom and responsibility 
of humankind.  Through covenantal living, humankind cares for creation and the 
economy in ways intended by the Creator.  The covenant concept invites us to 
envision a world of community and relationships through developing mutual bonds 
that foster human life.  The self-sufficient and abundant nature of the Trinity presents 
liberation from insecurity and economic scarcity.  In an eschatological covenantal 
household of God, the need of every individual is taken care of through trust, 
cooperation and sharing under the lordship of the divine Creator.  Possession, rights 
and justice are not objects of power but realities that enable fulfilment of individual 
uniqueness as well as pursuit of the common good.  In the temporality of life on earth, 
the believing community strives towards covenantal living while remaining loyal to 
the law and order that regulate society.  In doing so, the church offers the vision and 
hermeneutics through the formulation of a covenant response to economic life.  The 
world remains God‟s good creation but the divine kingdom has not been realized in 
this already-but-not-yet temporality.  Accordingly, the church is positioned in a 
wider world that is the field of mission.  It seeks the peace and harmony of the 
kingdom of God on earth through a continuous quest for covenantal living based 
upon the Word of the Creator. 
 The covenantal way faces many difficulties when applied to temporal life on 
earth.  It is a qualitative concept that is difficult to measure in economic models.  
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Any attempt to extract its rich content leads to an abstraction that may distort its true 
meaning.  The concept is easily distorted into a legalistic form, resulting in confusion 
with notion of the contract.
92
  In a multilevel and multi-faith pluralistic society, the 
struggle among different interest groups will always cause tension.  The covenant 
concept does not offer easy solutions to economic issues but provide a platform for 
open dialogue.  We are provided with a glimpse of the ideological covenantal society 
in the New Testament, yet even the early Christian community does not represent a 
perfectly covenantal community.  Believers remain sinful human persons who tend 
to distort the innate covenantal goodness in human nature.  Accordingly, a perfectly 
covenantal society can only be realized in the end of time.  Yet the covenant way is a 
relational order of creation, known to humankind as part of an innate human nature.  
Our task therefore is to rediscover and implement the covenantal contents in a 
realistic manner to the economic order on earth. 
 Since covenant is the intended way of relational order on earth as revealed 
and enacted by the Creator God in reaching out to build a relationship with His 
people, it is therefore the foundation of any society that seeks authentic communal 
relationships.  Economic life is to be protected not only under law and justice, but 
within the relationships and moral principles that guard the economic order.  
Covenant expresses the urgency and immediacy of the relationship between God and 
humanity.  This relationship is equally shared among members of humankind.  In a 
covenant, the destructive powers of cruelty and injustice can be overcome through 
renewed common life.  The covenantal parties are inspired to envision a world of 
interdependence not through profit maximization but through mutually supportive 
bonds.  Such covenantal bonds foster human life and take care of the vulnerable.  
Human beings become God‟s representatives invited to participate in the stewardship 
and care of creation through covenantal living.
93
  Christian participation in the 
economic household of this world is a participation in Christ.  The covenantal 
economic agent is the ecclesiastic community.   Therefore as Jesus proclaimed under 
the new covenant of economic order, that whatsoever the believer does unto the least 
among them is equivalent to serving Christ Himself (Matt. 25:40).   
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Our exploration so far suggests the possibility of a covenantal market that 
may be realized when all creation reconciles and resides within the household of God.  
At the same time, the realization that this is an ideology for the end times affirms the 
need for a realistic framework for the covenant concept to be rediscovered in 
temporality.  In part II of this thesis, I shall present the Two Pillars paradigm that 
promotes complementary interaction between the concepts of covenant and contract 















The Two Pillars Paradigm:  
A Dialogical Framework for Covenant and Contract to Act as  
Complementary Concepts that Uphold the Market 
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Chapter 4 
Covenant and Contract:  A Two Pillars Paradigm for the Economic Market 
 
This chapter presents a Two Pillars paradigm for the economic market.  It 
traces the development of the modern market into a contract-based exchange, 
gradually eroding the covenant characteristics that are originally embedded in society 
and the economic order.  Having rediscovered the significance of the covenant 
concept in part I of this thesis, part II argues that both covenant and contract are 
significant and essential to a well-balanced economic market that promotes the well-
being of the whole person.  In the Two Pillars paradigm, covenant and contract act 
together in complementary ways as the Two Pillars that are both essential to uphold 
the proper functioning of the market.  The two similar but distinct concepts of 
covenant and contract are analysed in detail in this chapter to show their differences, 
implications and interactions.  The Two Pillars paradigm contributes a dialogical 
framework for interdisciplinary discussions and for further examination of specific 
economic issues.  The economic quest for efficiency and productivity is explored in 
light of the covenantal characteristics of sharing and cooperation to show the place of 
both productivity and cooperation in a balanced market.  The notions of private 
possessions versus public goods are examined to show how the covenant interacts 
with the contract to support both individual property rights and promote common 
societal interests.  The ultimate target is to build a well-balanced economic market 
that enhances human relationships, freedom and inclusive care for all members of 
society. 
 
4.1  Development of the Contract-Based Market 
 In medieval societies, relationships are customary, with trades and crafts 
inherited through kinship.  Economic and ethical ideas are closely connected.  Land 
is held and not owned.  There is a strong sense that freedom should be exercised 
under ethical constraints and under the duty to God and others.  These medieval 
traditions place justice above the freedom of choice.  During the same time when 
social contract and contract law developed in the eighteenth century, the church 
gradually withdrew from its central role in the social order.  Although Christian 
ethics were still professed, the church increasingly focused on matters of purely 
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spiritual concern, leaving the morality and functioning of the market to the state.  
When tracing the rise of capitalism, Tawney laments that “the very concept of the 
Church as an independent moral authority, whose standards may be in sharp 
antithesis to social conventions, has been abandoned”.
1
  An ideal of personal 
character and conduct gradually replaced the “kingdom of Christ” commitment.  
Economics was separated from ethical interests.  “Individualism in religion led 
insensibly, if not quite logically, to an individualist morality, and an individualist 
morality to a disparagement of the significance of the social fabric as compared with 
personal character.”
2
  For example, addressing poverty becomes the obligation of 
good conscience and therefore an individual responsibility, not a social obligation.  
Under the governance of the state and the development of contract law, trade and 
commerce flourish.  At the same time, the economic market becomes increasingly 
contract-based. 
The word “contract” originates from the word “pact” or the Latin pacta.  The 
most significant development of the concept relates to its primary use as an 
instrument of private law for commercial transactions.  A contract is an agreement 
with one or more counterparties for the exchange of goods or services.
3
  This form of 
contractual mercantilism is based on the understanding that community is rooted in 
self-interested arrangements governed by law.
4
  Contract law is based on the 
principle expressed in the Latin phrase pacta sunt servanda (pact must be kept).
5
  On 
the positive side, development of the contract provides a method of entering into 
mutual agreement for activities conducted in the market, allowing voluntary 
relationships that shape the modern notion of human rights and individual freedom.  
It nurtures the modern culture of personal worth, human dignity, entrepreneurial 
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spirit, individual freedom and right of participation.
6
  However, the sovereignty of 
contract has a negative side.  The contract atomizes individuals, who then pursue 
their own advantages without the necessity of regard for other people.  The 
contractual mechanism turns land and labour into market commodities.  It then in 
turn imposes its own assumptions and values that affect human mindsets and 
community relationships.  In focusing on contracting for self-interested individuals, 
the contracting individual is removed from the need for tradition, history and 
narratives.  The overall result is that contract-based market encourages arms-length 
transactions so that commercial interests can be segregated from personal 
relationships.  Under this arrangement, political and economic society no longer 
comprises communities of human persons but individual human persons.
7
  The need 
to direct resources to societal interests in turn leads to the necessity of government 
intervention in the market.  Taxes, regulations and welfare services are then put into 
place to address these needs. 
General principles of contract law emerged during the late seventeenth to 
eighteenth century in accordance with the development of the free market and 
political economic ideals.  There was a shift from particular relationships to general 
contract principles, and from executed to executory contracts.
8
  In the nineteenth 
century, the classical theory of contract developed into its modern form.  Classical 
contract law is based on definition of terms, conditions and liabilities by the 
voluntary parties involved.  It is characterized by an impersonal nature that extends 
to become a characteristic of the contract-based market.  The contract does not 
regard who the participants are, or what the matter of exchange is.  The removal of 
all particularities of persons and subjects in the law of agreement gives rise to what is 
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known as abstract relationships in classical contract law.
9
  Liberal economics in the 
nineteenth century capitalizes on this development to derive theories of individual 
economic units with complete mobility and freedom of decision.
10
  The significance 
of contract in modern life continues as it penetrates other aspects of societal living in 
the form of public regulations, labour law, insurance legislation, business order and 
social welfare.
11
  Commerce, finance and economic markets gradually came to 
depend entirely upon contractual arrangements of abstract relationships.  Atiyah 
summarizes the key presuppositions in the thoughts of Hobbes and Locke that 
develop as part of the market economy ideology.  Under the contract, human persons 
are free of the control of any other.  They can choose and decide freely.  Their 
relationships with others are voluntarily entered into and motivated by self-interest.  
The labour of each person is placed under a contract belonging to the individual just 
like land or property.  Society comprises a series of market relationships.
12
  Not only 
is the market increasingly contract-based, but the contractual notions of impersonal 
relationships, freedom of choice and maximization of self-interest increasingly 
penetrate social aspects of economic and community life. 
Classical contract law has undergone modifications and has branched into 
many different forms.  It gives way to neoclassical contract law as the courts impose 
legal obligations on the contracts as a matter of public policy.  For example, an 
employment arrangement that involves obvious exploitation of labour may be 
deemed unenforceable by the courts because it is against public interest.  
Neoclassical contract extends the basic contract by tying the individual advantage of 
each contracting party to the success of their mutual venture.  This means that some 
communal standards of responsibility are injected into the contracts.  Values such as 
liberty, efficiency, trust, fairness and cooperation are weighed by the courts when 
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deciding the scope of contractual liability.  This allows contract to develop into 
formulation of general standards rather than mechanical rules.
13
  The introduction of 
these general standards promotes fairness in the market.  However, market 
relationships remain abstract and impersonal as values remain subordinate to 
quantifiable contractual arrangements in the name of economic freedom.
14
   
 
4.2  Conceptual Analysis of Covenant and Contract 
The Concepts 
The terms “covenant”, “pact” and “contract” have been used interchangeably 
in early literature.
15
  They are explored and applied in various ways in the disciplines 
of theology, law, economics and sociology.  In religion, a contractual God is one 
who obligates humankind in reciprocal duties.  In marriage, a contract denotes 
calculative means for the goal of common advantages rather than unlimited 
commitment.  In political society, contractual participants are only committed to 
limited and refutable purposes.  According to Torrance, covenant and contract mean 
the same thing in Scots law.  However, theologically the two concepts must be 
carefully distinguished.  “Theologically speaking, a covenant is a promise binding 
two people or two parties to love one another unconditionally. …A contract, in 
common parlance, is a legal relationship in which two people or two parties bind 
themselves together on mutual conditions.”
16
  Confusion between the two concepts 
means that gradual erosion of covenant characteristics can easily be neglected.  The 
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result is an increasing reliance on the legalistic contractual exchange and disregard of 
the covenant fundamentals that are essential for authentic human relationships.
17
 
As we have defined earlier, a contract is an agreement with one or more 
counterparty for the exchange of goods or services.  A covenant is a promise with 
one or more counterparty under common pursuit of shared values for long term 
cooperation and the well-being of the community.  Table 1 provides an overall 
conceptual comparison of contract and covenant.  The various differences between 
the two concepts are discussed in the following subsections. 
 
Table 1: Conceptual Comparison of Contract and Covenant 
 Contract        Covenant 
Form and Duration 
 
  













Disengage on Penalties 
Impersonal, Individualistic  
Exchange, Obligatory 
Self-Interest, Insecure,    
Possible Coercion/Fear 
Government, Institution 
Law and Regulations 
Bargain, Competitive 
Price as Consideration/Measure 





Failure on Breakdown of Unity 
Personal, Communal 
Sharing, Willingly 
Common Good, Secure, 




Aim for Common Purpose 
Result in Commitment 
Personal & Communal Ethics 
Culture Norms 
 
Form and Duration 
The Jewish Rabbi Jonathan Sacks is a long time advocate of the covenant 
concept in its application to society.  He summarizes the difference between 
covenant and contract into three basic aspects – form, duration and nature of the 
relationship.   
                                                 
17
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A covenant is not a contract.  It differs in three respects.  It is not limited to specific 
conditions and circumstance.  It is open-ended and long-lasting.  And it is not based 
on the idea of two individuals, otherwise unconnected, pursuing personal advantage.  
It is about the „We‟ that gives identity to the „I‟.  There is a place for contracts, but 
covenants are prior and more fundamental.  They form the matrix of mutuality 
within which contractual relationships can exist.
18
 
Sacks sees the social covenant as one that creates society with acts of moral 
engagement, while the social contract creates the state and its constitutional structure.  
Accordingly, the contract can bring together a global political structure, but a 
covenant truly frames a shared vision for the future of humanity.
19
  The covenant 
bond is an open-ended one, entered into with mutuality and loyalty.  Although one 
may argue that contractual arrangements can also be long term and continuing, 
scholars who examine the fundamental differences between contract and covenant 
generally find that contracts tend to have shorter duration.
20
  This is because the 
stronger covenant characteristics of personal bond, trust and promise support a 
longer lasting duration for covenantal arrangements.
21
   
The logic behind covenant and contract forms has also been examined by 
sociologists.  Bromley and Busching identify covenant and contract as alternate 
methods of organizing intentional social behaviour based on different logic and form.   
Contractual social relations are those in which individuals coordinate their behavior 
through pledging themselves to specific reciprocal activity.  Thus, contracts are 
articulated through a logic of calculative involvement and individual interest; 
covenants are articulated through a logic of moral involvement and unity.
22
   
Many social relations contain elements of both covenant and contract, 
whereby the two forms exist in rather complex relationships to one another.  For 
example, employment may commence based on a contractual arrangement while 
friendship and commitment may develop during the course of the work relationship.  
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Such specific behaviours are not inherently contractual or covenantal, but are results 
of conscious or unconscious choices within the given circumstances.  In covenantal 
relations, participants express connection, involvement, identification and 
commitment.  In contractual relations, participants exert prudence and individual 
interests, conveying a certain separation from personal involvement.  While 
covenantal relations call for sensitive response and affective commitment, 
contractual relations are oriented towards rational objective and alertness.  Contracts 
are reliable, astute and fair; covenants are loyal, sensitive and caring.  The qualities 
within contracts or covenants are not inherent but are developed through social 
interactions.  Persons are shaped by their own intentionality, contributing to the 
qualities of the other, while at the same time being shaped by the circumstances and 
people they encounter.  Economic transactions negotiated and completed with 
contractual aspirations differ from those of covenantal nature in their fundamental 
concerns, processes and possible outcomes.
23
 
Contractual relationships carry the logic of divided components in sequenced 
time-phase, leading to its completion.  They embrace the concept of efficiency and 
are thus driven and evaluated by it.  On the other hand, covenantal relationships tend 
to build continuing relationships that involve mutual commitment on promises in 
anticipation of mutually beneficial future outcomes.  Therefore they are driven by an 
integrative logic based on unity.  When disputes arise, the contractual burden of 
proof is for each party to demonstrate its mandated performance.  The covenantal 
burden of proof is for each party to demonstrate the activity that is not relevant to the 
covenant.   Bromley and Busching further assert that the receptor within contractual 
relationships is the mind or the brain, while in covenantal relationships it is the spirit 
or the heart.  This is because contractual partners adhere to the laws of the market 
and operate under operational mechanistic forces.  Covenantal partners make 
reference to spiritual or personal agents that are equally compelling.  In contracts, 
violations are linked to penalties.  In covenants, violations are breakdowns of unity.
24
   
The covenant paradigm presupposes an on-going, long-term commitment 
because it is based on relationships.  Consequently, it calls for continuous renewal in 
a loving and forgiving manner.  The Protestant view of sinful human nature that “all 
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are sinners in need of the grace of God” allows for inevitable failures within the 
covenantal emphasis while striving towards the ideal.
25
  The covenantal community 
experiences continuous renewal and respect for each other.   
 
Personal or Impersonal Market? 
Since Bromley and Busching work from a sociological stance, they take 
contractual relationships as social relations that are essentially commercial or 
impersonal in nature, while covenantal relationships are taken as those that involve 
human connectedness.  They find that both of these relationships are necessary for 
societal functions.  Religion and family are listed in the domains of covenantalism, 
while labour and trade are considered contractual.
26
  On this issue, economists Hill 
and Lunn assert that markets have developed from the personal systems in history to 
the impersonal systems in modern times.  They argue that the move from personal to 
impersonal markets is necessary for the division of labour and production 
efficiencies that lead to higher standards of living in the developed world.  Therefore 
they conclude that the ethical systems which theologians apply to modern markets 
are outdated and inappropriate for impersonal societies.
27
  Are markets necessarily 
impersonal in the interest of size, efficiency and growth?  How do we humanize the 
market and retain the essence of genuine human relationships that are valuable to 
human life? 
The nature of contractual arrangements supports impersonal bargaining of 
terms and voluntary participation.  According to this contractual system, the only 
requirement is to understand the rules and conditions.  Intentions and motives are 
irrelevant to these types of arrangements.  Hill and Lunn point out that economic 
markets enable cooperation among the participants without the need to explicitly 
recognize their intentions or overall character.
28
  The contract-based market is 
                                                 
25
 Stackhouse points out that sin is a basic condition rather than the intentional betrayal of some 
principle or norm.  Rationalized forms of denial of sins or justifications for sins are even more 
distorting.  Accordingly, continuous reminders and alerts to the covenantal characteristics and their 
enactment are necessary in light of human finitudes.  See Stackhouse, Covenant and Commitments: 
Faith, Family, and Economic Life, 28-30. 
26
 Bromley and Busching, 'Understanding the Structure of Contractual and Covenantal Social 
Relations: Implications for the Sociology of Religion,' 30. 
27
 Peter J. Hill and John Lunn, 'Markets and Morality: Things Ethicists Should Consider When 
Evaluating Market Exchange,' Journal of Religious Ethics 35, no. 4 (2007): 627-53. 
28
 Ibid., 628. 
   105
therefore indifferent to the objective good of the person.  Such a dynamic system of 
impersonal market activities is much more complex than a direct personal exchange 
because of its capability to expand in terms of scope and geographical horizon.  
Based on this contractual infrastructure, markets are ever evolving and changing 
along with institutions and legal systems.  By focusing on the rules rather than 
intentions, moral duties are left to the individual level and growth across difference 
spheres is enabled.  Workers produce goods and services that are utilized by people 
they do not know.  To Hill and Lunn, the contract-based market is relatively efficient 
because of its impersonal nature.  They therefore consider this impersonal 
characteristic necessary and essential.  This conclusion leads to their support for two 
systems of ethics – one for the world of impersonal exchange in order to regulate 
market actions, another for the world of personal relationships where the moral 
framework is assumed to be much richer and more demanding.
29
 
Indeed the contract enables an extended order of exchange because it is based 
on a set of rules and regulations.  Such rules and regulations are necessary to guide 
the functioning of the market that involves multitudes of human needs, wants and 
intentions.  Nevertheless, human needs cannot be satisfied through materialistic 
concerns alone.  The market also serves a communal and relational function that is 
intrinsically significant to human life.  The authenticity and self-integration of human 
intentions and actions are necessary to maintain the well-being of the self.  This 
means that contrary to the underlying assumption of the impersonal contract market, 
intentions are highly relevant to economic acts.  If the intention is egocentric and 
focuses on maximizing personal gains, then the market becomes competitive with 
acts of coercion and feelings of insecurity.  On the other hand, where the intention is 
in terms of mutual interest and sharing, a culture of community and mutual care can 
be realized.
30
  Although Hill and Lunn argue that intentions may not be related to 
outcomes, e.g. self-interested intentions can lead to cooperative ends, economic 
intentions do initiate market actions.  This is shown through the fact that when the 
covenant culture of mutual interest and moral is gradually eroded, it becomes 
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necessary to increase the number of rules and regulations in order to govern 
contractual arrangements.  These rules that attempt to regulate market intentions and 
activities, whether effective or not, tend to replace the human initiatives of genuine 
care for others by prescribing the boundaries and content of the tasks involved in a 
commercialized way.  The failure to align contractual rules with personal intentions 
leads to the failure of the contract-based markets to support moralized and authentic 
cooperation.  The covenant must be restored and renewed continuously to enable 
authenticity and well-being, rather than leaving the task of satisfying human needs to 
legalistic rules. 
Although markets are complex and are continuously evolving, human nature 
and the need for personal relationships and authenticity remain unchanged.  The 
advocate of two different sets of ethical standards is absurd and hypocritical.  It 
encourages the human person to put up different personae when dealing with 
different situations.  This is a major dehumanizing characteristic of the contract-
based exchange which is detrimental to societal relationships.  A moral community 
consists of ethical persons within a community who pass these norms on to later 
generations.  Relying on individual ethics at the contract level by rules and coercion 
cannot lead to a harmonious exchange in the long run.  This is particularly important 
within the complexities of the economic market.  In this regard, size and scope 
cannot justify an impersonal exchange.  For the customer of the supermarket, 
purchase and sale appear impersonal on the surface because of the contract-based 
mechanism.  However, a covenantal presupposition of community care and customer 
concern must precede the transaction and act as the underlying foundation for mutual 
trust.  Such degree of trust and comfort relies not only on rules and regulations, but 
on a communal sense of caring and goodwill.
31
 
The covenant cannot be fully captured in a contractual manner in legalistic 
terms.  Any intention to quantify or legalize it reduces covenant to contract.  This is 
because covenant involves identities and relationships.  It is an organic relational 
order that defies any calculative exchange.  Relationships in community require 
virtues to be exercised during a given encounter between the parties involved.  These 
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virtues in turn become the basis of covenantal trust and commitment.  Therefore 
market exchange cannot be purely impersonal.  The authentic human person needs to 
align intentions and acts.  Without such authenticity, material needs can still be 
exchanged and consumed, but true satisfaction cannot be attained.  The contract 
enables exchange of goods and services.  The covenant enables satisfaction from the 
supply and consumption of goods and services above the extrinsic activities involved.  
Workers may not know the persons consuming the goods they produce, yet in a 
covenantal market they can experience the consumers‟ gratitude for their services 
from the general respect for their work within their organization and community.  
The covenantal market culture in turn allows participants to experience a sense of 
security and care within the market exchange.  Market transactions are arm‟s length 
and enforceable by law due to their contractual nature.  At the same time, they are 
not entirely impersonal.  They have everything to do with personal interest, integrity 
and social norms.  Although market relationships cannot extend indirectly to the end-
user level, it is important for individuals to take personal interests in market 
relationships with the people they encounter on a daily basis.  This need is intensified 
as market relationships extend across geographical horizons because the covenant 
network relies on participants at each and every stage of the economic exchange to 
cultivate. 
 
Nature of Relationships 
 Sacks points out that the contract is about “interest”, while the covenant is 
about “identity”.  Covenants turn a plurality of “I”s into a collective “we”.  Marriage 
and friendship often take this form.  In the Bible, Jonathan covenanted with David 
because he loved him as himself (1 Sam. 18:3).  Contracts aim at mutual gain while 
covenants aim at mutual give.  Self-interest motivates parties to enter into contracts 
for mutual benefits.  These are based on mutual consent to fulfil certain obligations.  
Covenants are open-ended.  Their moral commitments are sustained by loyalty, 
fidelity and faithfulness.  Within a covenant, people can live together despite their 
differences and be inspired to share values and the common good.
32
  Similar to 
Bromley and Busching, Sacks finds both contract and covenant necessary, but for 
different reasons.  He locates social contract within the relationship between the 
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individual and the state, while social covenant is about relationship between people.  
The common good, being covenantal rather than contractual, belongs to society.  
Contract associations are for self-interest, while covenant is about association in a 
shared identity.
33
  The advantage of covenant over contract is in the fact that 
covenant embraces a relational concern that is fundamental to the ontology of human 
nature.  Such relationships become impersonal and unsatisfactory once they are 
placed under purely contractual terms. 
 A proper understanding of human economic behaviour needs to go beyond a 
system of egocentric self-interest.  Human persons are social beings not only in terms 
of interdependence for economic ends, but also during their quest for social 
connections among one another.
34
  The problem with a purely contractual 
arrangement lies deep within human nature.  Hobbes identifies the reason for 
entering into a mutual contract as one that is not based upon cooperation or love, but 
is based upon fear.  This presupposes an insecure and egocentric view of human 
nature, where one fears losing one‟s life to another.  Therefore alliances are formed 
to protect themselves from being subject to the predator of another.  This calculative 
reasoning suggests that the economic person joins the polity and economic order in 
fear and distrust.
35
  It is negative, dehumanizing, and contradictory to the covenant 
concept that promotes sincerity, security and trust.  The proper use of contracts 
requires an underlying covenant awareness and foundation in order to maintain a 
humanized economic order in the market. 
This does not mean the market is to be eliminated.  On the contrary, the 
market has shown itself to be a natural means of human exchange throughout history, 
contributing to economic growth and productivity.  Markets and competition have 
their inherent advantages.  They generate wealth, lower prices, increase choices and 
promote advancements.  Economic growth brings the possibility of decreasing 
poverty.  The problem is when the market goes too far to govern relationships and 
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abolish human identity.  As Sacks asserts, “the idea that human happiness can be 
exhaustively accounted for in terms of things we can buy, exchange, and replace is 
one of the great corrosive acids that eat away the foundations on which society rests; 
and by the time we have discovered this, it is too late”.
36
  However, humankind need 
not proceed down the road of destruction with the market.  Sacks adds that the 
“market exchange is the paradigm of the win-win scenario and the non-zero-sumness 
of human relationship”.
37
  It is a platform for human interaction that is not 
necessarily tragic.  With the awareness and enactment of the covenant concept, 
human persons can operate through the market by maintaining a balance between 
covenantal and contractual means to achieve cooperative ends. 
 Life in community encompasses participation, responsibility, and respect for 
individual differences.  Through participative acts of relating, sharing and receiving, 
participants affirm their identities as individuals and in community with each other.
38
  
The pursuit of common interest does not belong to the believing community alone, 
but to society as a whole because of the common fundamental goods shared by all 
humanity.  Mount sets individuals in community within both the common good and 
the covenant by stating that both traditions “affirm the centrality of community and 
resist the extremes and neglects of Western individualism with its suspicion of any 
effort to advance a common good because of plural versions of the good and its 
tendency to make all associations voluntary and contractual”.
39
  Working from this 
model, he finds the contractual idea, such as the social contract of bargaining, 
inadequate for the whole of moral life.  The common good is to be understood as a 
community quest and not a given.  It is embedded in the covenantal way of relating.
40
 
 The self-interest view of the market also takes on a legalistic counterpart.  
Trebilcock argues from a legal perspective that the convergence of public welfare 
and autonomous market choices are tenuous.  When the market operates under the 
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Will or Autonomy Theory of Contract Law, arrangements among individuals arise 
from voluntarily assumed, self-imposed obligations reflecting convergent intentions 
of the contracting parties.
41
  In such a community, there is no collective consensus 
for common economic goals or values.  A number of elements work to destroy the 
integrity of the voluntary nature of such contracts.  Examples of these include 
commodification of contractual elements, external influences, coercion, information 
imperfections, paternalism, discrimination, etc.
42
  These limits to the contractual 
arrangement can only be alleviated through a collective or covenantal awareness of 
community.  As Allen points out, consent and coercion are always intermingled in 
social life.
43
  Similarly, numerous other social factors influence the written contract 
to impose limitations in its use.  The contract should remain as a tool to serve the 
market rather than to direct how human persons relate to each other. 
 
Authoritative Basis 
To protect individuals and society from the negative aspects of corrupted 
human nature, an authoritative basis is needed to mediate human relationships.  This 
is particularly important in an age of plurality, when a variety of ideologies and 
associations resides together in search of the truth under different or contradicting 
means and ends.  The authoritative basis of the covenant is the divine order and 
communal norms, while the contract relies on individual morality and is safeguarded 
by law.  Tucker analyzes the covenant and contract forms in the Bible and Ancient 
Near East, and concludes that covenants are centred upon the oath formulae while 
contracts may or may not be.
44
  The contract requires an operative description of the 
underlying transaction, thereby giving it a focus on what has happened or is 
happening.  On the other hand, the content of an oath is a promise for the future.  
Therefore, covenant and contract are governed by two distinct authorities.  As a 
purely covenant society is only attainable under universal commitment to a common 
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faith, the authority of laws and regulations is required to mediate the market in 
coherence with the covenant order. 
From a legal point of view, the core nature of a contract lies in the fact that it 
is a promise that is enforceable by law.  Its elements include mutual assent and some 
detriments on the part of the promise.  Newman points out that a covenantal 
relationship fails to be a contract because there is no bargaining involved.  The offer 
and acceptance assent is missing as the divine covenant is granted as a gift without a 
bargained-for-exchange.  In the covenant of God with Israel, its scope is contained in 
the text of the Torah.  Here, sovereignty belongs to the Divine.  The covenant serves 
as a means of gift and guidance for establishing a relationship of promise.  On the 
other hand, a contract is under sovereignty of the law.  It binds the parties to service a 
bargained relationship of exchange.  Living under the sovereignty of God versus that 
of contractual law has basic implications for the functioning of the relationship.  The 
laws set out in the Torah for ancient Israel represent only part of what God demands.  
Those who strictly adhere to the Torah may still be lacking in true piety or love.  The 
covenant cannot be reduced to a legal formula since it is indispensable but not 
exhaustive.
45
  In the contract-based economic market, a payment in exchange for 
goods or services carries autonomous duties of delivery and responsibility bounded 
by legal requirements and penalties.  In a covenantal relationship, the pre-existing 
moral duty is derived from a genuine and free response to the offer of cooperation 
and mutuality.
46
  Accordingly, individual choices and cooperation are respected and 




Building Trust and Keeping Promises 
 During the development of contract law, the contract originally based on 
moral theory turned into a bargaining concept.  Consideration shifts from the purpose 
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for a promise to a price paid for the promise.  Liability involved in the contract 
changes from fault to absolute obligation, relying on the terms of the contract.
48
  
These are shifts in fundamental presuppositions that contain relational and moral 
implications.  During the development process, certain basic assumptions of the 
original contract idea become eroded, causing the nature of contract to deviate more 
and more from that of the covenant. 
 A contract is generally perceived to be promise-based in the same way as a 
covenant, especially in legal literature.  However, this notion is questioned by legal 
scholar P.S. Atiyah.  The traditional view is that contracts can be benefit-based 
subject to payment or consideration, reliance-based subject to guaranteeing or 
expectation, or promise-based subject to future execution.  Promise-based contracts 
are expected to turn into benefit-based or reliance-based at their future time of 
execution.  Atiyah points out three misconceptions of the promise-based contract.  
First, the protection of expectation is not the same as restitution or reliance.  A 
disappointed party has a relatively weak claim since full performance of the promise 
or redress based on such entitlement may not be possible.  Second, a promise-based 
contract involves a method of risk allocation or transfer.  One typical example is an 
insurance arrangement.  Such arrangements can be cancellable and may indeed be 
beneficial to do so upon changing circumstances, as long as alternatives are available.  
A contract based on continuing evaluation of future risks can therefore be perpetually 
refuted and reconstituted.  Third, promise-based liability is usually seen as a 
subsidiary way of ensuring compliance with benefit-based and reliance-based 
obligations.  This argument is relatively weak because of the two preceding 
misconceptions.
49
  Atiyah‟s analysis has profound impact on the structure of moral 
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promissory characteristic, especially in terms of future expectations.
50
  For the same 
reasons, a contract works best when it focuses on the immediate executable duration.  
Its relatively short term characteristic is therefore inherent to the nature of the 
contract.  At the same time, the contractual mechanism encourages continuing 
evaluation of risks and benefits, therefore a perpetual uneasiness of the need for 
calculative measures. 
Allen reminds us that covenant theory differs from contract theories over why 
we are obligated.
51
  Contract theorists are concerned with the duty of fair play.  
Fairness obligates one to fulfil the duties and rules as defined by the contract.  
However, fair play is deficient because it deals only with one part of human 
obligation.  Covenant offers a broader interpretation of obligations to fellow 
participants, as we accept others‟ trust in us.  Through mutual entrustment, the 
participants risk what they have to each other.  A contract breaks down with the 
breakdown of a system.  A covenant binds the participants and continues to do so 
under unforeseen circumstances.  Trust and commitment are therefore critical 
covenant characteristics that ensure individuals are mutually respected and provided 
with authentic identity and freedom in the economic order.
52
  The encounter with 
another elicits compassion, trust and bonding, making the covenant a necessary basis 
of authentic market relationships.  This mutual bonding breaks through egocentric 
self-interest into a freedom of mutuality, empathy and dialogue.  It enables the 
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Upholding Market Morality 
 To the free market advocates, self-interest is the answer.  This notion of self-
interest presented by Adam Smith differs from egoism.  Smith argues that self-
interest regulates the contracting interests so that individuals will honour their 
promises.  “When a person makes perhaps twenty contracts in a day, he cannot gain 
so much by endeavouring to impose on his neighbours, as the very appearance of a 
cheat would make him lose.”
54
  This view presupposes that morality depends upon 
the integrity of human nature and natural evolution.  Unfortunately, human nature 
and natural evolution do not always lead to desirable outcomes.  Values within the 
market are derived through the way participants interact within it.
55
  Therefore 
freedom of the market demands high personal moral standards.  The paradoxical 
truth pointed out by theological anthropology is that corrupted human nature 
prevents the realization of freedom in a purely contractual free market.  The covenant 
is needed to bring out the relational nature of humanity and the morality embedded 
within. 
 The covenant community is a moral community in which each person 
participates freely in his or her own right.  In the covenant community the human 
person is not merely something useful to society.  Rather, human persons are 
participants in the moral community.  They entrust themselves to others, accept the 
entrusting of others, and uphold continuing responsibility to one another.
56
  Covenant 
does not carry the necessary condition that the others are actually trustworthy.  It 
presupposes a gifting concept that starts from the willingness of oneself to 
voluntarily trust and give to others.
57
  Participants in a covenantal community work 
together for justice and compassion, starting not from receiving but giving.  The 
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practice of morality and the common good ensures social cohesion.  The covenantal 
community is then created and continuously renewed through festivity and 
celebration of life together.
58
  For example, parents do not calculate the future 
monetary return from their children when they provide for their needs.  They do so 
out of natural covenantal love and human instincts.  The covenantal community 
cannot be promoted through legislation alone.  It must be conjured through culture, 
education and social cohesion.  Is the shift from the modern contract-based market a 
more covenant-based community feasible?  I shall now explore the potential for a 
paradigm shift to the Two Pillars market. 
 
4.3  The Paradigm Shift 
As we have seen, the human nature of the economic person in a competitive, 
contract-based market is assumed to be egocentric and self-interested.  The self-
interest idea has been derived and developed over the years ever since Adam Smith 
has written his most widely quoted and misinterpreted description of the butcher, 
brewer or baker, who does not serve dinner from benevolence but out of self-interest.  
Over the years, the philosophical intentions of self-interest, sympathy and moral 
sentiments in the original Smithian system are gradually reduced to a narrow notion 
of selfishness and egocentrism as the market increasingly relies on the contractual 
mechanism.  The self-interest assumption understood as self-focused utility 
maximization in turn encourages market participants to become more individualistic.  
Numerous economic models and theories have been developed to explore, analyze, 
and enhance this assumption.  Economists excel in identifying the Pareto optimum 
for competitive market situations.
59
  However, is egocentric individualism a proper 
representation of human nature or human behaviour in the market?   
Amartya Sen, winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Science, has been 
offering constructive critiques of traditional economic assumptions and practical 
contributions to welfare economics.  His work shows that a paradigm shift in 
economic models is not only feasible but also necessary.  Sen finds that a simple 
reason why human nature is presupposed to be egoistic in economic models is that 
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no matter what a person chooses in an isolated act, it can be defined as being based 
on self-interest.  This definitional egoism is considered to be rational choice as long 
as it is consistent.
60
  According to this observation, self-interested human nature is at 
least partly a self-fulfilling paradigm.  If this is the case, market participants fall into 
a kind of helpless coercion that stands against the assumed characteristics of freedom 
and cooperation within a free market.  I assert that this helpless and coercive scenario 
is not definitive because humankind is equipped with the ability for making 
intentional choices.  To derive and enact responsible choices that contribute to the 
well-being of humankind, we need to continuously reflect upon our economic 
assumptions, become aware of market limits, and be willing to enact market 
alternatives.  The market choices we make concern not only the commodities we 
purchase and consume, but more fundamentally, the means and structures of market 
exchanges and how individuals participate in market activities. 
 Sen finds it a traditional misconception to consider that moral behaviour is 
generally detrimental to economic benefits.  Similarly, upholding covenantal 
characteristics may be misunderstood to have a negative impact on profits.  In fact, 
the use of egocentric self-interest in pursuing preferences and fulfilment does not 
necessarily maximize utilities to the individual.  This is because unforeseen 
consequences and external influences may occur at any time.  Also, the individual 
may not be able to accurately measure his or her own utility, or to define a measure 
of utility that leads to actual well-being.  For example, smoking or gambling may 
seem to yield high short-term utility to an individual, but leads to detrimental results 
and lower aggregate utility over time.  For similar reasons, focusing on quantifiable 
measurements alone does not guarantee maximization of profits.  Covenantal 
characteristics add to the intrinsic considerations or the underlying concerns of 
economic activities.  For example, employees who act morally may build more 
trusting relationships, contributing to increases in team spirit and efficiency in the 
long term.  Companies that promote covenantal norms may have higher levels of 
employee morale that in turn increases productivity.  Sen asserts that markets are 
about trust and relationships as much as self-interest.  Relying merely on legalistic 
and contractual means to prevent destructive self-interested behaviour will make 
economic activities in the market expensive and slow because of the costs and time 
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involved in additional legal processes and safeguards.  Similarly, the need to engage 
legalistic means to regulate workers‟ productivity, e.g. hiring additional supervisors, 
involves additional costs for the company.   
Sen presents “public goods” as an illustration of the limitations of a self-
interest market.  The mechanism of such a market breaks down when it comes to 
non-competitive goods that are not exclusively provided to the buyer who is willing 
to pay the highest price.  In such cases, the combined benefits of the general public 
must be compared with the production costs.  Besides the problem of resource 
allocation, there is also a need for embedding social concerns in the market processes.  
These factors are not necessarily detrimental to maximizing economic benefits.  
Behavioural codes such as anti-corruption, maintaining goodwill and business norms, 




Sen‟s work shows that economic modelling and measurements based entirely 
on egoistic self-interest are deficient in their ability to enhance life values.  It also 
means that important qualitative human values such as justice and freedom have not 
been adequately captured or considered in existing efficiency models.  More 
importantly, Sen questions the self-interest maximizing assumption of efficient 
markets.  In the pursuit of opportunities and freedom, the self-interest assumption in 
the welfarist assessment turns out to be irrelevant.  This means that when human 
persons are empowered with the priority of freedom in preferences, self-interest 
maximization becomes irrelevant.  Sen asserts that a focus on freedom shifts 
economic analysis towards more ethically and politically sound approaches.  He 
demonstrates that once the economic scientist is willing to shift the paradigm from 
egocentric self-interest to higher common human values, the horizon becomes 
largely broadened. 
At first sight, the market equilibrium based on efficient market transactions 
appears to yield good results.  When a given model assumes no externalities, the 
competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal.  Under even more stringent conditions, 
especially with the absence of economies of large scale, the “converse theorem” 
shows that every Pareto optimal is a competitive equilibrium that corresponds to 
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certain initial distribution of resources.  If this is true, it means that given the 
appropriate set of initial conditions, the market mechanism will reach an optimum 
social state.  The problem is that the converse theorem only applies under stringent 
circumstances demanding a “right” initial distribution of resources, right prices, 
incentives and decisions.  These are practically impossible in a complex and 
imperfect world.  Hence one returns to the first theorem that generates Pareto 
optimality.  The problem becomes one of distribution and inequality, when there can 
be large disparities in terms of wealth distribution at a Pareto optimum.  When 
conflicting versus congruent interests of individuals are added to the analysis, the 
Pareto optimum contains no alleviation for exploitations.  When public goods and 
common interests are put into the picture, the situation becomes more complex.  As 
Sen points out, the market mechanism is good at specific types of congruent issues, 
but cannot handle conflicts or congruent public interests.
62
 
 Sen offers basic capability equality as an alternative to the utilitarian 
approach.  This model is based on an interpretation of needs in the form of basic 
capabilities of each human person.  It shifts focus from goods to the effect of goods 
on different human persons.  The capabilities of a given good vary substantially from 
person to person due to the ability to take advantage of the good, personal taste, 
preference, pre-existing conditions, etc.  The indexing of capabilities is not simple, 
but the shift in focus allows for more humanized and morally relevant analysis of the 
market.
63
  Sen‟s capabilities approach can be traced to the perspective of 
“functionings” in the work of Lagrange, a mathematician from Smith‟s time who 
pioneered the pursuit of the variability of physical functionings from food intakes, 
with reference to activities, location and other factors.  While Lagrange pioneers the 
physical functionings concept, Smith shows the relationship between achievements 
of social functionings and opulence.  These concepts of functionings and capabilities 
become largely neglected in later economic discussions.  As economic models 
become increasingly inclined towards utilitarianism, the human aspects of societal 
living also become largely neglected.   
 The capabilities approach contains some resemblance to the biblical concepts 
of vocation and stewardship.  First of all, each human person is uniquely created and 
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equipped with different capabilities, preferences and needs.  Each is to contribute and 
serve the community while receiving and being cared for within it.  This is a 
fundamental part of the covenant community.  Second, a shared notion of ownership 
and contribution within the covenant community starts from the concept of 
stewardship for God.  The concept of capabilities supports realization of one‟s 
limitation, broadening an individual worldview to include not only self needs but the 
needs for others.  Sharing and contribution are put in perspective.  These form 
essential parts of the covenant community and economic order.  However, the 
capabilities approach faces some challenges in terms of its application in economics.  
It is understandable that some capabilities are naturally inborn, but most remain at 
least partially nurtured.  The investment of time and resources in education and the 
access to opportunities affect the continuing development and therefore the 
capabilities of individuals.  By the same token, capabilities cannot be objectively 
measured and can change significantly due to contextual or other circumstances.
 64
  
Nevertheless, the capabilities approach contributes to redirecting the focus of 
economic models to a concern for the individual human person.  It marks the 
awareness for the need of a paradigm shift in economic approaches, and offers an 
alternative that takes into account concerns for the human person. 
The market has developed naturally over time because it assists economic 
growth and efficient economic development through trades and exchange.  Such 
activities form part of human life in which community and cooperation are necessary.  
Although these activities are primarily material exchanges that can be made at arm‟s 
length, the underlying relational aspects cannot be neglected.  As Sen asserts, “it is 
not so much a matter of having exact rules about how precisely we ought to behave, 
as of recognizing the relevance of our shared humanity in making the choices we 
face”.
65
  In this regard, the covenant concept reminds us of the important human 
qualities such as responsibilities, commitment, justice and compassion within our 
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shared humanity that support freedom and the proper exercise of freedom.  Freedom 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for morality and humanized living.  As Sen 
asserts, “the value of the living standard lies in the living, and not in the possessing 
of commodities, which has derivative and varying relevance”.
 66
  He shows that self-
interest need not be the only way, and more importantly, it is unlikely to be the “best” 
way. 
 
4.4  The Two Pillars Market 
 Re-introducing covenant into the contract-based market is non-subversive in 
the sense that I do not seek to over-ride modern economic structures or to abolish 
market exchanges.  Nevertheless, the covenant concept appears subversive when re-
introduced to the contract-based market because of its fundamental relevance and 
significance to basic economic activities.  A realist‟s view of the market quickly 
points towards the fact that contract-based market exchanges have become 
indispensible in every aspect of economic life.  On the other hand, Christian 
eschatological hope for a shared economy of grace presents a possibility inert within 
creation that the church must work towards.  The question is not how one eliminates 
the market for another alternative.  Sharing and grace can function efficiently 
through the market exchange where participants cooperate for mutual benefits.  The 
critical issue for the Christian community is to act in humility and embrace all 
creation with an awareness of the natural tendencies within human nature to reduce 
covenantal grace to legalistic contract.   
Law and contract play critical roles in society.  It is unrealistic and 
unnecessary to advocate an eschatological truth as a here and now reality during the 
already-but-not-yet life on earth.  The high moral demands and relational basis of the 
covenant must be safeguarded through legal boundaries to support its universal 
application in the secular world.  At the same time, the contract is not self-
sufficient.
67
  It must work together with the covenant that lays the foundation of 
human relationships.  The covenant is the authentic human pathway to ensure the 
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market functions according to its original intention of human cooperation and 
interdependence.  The economic market provides a platform for exchange that aims 
at mutual benefits.  Whether it is a loan, service or sale, the parties involved are to 
derive a higher combined value of benefits based on such exchange.  The Two Pillars 
market does not advocate a total reliance on gift or grace but maintains the qualities 
of fairness and cooperative exchange as the characteristics of economic markets.  
This fairness of exchange is necessary to uphold freedom within the market based on 
responsible entitlement, individual capabilities and mutual respect.   
 The human tendency towards contractual arrangements over the covenant is 
not without cause.
68
  Rational, legal, logical and calculated means are much easier to 
work out and defend.  Such arrangements provide a natural order that is essential to 
society, especially in terms of justice.  Law and order must be maintained in any 
society to protect the rights and freedom of individuals.  In these manners, the 
contract is an important mechanism to facilitate law and order.  In terms of economic 
order, it is important that the market not only provide a platform for exchange, but a 
lawful and orderly one for individuals to deal efficiently and freely with one another.  
Contract law helps to initiate transactions between complete strangers, thereby 
expanding the scope of cooperation and exchange across communities and 
geographical locations.  It provides a set of default rules that enforces reasonable 
prices, fair terms, good faith and quality warranties.  Through constructive conditions 
of contracts, the participants can deal with potential performance disputes and 
establish channels for mediation of non-performance.  Mediation and court 
enforcement are made possible with formalization of the written contract.  At the 
same time, continuing contracts help to build trust and on-going relationships, which 
can develop into covenantal bonds.
69
  Nevertheless, the market must not be purely 
contract-based.  In order for the market to retain the communal qualities and protect 
individual freedom in association, the market platform must be embraced by an 
underlying covenantal concept by the participants.  Without the covenant, the market 
loses its life as a gathering place for human persons to relate and cooperate with one 
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another.  Rather, it becomes a mechanical place where individuals calculate their 
own interests and protect themselves against each other in fear and trembling. 
 The legal contract that is essential to guard against abuses must not be 
allowed to override human relationships and compassion.  Extreme forms of legalism 
lead to political tyranny and economic destruction.  Kraus asserts that in the covenant 
way of life, the dominant elements are peace, justice and right.  Peace marks the 
unbroken good condition of all relationships, justice denotes faithful behaviour, and 
right is the basis of law established by the commands of God.  Solemn 
commandments and the divine Torah reside in the core of Israel‟s worship and 
obedience to God with the covenant relationship.  This covenant is exclusive to the 
household of God, final and irrevocable in terms of its political power and solidarity.  
Accordingly, covenant and right are intimately connected in the Deuteronomic 
theology.
70
  In Deuteronmic history, Israel as God‟s chosen people answers to the 
Creator‟s authority and His commandments as granted in the Torah.   
The Bible does not offer a comprehensive theology of contract because the 
intended relational order commanded by God is covenantal.  However, both covenant 
and contract are essential to the formation of Israel in the Old Testament.  Although 
against His will, God allowed the Israelites to establish a social contract by choosing 
their king (1 Sam. 8).  Sacks points out that the formation of the state of Israel under 
this social contract differs from the formation of the society of Israel under the social 
covenant at Mount Sinai, when Israel accepted the sovereignty of God and the 
authority of His commandments.  By the same token, America is founded upon the 
Declaration of Independence of 1776 as its covenant base, and formulated its social 
contract, the Constitution, in 1787.
71
  The social contract is applied to create a state 
through a constitution, but a covenant is needed to form a society of common duties 
and belonging.  The economic contract represents a structured way derived by 
humankind to facilitate cooperation and exchange, but it has to be complemented by 
covenantal elements of sharing and love.  As such, the contract is an important and 
practical tool for maintaining social and economic order, especially in a society with 
non-believers.  Full realization of the covenantal way of life in the end times means 
that contractual safeguards will be replaced entirely by obedience and submission to 
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divine authority.  Egocentric self-interest and coercion will be replaced entirely by 
sharing and love.  However, the eschatological stage is not realizable until the end of 
time.  In the pluralistic modern society where believers and non-believers reside 




Covenant and contract work together through a range of types and forms.  
Two distinct types of covenant, the unconditional promissory covenant and the 
conditional obligatory suzerain-vassal covenant, have been identified in the Old 
Testament.
 73
  These covenants are similar in form but serve different functions.  
From these distinct types of covenant numerous forms and meanings of covenant 
emerge.
74
  In the Old Testament, the act of “cutting” a covenant is derived from a 
ritual meal in the context of invoking the presence of God to establish a system of 
justice within duties and rights.  In its practical application as a relational order, a 
covenant may take place among equals or between superiors and subordinates.
 75
  
Within the covenanting processes, deals are made and participants share duties and 
rights that nourish each other. 
Covenant and contract interact to serve the earthly economic order as a 
balancing mechanism.  They address different aspects of our lives.  The covenant and 
contract pillars of the Two Pillars paradigm work together in the form of a 
continuum of relationships.  The balancing point and interaction between the pillars 
differ according to the nature and complexity of the transaction involved.  Towards 
the end of the contract pillar, we have the example of a buy and sell transaction of 
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daily supplies.  This transaction is based on a simple contractual act of purchase and 
sale.  The buyer and seller may not have a personal relationship.  For obvious reasons, 
the buyer may have developed a relationship with the corner store owner when the 
purchases are made on a regular basis.  Similarly, the urban consumer who buys 
daily supplies at the supermarket may develop brand loyalty to some products or get 
to know some of the employees in the supermarket.  These relationships are 
fundamental to communal life.  However, they are not intimate.  In these simple 
purchase and sale transactions, contractual elements play a strong part while 
covenantal elements remain present in the background.  Farmers or manufacturers 
who supply the products take on a moral responsibility within the covenant with 
society to ensure that their products are safe, and to transact business in good faith.  
All parties within this supply chain remain participants in a wider societal covenant 
that ensure covenantal elements are embedded in the economic activities. 
 Towards the other end of the spectrum lies the family unit, a covenantal 
arrangement in which participants voluntarily love and contribute to the well-being 
of one another.  It is a consociation where oaths are solemnly taken and love 
becomes self-giving.  The transactions within such units are based on sharing and 
non-calculative means.  Children are raised not through calculation of their potential 
return.  Human associations are based on bonding and care.  Within the family unit, 
the contract plays a relatively small part, but remains in place to set the ground rules 
and to protect the consociation from injustice and abuse.  For example, it comes into 
play when educating the children or displaying proper respect for the rights of family 
members.  From the family unit the covenant concept spans a spectrum of 
relationships to the extended family, associations of friends, colleagues and co-
workers, superiors and subordinates, community, and finally to the stranger on the 
street.  All manners of economic relationships between human persons take on 
certain elements of both covenant and contract. 
Sacks asserts that a covenanted nation is a story-telling one.  Its history is 
memory in narrative form, being celebrated continuously and passed on to future 
generations.  The covenant community is future oriented with a continuous vision 
and purpose.  “Stories create memory, and memory creates identity.  That is why 
covenant and narrative are at the heart of nations consciously created out of 
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diversity.”
76
  He points out that covenant complements the state and the market by 
putting forth human persons as altruistic individuals seeking the common good.
77
  
While the state and the market compete for power and wealth respectively, 
covenantal institutions do not compete.  Instead, they cooperate to serve society.  
Similar to contract and covenant, competition and cooperation need to coexist in 
society.  On the one hand, total competition leads to egoism and inequalities.  On the 
other hand, total cooperation leads to sectarianism and totalitarianism.  Such dreams 
for utopias have led to the worst bloodsheds in history.
78
  The market is not only a 
platform of exchange, but contains certain persuasive priorities within itself merely 
due to its underlying mechanism interacting with an egocentric human nature.  In the 
modern market, the economic agent is encouraged to chase after trendy fashions, 
leisure and lifestyle in the place of personal uniqueness and identity.  In the market 
of mass production, the human person becomes reduced to the product of mass 
production itself.  Sacks identifies this as the anti-traditional nature of markets.
79
  
Personal identity is given to us through the historical horizon in which we are born.  
By presenting us with an alternate set of norms based on the promotion of transaction 
volume, the market abolishes personal identities and binds the economic person to a 
blind chase towards vanity. 
The covenantal and relational aspects of the Two Pillars paradigm ensure a 
long-term, continuing commitment to human living within any transaction that takes 
place in the market.  Covenant carries a chance for continuous renewal, with faith 
that the divine truth surpasses all human disruptions and distortions.  It contains an 
eschatological hope for a new economy of grace, sharing and love.  The call for 
humanization of the market challenges the fundamental economic paradigm, adding 
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excessive externalities to economists‟ neat and tidy analytical models.
 80
  Bromley 
and Busching point out that relational soundness appears problematic when a given 
contractual relationship is seen as affective.  For example, “in financial circles 
market stability is viewed as problematic when buying selling patterns are 
significantly out of alignment with what are perceived as rational predictors of 
market performance.”
81
  This mathematical and calculative approach stands in 
contrast with the personal and affective engagement with covenantal partners in a 
relation that targets mutual well-being.  The solution is not to exclude the 
externalities, but to build models and methods that reflect authentic human nature 
with embedded covenant concepts, and to clearly articulate the qualitative limitations 
that simple models cannot portray.  In doing so, a continuous discernment of a 
balance between eschatological truth and reality is essential. To rediscover the 
covenant characteristics in the market, one needs to start from the human person and 
persons in community.  Morality is made possible when human persons encounter 
each other in community.
82
  Through covenant awareness and relationship building, 
the market can rediscover true moral norms through development of a covenantal 
culture that embraces authentic intentions, personal responsibilities and concern for 
others. 
To the believer, economic life forms part of the celebration of created life on 
earth.  The emphasis on integrity and ethics has been part of the covenantal life since 
the Old Testament times.  Early rabbinic teaching states that integrity in economic 
affairs is part of the fulfilment of religious life.  The Talmud considers study and 
practice of the ethical laws in commerce and finance as part of the way to 
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sainthood.
83
  There is a natural tendency for human persons to reduce such teachings 
to legalistic norms, therefore transforming relational covenants into commercial 
contracts.  The Christian‟s mission is to exert a renewal of the covenant paradigm 
into the economic order that is increasingly tilted towards purely contractual and 
legalistic terms.  Both covenant and contract are concepts essential to the proper 
functioning of the economic order.  Accordingly, the Two Pillars must be allocated 
their proper places within different types of market functions and aspects of human 
life.  There remains an undeniable reality that while Christians continue to reside as 
resident aliens on earth, legal requirements continue to be necessary to act as 
authoritative governance for a secular age that otherwise contains no higher 
standards.  A fully covenantal economic order is only realizable eschatologically.  
Yet during the already-but-not-yet temporality, humanity must work towards 
covenant living.  The Two Pillars paradigm outlined in this chapter takes into 
account practical applicability to actual market situations, and the rediscovery of 
authentic human nature embedded in the goodness of creation.  It recognises 
fundamental human needs for sharing and cooperation during the quest for efficiency 
and productivity, thus ensuring a balance between humanization of the market and 
satisfaction of material needs. 
 
4.5  Sharing and Cooperation in the Quest for Productivity 
The market is concerned with how the economics of the order of creation is 
actualized.  Its rules and boundaries should be set with good intentions of governance 
and safeguarding.  Legal order and contractual limits serve to protect and govern 
economic order, and to promote productivity.   These positive aspects of the contract-
based market need to work together with covenant characteristics to ensure 
fundamental humanizing values are encouraged and upheld in the market during the 
quest for productivity.  Economic notions of efficiency and competition in the 
modern market must be balanced with covenant assertions of sharing and 
cooperation.    At the same time, the covenant characteristics of sharing, love and 
compassion must underlie the contractual exchange to derive authentic communal 
cooperation.  The responsibility of serving the market and the community is deeply 
rooted in the election and calling of humankind from within the order of creation.  
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The creatures of God find ultimate life and nourishment only when standing in 
creaturely relationship to God.  Such goodness is poised for eschatological 
realization through the redemptive work of Christ.  Until then, in the already-but-not-
yet transition of time and space, humankind continues to long for authentic covenant 
relationships within the community – the true essence within human nature that has 
given way to our sinfulness. 
 Economic activities start from the ontological needs and wants of humankind.  
Efficiency and competition serve to increase productivity and satisfy as many needs 
and wants as possible.  Modern economics focuses on the material aspects of these 
needs and wants as its sole concern.  In reality, human needs and wants encompass 
many different scopes and interacting categories including material, social, spiritual, 
etc.  These ontological requirements become the foundation of human interaction and 
relationships within society.  Material need and wants, though essential, are not 
sufficient for the well-being of the whole person.  Efficiency and positive 
competition can facilitate productivity in the contract-based market, but the notions 
of sharing and cooperation must be simultaneously considered when making 
economic decisions.  This is because the economy not only serves a material 
exchange purpose, but represents the platform for providential care of all human 
persons in community with each other.  It is a “household” of participants 
exchanging goods and services in a spirit of sharing and cooperation. 
The word “economy” is derived from the Greek word oikonomia, which 
means the “law of the household”.  Accordingly, Meeks identify the living 
relationships essential to survival of human beings in society as oikos -- the 
household.  In the oikos of God, people serve each other through mutual self-giving, 
thereby forming the basic economy of relationships among those within the 
household.  The economy is an agent of God‟s work in which all of God‟s creatures 
find access to life.
84
  Out of nothingness God created the heavens and the earth, with 
the human person as part of the creaturely creation within the cosmos.  This means 
that from the very beginning, the economy of God is within the household of creation 
itself, representing the commencement of the household order called into being by  
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the Creator.
85
  Within the creation and continuing providence of God, we identify a 
covenantal history with a narrative that points towards the original design of the 
relational order that must be rediscovered to derive an economic order that originates 
from creation and points towards eschatological perfection. 
 Creation is a sphere willed and established by God before its existence.  
Consequently, the worldly order involving human relationships and economic 
activities is called into being within the time and space of divine will and design.  
Within the goodness and intention of creation and creaturely existence, there is an 
economic order posited and willed by God under covenantal and providential care.
86
  
The nature of this eternal, perfect covenant reveals to humankind the nature of 
authentic love and perfect freedom.  The bonding and pledge of love in freedom 
within the covenant forms the economy or relational order intrinsic to the triune God.  
It is also the nature of perfect economic order in the free love of God‟s economy.  
This economy is revealed in the history of creation, whereby humankind is invited to 
participate in work and the Sabbath, as well as the joy and rest it carries.  The human 
being is “set in the service of the ground from which he was taken”, and that it will 
“bear and produce in the power and goodness of God”.
87
  The ground becomes a 
hope for the fulfilling of man‟s needs with his existence and ability to work.   
 This notion of sharing and cooperation as part of the order of creation must 
be reiterated in the modern market.  It is the original purpose for humankind to work 
and plant the earth, integrating into the totality of the created world.
88
  In a sharing 
community, production and growth originate from the purpose of cooperation, rather 
than self-satisfaction.  Economic activities such as work and production that deploy 
resource and later develop into trading and market exchanges, all start from the 
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ordination of humankind by God to work and serve the earth.  This ordination is not 
meant for individuals alone, but for human persons to work together, to cooperate for 
mutual benefits, and to share the results in celebration and thanksgiving.  The duty to 
cultivate and keep the earth means that humankind as gardener is blessed through a 
giving relationship with all creation, revealing the beauty, glory and fullness of 
creaturely life.  The original intention of covenant partnership is shown here through 
the relational order amongst creatures and the cosmos.
89
  Economic necessities and 
desires are thus placed within the much wider context of the whole cosmos in serving, 
sharing and cooperating during the process of work and production. 
 Modern economic persons have no idea of a covenant of grace freely 
established and maintained by God.  When grace is unknown, we dwell under 
insecurity and strive for material abundance to fulfil both external needs and internal 
desires.  The attempt to become self-sufficient economic persons places us in 
isolation, destructive competition and coercion.  When human persons focus entirely 
on organizing economic life around our own needs and desires, the market becomes 
a place for exploitation of resources and other people.  Such individualism reduces 
all relationships to rivalry or manipulation.  In such a market, human persons lose 
their identity through commodification into headcounts, labour hours or purchasing 
power.  The providence of God is essential to redeem and reconcile the market.  
Gifting and self-giving love are the ontological characteristics of God from whom all 
wellsprings of life originated.  The isolated economic person is perpetually haunted 
by insecurity because self-satisfaction continuously fails to deliver.  Through 
covenantal participation, individuals enter into a common economy of providential 
care.  In contrast, a focus on maximizing material ends narrows economic 
relationships to self-satisfying means.  Materialism presents a mechanism based on 
the investigation of atomic science, without consideration for the richness and 
diversity of the created world and its meaning.
90
  It brings about an unconscious fate 
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that is elevated to replace the transcendental.  What appears to be quantifiable and 
controllable inevitably turns out to betray its intended purpose.
91
   
If humankind continues to focus entirely on productivity and efficiency, our 
natural desires drive economic development to the exhaustive deployment of the 
environment and calculative means of market exchange.  Well-defined legal concepts 
are then developed to facilitate efficiency and effectiveness.  While these rules and 
judgements may achieve productive ends, the intrinsic goodness of the covenantal 
order easily give way to contractual finality.  In contrast, the essence of the Two 
Pillars market is a covenant relationship of giving and receiving, governed by the 
boundaries and clarified by the contractual arrangement but transcends calculative 
legal limits.  The relationship is active and positive, enabling the participants to work 
together towards a common objective with mutual benefit.  No earthly creature can 
escape the necessity of cooperation and coordination with one another.  The 
relational, self-giving nature of the covenant cannot be perfected in the earthly 
duration because of corrupted human nature during this already-but-not-yet 
temporality.  Nevertheless, God‟s original intention of the covenant order is not 
concealed.  It is revealed in Scripture through the history of the covenant of grace, 
and in world events where divine providence continues to uphold the temporality 
necessary for participation in the covenant in communities that uphold both 
productivity in the form of stewardship, and sharing in the form of care and 
cooperation. 
 
4.6  Private Possessions and Public Goods 
When human persons share and cooperate in production activities, questions 
about private possessions versus public goods arise.  A proper understanding of the 
covenant concept helps to place these concerns in their proper context, lifting our 
focus from material possessions to notions of gifting and receiving within the 
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relational covenant.
92
  In a covenantal market, responsibility and stewardship receive 
their meaning by taking creation and therefore material matters as gifts from God.  
Without the immanence and transcendence of divine authority, covenantal intentions 
quickly deteriorate into mere contractual pursuits.  Without the doctrine of creation 
and the gratuity of receiving from the Divine, irresponsible deployment of resources 
can lead to exploitation and adverse ecological consequences.
93
 
 While acknowledging the right to private possession in the form of 
contractual entitlement, the covenant opens up the participant to simultaneously 
embrace the notions of social capital and the common good.  The Calvinistic concept 
of common grace provides insights for opening up private grace and advantages to 
the public arena.  Reformed theologian Abraham Kuyper explores and applies this 
concept to divide grace into the dimensions of a saving grace that abolishes sin, and a 
temporal restraint that holds back the effect of sin.  The common grace concept 
prevents a division of the spiritual versus secular, reminding Christians that they 
remain Christians whether inside or outside of church premises.  The same grace of 
spiritual and material abundance is offered to the believer and non-believer alike.  No 
sphere of life for the Christian falls outside Christ.  Similarly, no sphere of creation 
falls outside the sovereignty and covenantal plan of the Creator.
94
  Through this 
common grace, Kuyper places all spheres of existence and divergence of worldviews 
under the sovereignty of the Creator.  At the same time, Kuyper acknowledges the 
sphere sovereignty concept to enable different levels and purposes of human 
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association, reflecting the essence of the covenant concept in society.  To Kuyper, 
sphere sovereignty reflects a similar sentiment deriving from the covenant concept to 
that of the consociation in the federal society depicted in Johannes Althusius‟ 
polity.
95
  Kuyper argues that spheres of life such as family, business, art, etc., 
develop spontaneously in an organic way.  The different organic spheres share 
common concerns in the form of morality and the common good. 
 Creation in the imago Dei provides the basis for an inclusive family that 
values diversity as much as unity.  The Two Pillars paradigm embraces private right 
and property, as well as public goods and common interest.  Individual difference is 
an asset that enables and contributes to covenant relationships.  Such differences are 
not results of sinful human nature, but represent the intention of the Creator to grant 
uniqueness to each individual person.  Human sins turn differences into divisions 
while covenant enables differences to converge and cooperate.  Covenant encourages 
uniqueness and multicultural coalitions by identifying common grounds for identity, 
participation and responsibility.
96
  These common objectives converge to the public 
good within the common grace of God.
97
  Ultimately, the common good serves the 
interests of all its participants. 
 Vatican II defines the common good as “the sum of those conditions of social 
life which allow social groups and their members relatively thorough and ready 
access to their own fulfilment”.
98
   The three features that support this idea of the 
common good are human dignity, interdependence and participation.  Human dignity 
is rooted in creation of the human person in the imago Dei.  Interdependence means 
that human persons are bound together in communities.  Participation refers to 
entitlements such as food, shelter and education, as well duties to contribute to social 
political and economic institutions.  Hollenbach identifies the approach of Vatican II 
                                                 
95
 The philosopher and theologian Johannes Althusius applies the covenant concept to present a polity 
of consociations for political society.  Details of his work are discussed in chapter 2.  
96
 Mount, Covenant, Community and the Common Good: An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 45-6. 
97
 Allen summarises common good to include justice, goodness and shared objectives.  The pursuit of 
the common good need not conflict with the good of each member, because “from the standpoint of 
covenant love the common good includes as part of its meaning respect for the worth and therefore for 
the rights of each member of the community”.  See Allen, Love and Conflict: A Covenantal Model of 
Christian Ethics, 267-9. 
98
 Mount, Covenant, Community and the Common Good: An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 42. 
   134
as “dialogic universalism”.
99
  It assumes common outlines of well-being for all 
human persons while dialogical engagement with pluralistic cultures remains part of 
the human good.  Social capital is an obvious common sphere for all societal 
participants.  At the same time, individuals reside in a diversity of private spheres 
that interact within a dynamic network of relationships.  I claim that the covenant is a 
more comprehensive concept that serves to enable authentic relationships within 
such diversities.
100
  It supports smaller communities of common goals and interests at 
the social spheres, while at the same time enables participation in a wider society for 
unity and the common good. 
 In contrast to shared objectives and the common good, modern society tends 
to reduce commonalities into quantifiable measurements for contractual purposes.  
For example, Moltmann points out that money is the only universality in the 
contemporary world.  It has become the only medium of economic communication 
that enables communities of exchange and trade.  Human persons enter into 
communication as homo oeconomicus, in the form of labour hours and as units of 
purchasing power or consumption.  In light of these economic relationships all other 
designations appear insignificant because they cannot be translated into monetary 
terms.  The economy thus offers a social ethics and ruling power of its own.  The 
highly complex systems of relationships among humans, nature and the Divine have 
transformed into continuous hunger for growth, expansion and conquest.  As human 
persons seek security from satisfying their needs and wants, mere material existence 
constantly fails.  The goal of human lordship over the world and its resources fails to 
offer the paradise that fills the emptiness in humankind.  Lordship captures for itself 
more and more possessions.  Possessions and possessing power lead to exploitation 
of both human persons and ecological resources.
101
  The protection of private right 
and property is a concern for individual economic freedom, security and respect.  In 
order to enable this private sphere of contractual functionality, concerns for social 
capital and the common good must coexist.  Otherwise, possessions easily turn into 
egocentric exploitation or materialism.  The covenant allows private possession to 
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open up towards charity and community concerns.  It lifts the participant from a 
quest for material security to a higher level of freedom and security in mutual care 
and sharing. 
 Moltmann asserts that economics cannot be excluded from the lordship of 
Christ because the oikoumene of God is to be kept under His will and order.  Under 
the universal lordship and salvation of Christ, Christian theology is also economic 
theology or “materialistic theology”.  The living testimony of Christians penetrate 
every sphere of life to enact God‟s will and order as they strive towards the kingdom 
of God and the hope of perfecting His household order.  Christians choose to turn 
away from the ruthless satisfaction of demands to community, living in solidarity 
with others and with nature.  They do not see others as competitors in the struggle for 
existence, but live towards the vision of symbiosis with others.  Under covenantal 
living, they are able to see the persons behind the monetary terms, and the essential 
social bonds behind the contractual exchange.  They enjoy freedom within the rules 
and boundaries of the market mechanism, but turn away from the domination and 
suppression that result from exploitation of market freedom.  The covenantal 
fellowship and participation in equal responsibility and just distribution of goods 
enable survival of human persons individually and collectively.
102
 
Private possession and property rights are often placed in the context of 
individual freedom in the modern market.  Moltmann points out that freedom as 
lordship differs from freedom as community.  In the former, persons find themselves 
in their possessions and as proprietors.  They maintain a lordship over themselves, 
taking freedom as the ability to be their own ruler.  The limit of individual freedom is 
the freedom and property of the other.  Therefore freedom of others is respected in 
order to claim freedom of the self.  In contrast to freedom as lordship, freedom as 
community is based on the love that brings human freedom to its truth.  Through 
love in relations to others, human persons are recognized and accepted in community, 
becoming free as they open and shares their lives with one another.  This freedom is 
communal, mutual and participative.
103
  It is covenantal in nature. 
 The law that intends to govern common life does not take into account 
individual persons and their characteristics.  It relates to a hypothetical legal citizen 
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of a particular society in general, calling for conformity through a presupposed social 
agreement.  The legal system provides an image of the human person who resides in 
a given time and place.  It grants status and rights within the given society, and sets 
out the penal code relating violations.  In doing so, it presupposes moral self-
determination, calling for responsible decisions at all times.  The person‟s social 
situation is not taken into account under an abstract view of the legally framed 
individual.
104
  In terms of economics and distribution, this means that legal and 
contractual systems alone become inadequate to articulate social good.  Choices and 
material satisfaction must be used properly for life‟s preservation and not for its 
destruction.  Its goal is not the increase of power, but the freedom from compulsion 
and necessity, and the striving for the realization of the good.
105
  Moral purposes 
must be considered in order to attain quality and community in property rights and 
the common good. 
 
4.7  The Two Pillars Paradigm as a Dialogical Framework 
 The covenant concept is subversive because its self-giving, sharing and 
forgiving aspects are high standards difficult to maintain unless trust and 
commitment are always present in a community.  Balancing the covenant concept 
with contractual arrangements makes the Two Pillars approach realistic to the secular 
community.  The Two Pillars paradigm maintains that both covenant and contract are 
essential to economic activities, and should interact in complementary ways to 
uphold the economic market.  It results from a public theology that thinks on behalf 
of humanity as a whole, rather than starting from the interest of the church.  The 
paradigm starts from an accent of fundamental human nature and the order of 
creation that is universal, while offering a structure that allows for communal 
particularity.  As such, the paradigm forms an important framework both for 
interdisciplinary dialogue and for discussion of economic issues.  The covenant and 
contract pillars together offer a spectrum of possibilities for regulating economic 
activities.  A balance is required between covenant and contract to support healthy 
economic order.  Detrimental consequences result when society relies solely upon, or 
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overly inclines towards, the contractual approach.  The believing community must 
strive to demonstrate the relevance of covenantal living, and to bring the covenantal 
aspect of relating to the contractual world in witness and in pursuit of a balanced and 
humanized market.  To further clarify the Two Pillars paradigm and to illustrate its 
practicability and dialogical nature, I shall demonstrate its application through the 
example of long-term employment arrangements in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Illustration of the Two Pillars Paradigm in Long-Term  
Employment Arrangements 
 
 This chapter focuses on the specific aspect of work as a continuous, long-
term arrangement between an employer and employee.  Through this example, I 
demonstrate the relevance and application of the Two Pillars paradigm in terms of a 
given economic activity.  Work and work arrangements are integral parts of human 
life and economic cooperation.  I shall explore the underlying presuppositions of 
work, development of the employment contract, and the economic relational contract 
models that attempt to capture the relational aspects of long-term employment.  The 
covenant approach to employment is then compared and contrasted with the 
relational contract arrangement.  Finally, the Two Pillars paradigm is presented by 
analyzing its effects and implications with respect to different components of the 
long-term employment arrangement.  This illustration shows the relevance and 
practicability of the Two Pillars paradigm, and how the covenant and the contract are 
mutually dependent and shade into one another.  Both the covenant and the contract 
are needed to promote humanized relationships and the overall well-being of the 
market participants. 
 
5.1  Human Nature and Economic Presuppositions on Work 
According to a simplistic view of the market, the purpose of work is to 
produce goods and services in return for money to spend in exchange for other goods 
and services.  This process assumes that the market mechanism is the best way to 
distribute work and resources.  Human persons enter the labour market to earn their 
living through market exchange.  The market system in turn demands a degree of 
commitment and performance from its participants.  Whether intentional or not, 
norms that focus upon productivity and efficiency easily cause human work to 
degrade to labour commodities.  Modern economics embraces the two dominant 
philosophical ideologies of naturalism and materialism.
1
  In the employment 
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 For a discussion of the definitions and limitations of materialism and naturalism, see Paul K. Moser, 
'Human Persons: Their Nature, Faith, and Function,' Ex Auditu 13 (1997): 17-36. 
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arrangement, a presupposition of materialism presents a monistic view about the 
material or physical existence of all things that tends to minimize the relational 
aspects of employment relationships.  A presupposition of naturalism tends to 
minimize the need for active interference or structural enhancement to the workplace.  
The modern person falls naturally into negative notions of work, placing work in 
contrast to leisure.  Consequently, the tendency is to avoid labour and to impose it on 
others. 
Markets are originally formed to serve human persons and communities.  
When such roles and functions are reversed, the quality and value of human life 
deteriorate.  In the Smithian system of self-interest and division of labour, work is an 
instrumental means to obtain material ends.  This self-interested motive in turn 
benefits the aggregate common interest.  According to Smith, division of labour 
brings about separation of trades and employments, creating a network of 
consumption interdependencies.  Therefore the division of labour gives rise to 
market relationships.  With the creation of private property and segregation of work 
responsibilities, individuals can earn a living according to their capabilities, and own 
the assets necessary to provide for their daily needs.  Accordingly, it is possible to 
attain a kind of economic independence through work.  This Smithian view of 
economic exchange finds work and economic relationships to be essential and 
dynamic.  Division of labour creates a functional structure of cooperation and 
interdependence that significantly increases productivity and efficiency.  While these 
are appealing, commercial exchange relationships can also become calculative and 
coercive when left to evolve entirely through self-interest.  Although wealth brings 
material satisfaction, power and status, it can also turn into a driving force for 
measurement of value and identity.  
The division of labour shapes a mechanism of cooperation and 
interdependency based on functionality.  When this mechanism is further enhanced 
through the development of employment contract law, contractual arrangements 
flourish and permeate our daily lives.  Such a mechanism promotes economic growth 
and productivity, leading to higher standards of living.  Together with these 
advantages, over-reliance on contractual arrangements brings adverse effects on 
human relationships.  In neoclassical economics, the contract promotes discrete and 
impersonal exchange.  In a purely contractual model, it will always be beneficial for 
a given party to minimize performance if that non-performance does not affect the 
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counterparty‟s probability of performance.
2
  Through these models, we can see that 
contractual arrangements carry both advantages and disadvantages.  They show that 
the tendencies to prioritize performance and self-interest can be detrimental to basic 
human relationships when these mechanisms are left without scrutiny.  Human 
persons naturally motivated by self-interest tend to find increasingly egocentric and 
calculative means to meet quantifiable ends in the form of material gains.  Work is 
reduced in the labour market economic models to a commodity measured by labour 
hours and wages as part of a market exchange. 
What are the meaning and essence of work?  The significance of work as an 
essential human activity is strongly asserted in the Catholic Encyclicals.  In Rerum 
Novarum, the human person is to engage in gainful occupation for “a true and full 
right not only to demand his wage but to dispose of it as he sees fit”.
3
  Economic 
rights and freedom are seen as essential parts of personhood.  The right to private 
possessions is affirmed although common interest is considered at the same time.  
Products of the earth serve as compensation for human labour.  This is the natural 
scheme that allows the human person to secure a livelihood.  Since the ability to 
work for a living is a natural right, it is the duty of employers to respect the dignity of 
workers by ensuring just demands and proper compensation.
4
  In Laborem Exercens, 
work is taken to bear the mark of humankind and of humanity as a sign signifying 
that a person is operating within a community of persons.  It is a perennial and 
fundamental aspect of human life that yields dignity to human existence, supports 
science and progress, and cultivates civilizations.  Accordingly, considerations over 




What then happens, when the nature of human work falls under the 
anthropology of the modern market?  Meeks points out that in the anthropology of 
the modern market, human persons are tailored to fit the market mechanism and 
technological advancement.  The notion of homo economicus simplifies human 
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 Victor P. Goldberg, 'A Relational Exchange Perspective on the Employment Relationship,' in Firms, 
Organization and Labour: Approaches to the Economics of Work Organization, ed. Frank H. Stephen 
(London: Macmillian, 1984), 129. 
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 Pope Leo XIII, 'Rerum Novarum,' Encyclical Letter (1891): par. 9. 
4
 Ibid., par. 14-32. 
5
 Pope John Paul II, 'Laborem Exercens,' Encyclical Letter (1981): par. 1-3. 
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persons to fit as actors in the market by an implied adherence to the market solution 
for the distribution of goods.  Human persons necessarily become economic persons 
and market participants who are drawn into the commodification of all goods and 
services into marketable units.  This in turn leads to a commodification of the self, 
and a self-making identity based on market sentiments of production and sale.
6
  The 
labour market is a typical example of commodification of the self in respect of the 
contribution of human effort to society.
7
  Meeks asserts that ideologies that attempt 
to exalt work present work as justification for one‟s existence.  Coupled with the 
commodification of work, such ideologies place the human person under slavish 
manipulation by work arrangements.  As human persons seek for meaning and 
justification of their own existence through work, they fall into the traps of 
commodification and dehumanization in the labour market.  With the concerns for 
human identity and purpose in life, work is viewed as the functional and 
organizational basis of life, contributing to the self-image and social recognition of 
the individual.  The possibility and quality of work determine the meaning of life.  In 
such situations, the domination of efficiency over work reduces work to its 
functionality and labour to a means to an end.  When the value of the human person 
is measured in terms of productive work, the unemployed may find themselves 
secondary citizens who cannot access the basic necessities of life.
8
 
The complex nature and multiple implications of human work render any 
simple definition or single anthropological viewpoint inadequate.  Perhaps one of the 
more comprehensive explorations of the theology of work is the threefold nature of 
work proposed by Darrell Cosden.  Cosden asserts that work is constituted by its 
instrumental, ontological and relational aspects existing together in a mutual and 
                                                 
6
 M. Douglas Meeks, 'Being Human in the Market Society,' Quarterly Review 21 (2001): 254-8. 
7
 As a result, Meeks concludes that “work is a central theological issue because nowhere are the 
relationships of authority and subordination more apparent than in the relationships of work.  Work is 
the most immediate way in which human beings dominate and exploit each other.”  See Meeks, God 
the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy, 127. 
8
 Instead of placing value on the functionality of work, Meeks presents a Trinitarian perspective by 
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unemployed are freely taken care of through inclusive, self-giving love.  The fullness of life in the 
other motivates the Triune community‟s work in faithfulness and steadfastness.  Such characteristics 
are embedded in human nature as humankind is created in the imago Dei.  See Ibid., 132-43. 
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interdependent relationship.  Work as an instrumental activity means that it serves 
certain outcomes, such as self-satisfaction and contribution to society, which are 
beyond direct consequences of the activity itself.  This instrumental aspect is 
essential but cannot stand on its own because work is quickly dehumanized if the 
human person is taken merely as an instrument or tool to achieve certain results.  
Consequently, the ontological nature of work as part of life itself cannot be 
overlooked.  Human work is in itself an activity of human life, and represents a gift 
from God.  The working process builds discipline and character that play a part in 
spiritual development.  One meets the needs of each other and acquires the means for 
charity through performance of work, leading to co-creation and interdependence in 
the communal sense.  The relational aspect of work addresses ethics, social 
relationships and existential realization in work.  It concerns how work is organized, 




Theological anthropology proposes an evangelical humanism that emphasizes 
the ontology of the human person.  Human nature and destiny reside in their identity 
and action in the reciprocities of relationships with God and others.
10
  The workplace 
is one of the most important arenas for the development of unity, identity and 
presence of the human person.  Through work and acts, the participant is placed 
within the spectrum of historical narratives and economic transactions.  Work being 
ontological is therefore essential to human worth.  This theological view finds 
adverse circumstances, such as structural unemployment, immoral because the 
exclusion of individuals from work rejects the value of human persons.
11
  Mutual 
trust and cooperation are important foundations for human identity and overall well-
being.  These tend to breakdown when the zeal for profits dominates the market 
culture.  At the same time, the sinfulness of human nature implies that egocentric 
market participants are characterised by continuous desires to satisfy pleasure and 
avoid pain through material ends.  This sense of insecurity and perpetual desire is a 
distortion that leads to an insatiable desire, drawing the human person away from 
                                                 
9
 Darrell Cosden, A Theology of Work: Work and the New Creation (Cumbria: Paternoster, 2004), 10-
2. 
10
 Meeks, 'Being Human in the Market Society,' 219-29. 
11
 Timothy L. Smith, 'Work and Human Worth,' Christian Century 84 (1967): 1094-6. 
   143
God.
12
  To examine this distortion under the natural development of the employment 
contract, we turn to the development of employment contract theory in legal 
scholarship. 
 
5.2  Development of the Employment Contract and Its Relational Aspects 
In modern society, contracts are often thought of in legal terms.  From the 
negotiation process to the drafting and enforcement of a transaction, participants are 
drawn into a set of formal presuppositions that characterize the contract mechanism.  
Even a single, discrete transaction at a retail shop occurs within relationships that 
involve a wide network of producers, suppliers and retailers.  Development of the 
employment contract provides the basis for further developing the division of labour 
in terms of individual interests and social status, as well as the commodification of 
labour hours by laying out predetermined terms and conditions.  As contract theories 
are studied and developed, the limitations of contracts in capturing relational aspects 
of employment arrangements become apparent when put into practice.  Consequently, 
the legal profession starts to develop extensions and variations to the simple contract 
in an attempt to alleviate these limitations.  Major examples of extended contractual 
forms include the psychological contract, implicit contract and relational contract. 
Rousseau defines the psychological contract as “an individual‟s beliefs 
regarding the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between that 
focal person and another party”.
13
  She asserts that subjectivity is inherent in all 
contracts.  Such subjectivity can occur in written or oral agreements, intrinsically 
residing as part of any agreement from a relationship or interaction over time.
14
  
Employment contracts are essentially relationship-based agreements that go beyond 
economic exchange to relational concerns.  They involve not only promise and 
contribution, but extend into cognitive limits, divergent frames of reference, and the 
formative nature of relationships.  The main concerns here are the beliefs and 
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expectations within the contract, binding the participants into some reciprocal 
obligations.  While other contractual structures reside among the participants to the 
contract, the psychological contract is perceived by the individual person when 
reciprocity is expected of the counterparty.  It reflects the individual‟s commitment 
to an organization, involving the acceptance of organization values, the willingness 
to exert effort, and the desire to remain an employee.
15
  Since psychological contracts 
are implicit in nature, they can be considered a form of implicit contracts. 
An implicit contract is “a non-contractual employment arrangement that 
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the repeated, post-hiring, bilateral trading game 
other than the degenerate agreement consisting of a sequence of Nash equilibria to 
the one-shot trading game”.
16
  Bull examines the reasons for and values of implicit 
contracts.  His model shows that in the labour market hiring process, informational 
asymmetries among the company, potential employees and third parties cause a 
contract to be incomplete and provide incentives to form an implicit contract.  This is 
largely due to the complexities in monitoring employee effort that tend to be implicit 
rather than explicit during the employment process.  Implicit contracts mediate a 
large proportion of the employment relationship.  However, they appear worthless 
from an enforcement point of view because implicit qualities in the contract may be 
observable but are not verifiable in a court of law.
17
  Implicit contracts extend 
beyond psychological contracts because they contain implied expectations that are 
based on past experience or circumstantial reality beyond subjective beliefs.  
Examples of these implicit elements may include employee performance or job 
security, for which expectations can be implied from continuing performance 
measurements or company policies.  Psychological contracts concern individual 
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beliefs in the reciprocity of a relationship, while implicit contracts represent mutual 
obligations characterizing the nature of the employment relationships.  Implicit 
contracts share similar attributes with the relational contract, described below, since 
these theories are developed simultaneously under different terminologies. 
A relational contract recognizes the relational nature of contractual 
arrangements.  Legal scholar Ian Macneil is widely known as the original advocate 
of relational contract theory.  He points out that contracts can never reside outside 
social relationships.  The fundamental roots of a contract are society, specialization 
of labour and exchange, choice, and awareness of the future.  It involves reciprocal 
exchange based on extensive specialization where individuals contribute their own 
specialization while relying on others to do the same.  It necessitates a sense of 
choice whereby individuals are equipped with perceived freedom to elect their own 
behaviours.  His work points towards the need for contractual participants to have a 
conscious awareness of a future for the contract.  This awareness and expectation for 
continuing relationships provide the relational basis for a given contract to fully 
develop and realize.
 18
  Relational contract theory attempts to capture the relational 
aspects of contracts that may be over and above the formal contractual agreement.  
From a legal point of view, the relational approach to contract is informed by four 
core propositions.  First, each transaction is embedded in a complex network of 
relationships.  Second, all formal and informal elements significant to a transaction 
must be considered in order to understand a transaction.  Third, all relationships and 
sequences relevant to a transaction must be recognized in order to analyse the 
transaction effectively.  Fourth, such contextual analysis is more sensitive to the 
contractual relationship than an approach that privileges the formal agreement.
19
   
Having identified the relational nature of contracts, the next step is to 
examine the behaviour and implications involved within the relational exchange.  
These may include a multitude of variables such as trust, cooperation, 
communication, justice, equality, solidarity, reciprocity, etc.  Different context and 
group dynamics give rise to different norms and culture.  Relational contract theory 
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makes the self-maximizing notion of the neoclassical contract appears too simplistic 
even for the most individualistic discrete transaction.
20
  A multitude of other factors 
such as coercion and dependence may occur among the participants.  The 
neoclassical contract assumption of equal bargaining power in a transactional 
relationship is often not the case.
21
  When applied to employment arrangements, the 
neoclassical model disregards the participants‟ identities and fails to account for the 
complexities of employment relationships.  The contract may be useful for protecting 
the interests of the relevant parties and for providing a means of formal and fair 
negotiation.  However, a pure contractual model overlooks the underlying dynamics 
outside of the contractual structure, as well as the continuing nature of personal 
relationships and unwritten norms involved when people work together in an 
employment environment.  Future events and unforeseeable circumstances can never 
be adequately represented in a written contract.
22
   
Relational contract theory is formulated to capture economic relationships 
among contracting parties that involve planning, trust, cooperation and other 
personal norms.  Relational contracts attempt to embrace unwritten terms among the 
contracting parties.  It is a tool developed to understand commercial contracts in 
better ways.  The relational contract recognizes the long-term nature of some 
contractual arrangements, e.g., in a long-term employment relationship, within which 
the extended duration and relational aspects prevent participants from calculating full 
value of the exchange on the outset.  It recognizes that future cooperative behaviour 
and governance mechanisms are necessary, that unforeseen contingencies are 
expected, and that continuing accommodation to contractual terms is required.  
During the process, bonds of friendship, interdependence and altruism may develop.  
At the same time, there may be conflicts and dissatisfactions.  The relational aspects 
of the contract lie outside of the written arrangement, and may result in gains or 
losses implicit to the contract.  The commitment and cooperation involved in a 
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relational contract is far more complex than the bargain for a single transactional 
exchange.
23
  The long-term employment relationship is typical of relational contracts 
that involve both explicit and implicit characteristics.  It is a type of relationship 
involving both quantitative economic exchange and qualitative human living.   
All employment contracts involve the very basic unquantifiable relational 
aspects between the employer and employee.
24
  Fox points out that in order to adapt 
the contract to business organizations, contractualism has to be combined with the 
traditional master-servant model.  While contract theory allows equity and discretion 
to the participants in defining the nature and terms of the contract, when the law is 
applied to the employment relationship such discretion reverts authority and control 
to the employer.  This is because employers generally retain greater coercive power 
within the relationship from their status and resources.  The master-servant model 
thus enters the employment contract, legitimizing the employer‟s prerogative.  This 
status differentiation reduces the employment contract to a legal device for the 
employer to make rules and exercise discretion.  In addition, the long-term and 
continuous nature of the employment contract prevents definition of specific 
obligations of the employee over time.  It is hardly practical to exhaustively fix the 
obligations of participants in the employment relationship at any given point in time.  
The employment contract is therefore necessarily a continuously renewing and open-
ended one.
25
  Legal scholars identify the open-ended nature of the employment 
contract as an essential incompleteness.  This means that employment arrangements 
necessarily contain self-enforcing notions.  Scholars therefore proceed to model these 
long-term relationships in repeated games by studying the participants‟ ability to  
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cooperate in trust and good faith.
26
  Undoubtedly, the contract mechanism cannot be 
expected to capture all the essential elements within employment relationships.  In 
particular, human factors such as trust and commitment cannot be explicitly 
formulated.  Informal or implicit agreements necessarily coexist with the formal 
written contract. 
Informal agreements are identified and studied by scholars in economics, law 
and business alike.
27
  MacLeod and Malcomson analyze a series of wages and 
performance outcomes that are implicit in employment contracts.  They focus on 
contractual terms such as piece-rate or informal bonuses that cannot be legally 
enforced because of their unverifiable nature.  These self-enforcing, implicit 
contracts resemble actual employment contracts more than those in the standard 
principal-agent models.
28
  When modelled in a repeated game, MacLeod and 
Malcomson find that many potentially perfect equilibria may result for these 
contracts.
29
  Vacancies and unemployment may coexist.  When the renegotiation 
process is applied as a criterion for selecting equilibria, this potential mismatch in 
employment is eliminated, but division of potential benefits from the employment 
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outcome remains ambiguous.  Various other assumptions and externalities are further 
explored in the models, leading to the conclusion that equilibria selection depends 
largely on the participants‟ beliefs about employment expectations, benefits and 





5.3  Employment Contracts as Repeated Games 
The relational contract approach to employment portrays the employment 
relationship as one of functional interdependence.  Pearce and Stacchetti build a 
repeated agency model to capture the interplay of explicit and implicit contracts, in 
which the agent‟s actions are observable to the principal but not verifiable in court.  
They find that optimal cooperation between the players requires the use of both 
explicit and implicit contracts.  The constrained efficient equilibria of supergames 
based on a standard agency model show that the presence of bonuses discourages 
cheating and smooths the agent‟s consumption pattern with reference to salaries and 
utilities.
31
  In such situations, the long-term employment contracts are in effect 
continuously renegotiated, although they are perceived to be a single, anticipated 
arrangement by the participants involved.  Explicit contacts that are short-term in 
nature should therefore be designed to enhance the effectiveness of long-term 
implicit contracts.
32
  Levin studies the trade-off for organizations to have a 
multilateral relational contract with their workforce as a whole, versus bilateral 
relational contract with individual employees.  He finds that while bilateral contracts 
are more flexible in terms of workforce changes, multilateral contracts that bind the 
organization more strongly to implicit commitments improve workforce 
motivation.
33
  The findings of these studies add to our understanding of the 
functional relationships in the employment situation, yet they are necessarily 
                                                 
30
 W. Bentley MacLeod and James M. Malcomson, 'Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and 
Involuntary Unemployment,' Econometrica 57 (1989): 447-80. 
31
 The constrained efficient equilibria of supergames are the best that can be achieved given the 
constraints of informational imperfections or other factors. 
32
 David G. Pearce and Ennio Stacchetti, 'The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in 
Repeated Agency,' Games and Economic Behavior 23 (1998): 75-96. 
33
 Jonathan Levin, 'Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship,' The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 117 (2002): 1073-1103. 
   150
economic abstractions that present observations limited to the instrumental aspects of 
the relationships under the assumptions of rational self-interest. 
The use of repeated games to model relational contracts in employment 
situations involves a number of parameters.  In an explicit contract, verifiable 
conditions of employment such as wages and working hours can be specified.  At the 
same time, the employment contract may also involve implicit terms such as a 
discretionary bonus and quality measurements.  In repeated game models, threats to 
the relationship may include decrease in trust, expectation of lower bonus levels, job 
security concerns, morale problems, etc.  Termination of employment involves 
severance pay and breakdown in relational bonds that parallel “punishment” in the 
prisoner‟s dilemma model.  To further explore the use of repeated games in 
modelling relational aspects of economic behaviour, I shall discuss the example of 
the Prisoner‟s Dilemma. 
 The Prisoner‟s Dilemma is a familiar illustration in the social sciences, and 
widely used to model strategic behaviour in economic theory.  It is an interesting 
scenario where rational individual self-interest appears to leave the participants worst 
off.  This model is presented here to illustrate the covenant response to economics 
behaviour, and the limitations of economic modelling with reference to the covenant 
concept.  In this model, two prisoners who have committed a crime together are 
asked to confess their crime for a reduced sentence.  If neither confesses, the 
evidence for conviction is mild so both receive a light sentence, say one year each.  If 
both confess, they receive five years each.  If one confesses but not the other, the 
confessor will go free while the other receives a heavy penalty of ten years.  The 
prisoners are held in different cells without knowing the decision of the other.  This 
means that without knowing the decision of the other prisoner, a prisoner who 
confesses either gets five years if the other confesses or goes free if the other does 
not.  A prisoner who does not confess either gets ten years if the other confesses, or 
one year if the other does not.  This is a simple “game” scenario where it is better to 
confess no matter what the prisoner thinks the other is going to do.  This means that 
prediction of the other‟s action or strategic intentions is not necessary.  Under such a 
simple self-interest maximizing scenario, both prisoners will confess and end up with 
five years of imprisonment.  As a result, their individually rational actions work 
against their social interest because if they cooperate on not confessing, they only get 
penalties of one year each.   
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When Prisoner‟s Dilemma situations occur in real-life situations, cooperation 
does occur in some cases.  This starts the social scientists‟ quest in modelling 
different situations around the phenomenon and placing the model in parallel to real 
life conditions such as business decisions or employment negotiations.  Cooperation 
based on reciprocity has been observed in numerous situations including breach of 
contract, political negotiations and international trade.  The answer lies in 
considering the repeated play of the Prisoner‟s Dilemma game, when a strategy such 
as Tit for Tat quickly emerges in experiments with real players as the participants 
respond to the decision of each other.
34
  In a sense, this is not cooperation but a 
rational calculation taking into account future circumstances in the pursuit of 
egocentric self-interest.  Nevertheless, it affirms the complexity of human behaviour 
and the fact that cooperative behaviour can be taught intentionally.
35
 
The Prisoner‟s Dilemma is an interesting and useful illustration because it 
captures the reality of possible inefficiencies in the market exchange in a simple way.  
Maximization of individual interests does not always add up to optimal common 
advantage.  When the market is left on its own to operate through fate of natural law, 
the results can be against the social interest.  As a government policy administrator, 
Adam Smith realizes this fact.
36
  Law and order are necessary to administer contracts 
in the market.  At the same time, a covenantal polity is necessary to ensure proper 
human relationships and cooperation for the common good.  In the context of the 
workplace, employment relationships portrayed as repeated games assume rational 
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calculative intention from all participants.  The relational aspects captured in the 
economic models therefore remain contractual rather than covenantal. 
Economists have applied the Prisoner‟s Dilemma to model numerous 
different situations.  Leibenstein finds that it is useful to view productivity as a 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma problem.  He argues that productivity can be viewed as an 
interactive game involving numerous interdependent variables under the decision of 
multiple decision-makers.  Workers who are part of this “productivity game” are 
employed under incomplete contracts that can specify remuneration but cannot fully 
monitor the effort exerted.  Therefore productivity partly depends on the effort made 
by individual workers.  Under these scenarios, effort conventions are usually non-
optimum.  Accordingly, Leibenstein concludes that the invisible hand does not 
produce a Pareto optimal result.
37
  Arce, Daniel and Sandler find that in their 
experiments, when a variation of public versus private incentives are given to the 
participants, public benefits facilitate cooperation in repeated plays of the Prisoner‟s 
Dilemma.
38
  Dayton-Johnson shows that a critical level of social cohesion must 
precede cooperative behaviour, while social cohesion can be facilitated by 
information and cooperative norms.
39
  Cooperative norms mitigate the inefficiencies 
that arise in the Prisoner‟s Dilemma.  These norms must be embedded in an ethical 
market climate and a culture for moral economic relationships. 
Frank places the self-interest model in contrast to a commitment model in 
which workers assume a considerable level of commitment to the employment 
contract.  He recognizes that beliefs about human nature in turn shape human nature 
itself, especially in terms of its consequences for material welfare. 
[T]he traditional self-interest model says that people who love, who feel guilty when 
they cheat, vengeful when they are wronged, or envious when they get less than their 
fair share will often behave in ways that reduce their material payoffs.  But the 
commitment model tells us that precisely because of this, they may also enjoy 
opportunities that would not be available to a purely opportunistic person.  In many 
cases, a person or society armed with this knowledge will make better choices than 
one exposed only to the self-interest tradition.
40
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Frank‟s model identifies emotional predispositions as the driving forces 
behind moral behaviour.  Workers feel guilty when they cheat, vengeful when they 
err, and envious when things are unfair.  Instead of attempting to free ride on other 
workers, committed employees are responsible and cooperative.  The finding shows 
that the commitment model needs to be supported by an appropriate working 
environment that promotes proper norms.  An increase in personal ties among the 
workers leads to a decrease in motivation to shirk on the job.  Being moral and doing 
the right things impose economic costs on the workers but most people have the 
capacity to be educated and to behave in a committed manner.
41
  While cooperative 
norms and commitment can be present in either the covenant or contract situation, 
the essence of non-egocentric cooperation and commitment in true human bonding 
must be based on covenantal relationships.  Such covenanting capabilities can be 
educated and nurtured. 
 The wide application of the Prisoner‟s Dilemma to economic theories such as 
optimum savings, taxation, allocation involving externalities, etc., demonstrates that 
cooperation and commitment are beneficial under many real-life circumstances.  Sen 
points out that the problem here is actually what the person presupposes under the 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma.  In a rational economic model where people act on self-interest, 
one assumes participants to be self-interested.  The choice of cooperating in view of 
self-interest is based on rational calculation.  On the other hand, a choice of not 
cooperating follows a moral code of behaviour or a set of personal values beyond 
calculative rationality.
42
  Numerous possibilities begin to emerge when externalities 
such as on-going relationship, coercion, conflicting interest, etc. are added to the 
interactions.  If one continues to focus on the self-interested assumption of economic 
human nature, this can mean that cooperation simply starts from a calculated risk or 
expectation of reciprocity.  This story can continue.  On the other hand, if the horizon 
is opened up to include the possibility of irrational acts, social interests or even 
sacrificial intentions, the story becomes a human narrative of non-calculative 
bonding.
43
  This may not fit the classical view of the self-interested economic person,  
                                                 
41
 Ibid., 4-13. 
42
 Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement, 65. 
43
 As Axelrod discovers, cooperation among the participants can start from the few individuals who 
have a chance for brief interaction with others.  See Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 21. 
   154
yet it carries some truth to the relational aspects of human life.
44
 
 The Prisoner‟s Dilemma has a number of limitations when modelling human 
relationships.  The observable behaviour in economic modelling may not reflect the 
true essence of the underlying human relationships and motives.  Gilbert questions 
the validity of the Prisoner‟s Dilemma by pointing out that “the central assumptions 
of the Prisoner‟s Dilemma are devoid of any vision of enduring, mutually beneficial 
connections between the human beings who create and sustain such institutions as 
business and the modern corporation”.
45
  Accordingly, we imprison ourselves by 
using the Prisoner‟s Dilemma to model human interactions.  Gilbert challenges the 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma in terms of five assertions: commitment, cooperation, trust, 
mutual benefit and defection.  The commitment concept in the Prisoner‟s Dilemma 
game has nothing to do with human relationships.  It only represents the prudence of 
an egoist.  The cooperative person builds a reputation in the game over time that does 
not necessarily contribute to relationships.  The game itself does not allow for 
evolving relationships in which trust can be anchored.  It also does not capture any 
mutuality or the common good.  Since a history of relationship is not provided for in 
the game, defection as a departing strategy has little ground.
46
  Gilbert‟s observations 
point towards a deeper meaning of ethics that goes beyond the modelling approach.  
The five questions converge to the lack of recognition of human identity in the 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma.  The fact that human persons act in relationship with each other 
must first be presupposed before the model takes on any meaning.  This is the 
underlying covenant concept that embraces society, even before any analysis can 
actually commence.   
 In the eschatological sharing economy of grace, the participants in the 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma will act in self-giving, covenantal love to uphold the oath and 
bonding with each other.  Within the covenant, perfect trust and total commitment in 
the form of authentic relationships will ensure reciprocity.  Such a paradigm is 
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ideological in the already-but-not-yet realm.  During this temporality, a balance 
between covenant characteristics and contract legalities is needed.  The Two Pillars 
paradigm offers a balance between unconditional compassion and economic justice.  
A participant acts in self-giving, covenantal love and trusts the others to do the same.  
When faced with a breach of trust, the participant reassesses the situation under the 
view of a covenant renewal, rather than taking the exit route in the first instance.  
Covenant renewal is balanced with justice to derive a decision based upon loving-
kindness and personal judgement.  This decision cannot be calculated empirically.  
To the social scientist, this is irrational behaviour that cannot be modelled.  The 
social scientists‟ objectives of modelling through the Prisoner‟s Dilemma are to 
simulate human behaviour.  Accordingly, alternatives to the self-interested, 
contractual model such as the altruistic model or commitment model are measured 
by their results.  Under the covenant concept, the intrinsic value of human 
relationships, trust and compassion need to be taken into account in measuring 
results.  These highly valued human qualities are often destroyed when one focuses 
entirely on the means to achieve immediate economic results, with the negative 
impact on society long-lasting and unaccounted for.  In a repeated Prisoner‟s 
Dilemma scenario where trust is eventually breached and relationships broken, 
community shatters.  Contractual arrangements and laws to guard against the breach 
of contracts are necessary because of the natural sinful tendencies of fallen human 
nature.  Yet at the same time, humankind must strive against such tendencies in 
pursuit of the covenantal relationships that bond human persons together and truly 
uphold the market in its proper function, i.e. to serve humankind rather than be 
served by it.  Relational norms are much needed to complement the contractual 
arrangement in employment relationships.
47
  These can best be served by enacting  
                                                 
47
 Further to the discussions on psychological, implicit and relational contracts in section 5.2 above, 
Bird applied these concepts to identify three sources of relational contract norms for employment 
relationships – the psychological contract, company credo and organizational culture.  First, 
psychological contracts are employees‟ perception of mutual obligations within the employment 
relationship.  It is perceived between the individual employee and the organization as a whole, but not 
necessarily representing organizational expectations.  It can remain within the mind of the particular 
employee, changing over time as the employment relationship progresses.  Violation of the 
psychological contract occurs when the employee perceives a failure of fulfilment.  Second, the 
company credo is the document of ethical rules for employees.  It lays out the explicit standard of 
employment behaviour within the company, usually including requirements for commitment to 
integrity and appropriate business conduct.  Company credos affirm the law, demand honesty, call for 
loyalty and promote fairness.  Third, organizational culture is the consistent set of goals and norms 
within an organization that influences the values and behaviour of its employees.  It represents the 
beliefs, values, assumptions and norms that define the organization and how its employees behave.
 
 
See Bird, 'Employment as a Relational Contract,' 170-80. 
   156




5.4  A Covenant Approach to the Employment Arrangement 
The predominant Protestant understanding of work starts from the doctrine of 
vocation, which involves work to meet physical needs, as well as personal obedience 
to God in the context of a “calling”.  Forrester finds Abraham to be the first person 
who received an explicit sense of calling and vocation from God.  God commands 
Abraham directly to embark on a pilgrimage within a personal relationship with God 
Himself.  This marks the beginning of the election of Israel as the chosen people 
within the covenant with God.  It is this sense of vocation that makes and keeps 
Israel a people under God‟s covenant.  Within this national vocation, God keeps 
Israel prosperous and safe, while charging them with obligations and duties towards 
God and other people.  The meaning of vocation and calling in the context of the Old 
Testament is much richer than work alone.
48
  Yet the essence of being charged with 
the covenant entails a communal essence of work that embraces both privileges and 
responsibilities of the acts of working together.  This covenantal essence enriches the 
meaning of work as understood in the secular context.
49
 
In transactional contracts, employees‟ involvement and contribution is limited 
to the offering of skills and abilities that are instrumental to the outcomes sought 
within the contract.  Accordingly, the participants are steered to focus on maximizing 
self-interest and managing expectations.  In comparison, a relational contract is more 
open-ended, subjective and evolves over time.  It is based on long-term fairness, 
obligations and reciprocity.  Such social exchanges support psychosocial ties 
between the employee and employer.  The participants involved tend to focus on 
equity and exchange of contributions to the relationship.  It safeguards the 
employment relationship by providing a minimal fallback position upon its 
breakdown.  In comparison, a covenantal relationship takes a further step into 
promoting healthy employment relationships.  It is yet another form of relational 
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concern based on mutual commitment and shared values of the participants.  It 
focuses on normative and moral commitments, allegiance to shared values, and 
willingness to sacrifice self-interest for the common good.  Therefore covenantal 




The covenant approach to work places work in the context of co-creation, 
stewardship and vocation.  Herman defines covenant as enduring commitments that 
withstand durable contingencies.  When applied to employment situations, 
covenanting is “a process for creating a community of mutual accountability by 
engaging the wills of management and employees in the marking and fulfilling of 
commitments oriented to shared goals and self-restraint in the use of power”.
51
  It 
involves promises, respect, the common good of the firm and concern for wider 
social goods.  This covenantal view puts the notion of work in its proper place as a 
constructive and positive element of human life. 
As shown through the concept of incomplete contracts discussed earlier, 
employers and employees may bring into the workplace many contingencies such as 
changes in the working environment or absenteeism due to unexpected illness.  
These contingencies are often uncontrollable and unpredictable intentions and 
actions generated by external complexities.  They contribute to changes in 
expectations and outcomes.  Herman points out that employers and employees are 
continuously present to each other with their own capacities to define and pursue 
purposes during the employment process.  Employees may place higher priority on 
job security and wage increases, while employers seek to promote productivity and 
control costs.  Accordingly, the participants derive their own strategies and tactics 
ranging from the more negative means of coercion to the positive ways of 
empowerment.  Struggles within the employment relationship may be non-vocal or 
invisible, and are continuous in nature.  They can either lead to negative conflicts or 
positive cooperation.  Contractual arrangements help to alleviate employment 
contingencies.  They are behavioural devices for social actors to reduce their 
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vulnerability to each other.
 52
  Terms and conditions within the contract are designed 
to neutralize contingencies.  However, the continuous nature of the employment 
relationship cannot be adequately captured in a contract.  The contract as a mediating 
tool is not self-sustainable when faced with the complexities and contingencies of 
employment relationships.  A covenantal interpretation of the employment 
relationship means that the participants are united to pursue the common interest of 
the organization, and bind themselves not to exploit their advantage over the other 
during the employment process.  As Herman points out, “a covenant ethic enjoins 
management and employees to express lovingkindness and justice in the tactics they 




In a 2002 study, Barnett and Schubert studied 194 employees of a large retail 
department store to find out the relationship between work climates and covenantal 
relationships.  They define covenantal relationships to be those based on mutual 
commitment and shared values, as compared to relational contracts of social 
exchange which rely primarily on equity and fairness.  Employees who build 
covenantal relationships with their employers feel valued by, and value, their 
organization.  Their findings affirm the importance of ethical climates for 
development of a covenantal relationship between the employee and employer.  
Climates that promote benevolence and moral principle foster covenantal 
relationships.  On the other hand, those that incline towards egoism promote self-
interest.  A one-sided focus on company profit and efficiency tend to be detrimental 
to development of covenantal relationships.
54
  The contract relies on covenantal 
elements to humanize the economic arrangement, so that profits and efficiencies can 
be complemented by humanizing characteristics to support overall well-being.  At 
the same time, covenant characteristics rely on the contract to safeguard the 
relationship against exploitation. 
Within a covenantal employment relationship, employers may not be able to 
promise lifetime employment, but can promise best efforts to sustain conditions of 
employment.  Employees may not be able to promise total satisfaction and 
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compliance to employers‟ expectations, but can promise integrity in pursuing the 
best interests of the organization.  Covenantal bonds develop through mutual respect, 
and trust is built through refraining from taking advantage of the counterpart.  
Covenanting is real and desirable in employment relationships because whether this 
awareness surfaces or not, the participants are already making and breaking promises 
during the continuous struggle with contingencies in the employment process.
55
  
Qualities such as trust, respect, integrity, love, justice, honesty and other virtues are 
imperatives in the well-being of employment relationships as part of fundamental 
human goodness.   
Another advocate of the covenant approach, Mount, points out that “covenant 
constitutes the community of identity and provides a vocation to work, worship, and 
rest in a commitment to the reign of God and its justice that encompasses all of 
life”.
56
  However, he also identifies the dangers of corrupted covenantal relationships 
in the workplace.  Where there is an imbalance of power and influence, the covenant 
can become paternalistic.  Where over-reliance on trust transcends the need for 
record keeping and fairness, employee interests can be compromised.  Misuse of the 
language of loyalty, teamwork and employees development can create conflicts and 
abuses.  Adverse workplace cultures such as excess competition or workaholic 
addiction can be elevated in the name of the covenant.  These situations can lead to 
rationalization and exploitation of employees.  Healthy covenantal communities 
encourage dissent and communication.  The essence of the covenant is to promote 
genuine participation.  Instead of suppressing contrary opinions, such communities 
seek to empower rather than take advantage of vulnerabilities.  A covenantal 
workplace needs to go beyond the minimum through mutual respect and loyalty by 
taking into account the welfare of all its members.
57
  The contract acts as a 
complementary means to balance the potential misuse of the covenantal relationship.  
It serves to maintain economic order and protect against inequality and coercion by 
subjecting the participants to a commonly accepted legal authority. 
Just as humankind remains in the fallen state until the end of time, the 
workplace on earth will continue to remain an environment where the criterion of 
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humanity is constantly violated.
58
  This means that while a perfectly covenantal 
relationship is unrealizable, even the Two Pillars paradigm faces limitations and 
difficulties.  It will not be easy to implement the paradigm properly and to find a 
balance between covenant and contract.  The Two Pillars paradigm provides a 
dialogical framework for participants to learn the covenantal way, cultivate 
covenantal norms, and continue to enact covenantal characteristics together with the 
contractual arrangement.  The balancing point, interaction and implementation 
depend on a number of factors such as industry context, working environment, job 
nature, etc.  There is no clear and simple solution to the arrangement because any 
attempt to capture humanizing covenantal characteristics distorts and reduces them to 
abstractions.  With this in mind, I shall proceed to examine the approach and 
components of the Two Pillars paradigm when applied to employment arrangements. 
 
5.5  The Two Pillars Paradigm on Employment Arrangements 
The Approach  
 Modern employment arrangements are based on the legal contract.  A written 
contract is often expected before the commencement of work.  However, this written 
arrangement does not exclude the assumption of implicit employment terms.  As 
shown in the above discussion on the development of implicit and relational 
contracts, legal practitioners are aware of observable but non-verifiable conditions of 
employment that are presupposed in the employment arrangement.  These implicit 
elements characterize employment arrangements as they comprise significant 
relational concerns over and above their instrumental function.  Besides observable 
conditions, the employer-employee relationship extends to unspoken understanding 
and contingencies that far exceed the contractual arrangement.  The contract alone is 
insufficient to capture all of the components.  An underlying covenantal awareness is 
necessary to act as the foundation and to interact with the written contract in 
sustaining a mutually beneficial employment relationship.  To understand the role 
and interaction of covenant and contract within the Two Pillars paradigm, its various 
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components need to be examined.  The following discussion illustrates the Two 
Pillars approach to employment arrangements through a parallel assimilation of the 
conceptual components of contract and covenant as explained in chapter 4.2. 
 
Form and Duration of Employment 
 The relatively short or fixed duration of a contract renders it insufficient in 
capturing a long-term cooperative relationship such as that of employment.  A 
contract can be terminated upon satisfaction of the contractual terms or penalties.  On 
the one hand, such exit arrangements provide safeguards from abuse and allow 
flexibility in job transfer and organizational change.  It is therefore essential to 
commercial decisions or personal development.  On the other hand, the exit 
circumstances of a written contract can facilitate breakdown of relationships because 
the escape clause can be used as measureable means to undo the original 
commitment.  Relying on contract terms alone may turn the highly valued attributes 
of commitment and promise into calculated assertions and expectation of rewards.  
When the perceived returns do not match expectations, the contract no longer acts to 
maintain a healthy employment relationship.  The contractual mechanism does not 
contain in itself any motives to encourage self-giving attributes or long-term 
perspectives of trust.  It is up to the participants to be aware of the underlying 
covenantal attributes that necessarily act together with the contract to enable a 
continuing employment arrangement. 
 The covenantal employment relationship is open-ended and long lasting.  It 
captures the essence of a community working together towards mutually beneficial 
common goals.  It is not based merely on calculated personal advantage.  
Performance measures and rewards need to be laid out and properly represented in a 
contract, but the covenantal elements of a continuing and open-ended relationship are 
essential to make the employment arrangement work.  Through the employment 
covenant, the employee is bound to the organization‟s vision and shares this with 
other employees in an open-ended relationship of mutuality and loyalty.  Contracts 
are in place to safeguard interests of the participants.  Covenants implicitly grant 
participants their identities as trustworthy employees who belong to the organization.  
Each employee is personally involved in a covenantal organization.  Their identity 
and trusting orientation provide the means for handling contingencies and working 
out difficulties.  The contract ensures outcomes are fair and efficient, while the 
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covenant calls for loyalty and care in the employment situation at hand.  Both of 
these attributes must work together to promote a healthy and balanced workplace 
culture. 
 
Structure and Intention of Employment 
 Employment originates from a society of cooperative servicing whereby 
participants contribute their specific skills for overall effectiveness and mutual 
benefits.  Such intentions necessarily involve communal sharing and voluntary 
contributions.  These covenant attributes must be retained in the employment 
situation as part of organizational norms to promote a healthy workplace.  The 
written employment contract provides the possibility of eroding such personal 
participation into impersonal exchange of labour skill and hours.  In many 
employment situations, working to the absolute conditions of rules and terms of the 
contract is one mild form of a strike.  This means that in reality, employees do 
contribute their time and personal commitment to their job.  Work attitude and 
personal dedication are important aspects of employment.  The employment 
arrangement is obviously not entirely impersonal, and cannot be adequately 
represented through an impersonal market exchange model. 
 The Smithian notion of the division of labour regards the action and 
intentions of work as motivated by self-interest.  The aggregate self-interested work 
contributions by individuals lead to cooperative outcomes.  Smith sees this structure 
of working together as part of human nature and rational reason, not deriving from 
the contract but through accidental concurrence of individual passions.  Therefore 
Smith offers us his famous saying, that “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest”.
59
  Smith‟s assertion presupposes a natural individual passion for different 
talents and occupations, through which every individual exerts their own effort in 
exchange for goods to care for themselves.  In the employment arrangement, a 
similar division of labour occurs with respect to work nature within the organization.  
Employees obtain wages that are in turn used in the market to purchase daily 
necessities.  Although Smith does not see the division of labour as originating from 
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contractual arrangements, contracts act to enable and further enhance the notion.  
During his day and age, Smith lamented that the division of labour was limited by 
the extent of the market.
60
  This limitation has been relaxed to a great extent by the 
expansion of the market through the development of a contractual and commercial 
system that supports industrialization, modernization and globalization.  The natural 
pursuit of self-interest is encouraged through the contractual mechanism, but remains 
inadequate to maintain the overall well-being of the individual and the common good 
of society.  Covenant awareness points towards human spiritual needs on top of 
materialistic concerns.  Impersonal and obligatory exchanges may serve material 
desires, but material desires cannot fully satisfy human needs.  A covenantal working 
environment encourages voluntary sharing.  It nurtures a culture that relies not only 
on rules but on caring and goodwill towards fellow workers.  Division of labour 
under contracted processes and outcomes enhances efficiency and effectiveness.  At 
the same time, an underlying awareness of covenantal elements promotes the overall 
well-being and integrity in the workplace.  A well-balanced employment 
arrangement relies on both contractual and covenantal processes to complement each 
other. 
 
Relational Aspects of Employment 
 As we have demonstrated in the previous chapter, social goods are as 
valuable to the individual as material goods.  This is particularly important to the 
employees as the workplace is an environment where they spend much of their time 
on a daily basis.  Employees work together in a community within the organization 
in relationship with each other.  The quality of such relationships greatly affects job 
satisfaction and the well-being of the participants.  Organizations in turn provide a 
platform of cooperation and interaction that is necessary to maintain the well-being 
of the self.  The contractual nature of relationship focuses upon interests and gains, 
while the covenantal nature focuses upon mutuality and giving.  These elements are 
not necessarily exclusive of each other.  The covenantal characteristics of mutuality 
and giving are the foundation of harmony and voluntary cooperation, whereby 
interests and gains of the participants are protected and attained.  As organizational 
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goals and gains are achieved, individuals share mutually in the beneficial outcomes.  
Both contract and covenant are therefore necessary and advantageous in the 
employment relationship. 
 Many problems inherent in a purely contract-based employment relationship 
can be alleviated through covenantal assertions.  An employment relationship based 
on calculative contractual terms alone focuses entirely upon self-interest and gives 
rise to a sense of insecurity.  The resulting relationship is susceptible to imbalance of 
power, coercion and fear.  These adverse conditions in turn affect the quality of the 
relationship and defeat the contractual purpose of safeguarding mutual interests.  The 
covenant directs the participants‟ attention to the common good and loving 
relationships, providing the necessary relational elements of security and bonding.  
Although these qualities cannot be measured or quantified, they are vital to the well-
being and proper functioning of both the individual and the organization.  Good 
employment relationships result in synergies that benefit productivity and efficiency, 
leading to enhancement of the common interest.  Employees who identify with an 
organization take pride in their work and dedicate themselves to achieve common 
organizational goals.  While the contract generates respect for rules and standards, 
the covenant ensures respect for one another.  While the contract promotes 
responsibility on a given task, the covenant calls for responsibility towards one 
another.  These are all essential and beneficial characteristics in the workplace.  
Receiving and sharing interact in the Two Pillars paradigm to build a healthy 
community involving participants who work together in mutuality. 
 
Authoritative Basis of Employment 
 Employer and employee are by definition within a hierarchical relationship 
that involves command and obedience.  In the New Testament, the apostle Paul 
teaches respect, obedience and sincerity to the slave or employee; and similar 
reciprocity to the employer or master (Eph. 6:5-9).  Whether under the contract or 
covenant, an authoritative basis is in place to mediate and arbitrate upon 
contingencies.  In a purely covenantal situation, participants rely on the divine order 
and communal norms to govern relationships.  This is not practicable given the inter-
relations of believers and non-believers as equal counterparties in the modern 
working environment.  Under the contractual arrangement, law and regulations are 
set out clearly to act as the authoritative guidance to individual behaviour and 
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corporate decisions.  Institutional rules and government authority serve to protect the 
societal order that embraces the employment structure.  However, this does not mean 
that covenantal elements are neglected.  The covenant aspects of employment present 
the employees as personal agents responsibility for their own actions.  As free agents 
to the employment arrangement, participants respect each other by acting with 
responsibility and integrity.  The authoritative bases here are not power or coercion, 
but mutually binding relationships, commitment and trust.  These are of the very 
essence of human integrity that must coexist with law and order to govern the 
employment relationship. 
 
Process and Result of Employment 
 The contract-based labour market is formed upon commodification of work 
into labour hours, and the exchange of such labour hours for monetary rewards.  The 
emergence of the labour market results in competition and the determination of the 
wage level as the price component for labour.  Promise and commitment to common 
objectives during the employment process give way to obligation and bargaining.  
Depending on the contract alone hinders employment outcomes because the focus on 
cooperation and common purposes deteriorates into continuous bargaining and 
evaluation for self-interest and personal reward.  The Two Pillars paradigm asserts 
that the covenant process is an essential complement to the contract in making the 
employment process meaningful to human life.  The quality of work and workers‟ 
satisfaction depend not only upon work nature and tasks completed, but also the 
interpersonal relationships and team spirit among co-workers.  In this regard, 
covenantal themes provide valuable insights in terms of balancing the employment 
process with humanizing qualities that in turn contribute to productivity. 
 The concept of the psychological contract in legal and business literature 
reminds us of the significance of the employment process in the mind of the 
individual.  The covenant components of trust and promise align expectations of the 
employee and employer, and allow the pursuit of common objectives.  On the other 
hand, a purely contractual approach based on benefit and reliance requires continuing 
evaluation of risks and rewards.  Such calculative measures are detrimental to 
productivity and efficiency.  For example, reliance on governance or audits to verify 
process effectiveness increases costs in both time and monetary terms.  In an 
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environment of covenantal foundation, resources allocated to these verification 
measures can be reduced or refocused to product quality or task enhancement. 
 
Morality of Employment 
 In the organization, the employee is not merely something useful for 
production purposes.  The employee participates freely, and continuously makes 
individual decisions that affect the overall benefit of the organization.  The employer 
relies on employees to perform their duties diligently and effectively.  These implicit 
requirements in the working environment presuppose moral integrity on the part of 
the employee.  In return, the employee needs to have a certain level of trust in and 
reliance on, the morality of the employer and the organization to carry out business 
in an ethical manner.  When the market views labour as a commodity, it loses its 
motive to promote ethical behaviour unless such ethical choices are directly tied to 
self-interested outcomes.  The erosion of morality in behavioural decisions is 
detrimental to work relationships in many ways.  For example, when trust and 
commitment is eroded, employee turnover rates may decrease productivity.  As 
implicit ethical standards are lowered, the quality of services and goods produced 
may decrease.  Additional costs may be required to safeguard morality in the 
workplace by establishing and enforcing written codes of conduct.  Under the written 
contract or corporate governance, rules and standards take the place of individual 
judgement when making ethical decisions.  To enhance the morality of organizations 
and therefore society as a whole, ethical awareness needs to be broadened to the 
communal level in a covenantal way.  With a covenant awareness, organizations 
nurture an appropriate culture and ethical norms that enhance both the integrity of the 
individual employee and the organization as a whole. 
 
The Implications 
When applied to long-term employment arrangements, the Two Pillars 
paradigm asserts that contract and covenant work together to ensure a balanced 
employment arrangement that is mutually beneficial to all parties involved.  
Individual employees should have their needs protected and cared for, while they 
work in an environment that nurtures communal relationships and the well-being of 
the whole person.  Employers are to entrust employees with the appropriate 
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organization resources and objectives, while being rewarded with loyalty and 
commitment from the workforce.  The organization as a whole not only strives 
towards productivity and profitability, but also retains a continuing healthy 
community of cooperation and harmony.  To achieve a healthy balance between 
contract and covenant, it is necessary for management to focus resources on the 
covenantal components of the Two Pillars paradigm.  This is because contractual 
arrangements involve written terms and quantifiable interests that naturally capture 
the attention of participants.  The contract needs to be placed within a culture that 
promotes covenantal values to ensure implicit values are properly nurtured.  This 
requires, first of all, top-down initiatives of covenantal leadership.  Covenant 
characteristics are then related from the employer through management to the 
workers, forming a set of organizational norms that develop into a culture of the 
workplace.  Further education and the increase in awareness encourage the 
participants to treasure covenantal values as the foundation of contractual interests. 
The application of the covenant concept to society and business ethics is not 
new, but is often neglected.  Pava asserts that covenantal organizations require 
covenantal leadership.  By this, he means an emphasis on the characteristics of the 
covenant being open-ended, long-term in nature, and respectful of human integrity.  
Ambiguity is embraced as part of mutual responsibility by leaving the relationship 
open-ended rather than purely contractual.  There is no time limit to the relationship.  
It protects the integrity, uniqueness and personhood of the participants by 
presupposing human freedom.  At the same time, a background of relational order is 
nurtured in the employment environment to enable the exercise of human freedom.
61
  
Executives in the organization need to work together to promote a covenantal 
atmosphere that encourages openness, participation and mutual respect.  The value of 
a positive working relationship and a sense of community in the workplace have long 
been noted in management approaches such as team-building concepts and 
workplace enhancement programmes.  These tools should be developed to promote a 
solid covenantal foundation in the workplace. 
 Another example of communal awareness is the need for organizational 
governance to promote a healthy and ethical working environment.  Caldwell and 
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 Moses L. Pava, 'The Many Paths to Covenantal Leadership: Traditional Resources for 
Contemporary Business,' Journal of Business Ethics 29 (2001): 85-93. 
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Karri present a conceptual framework based on stewardship theory characterized by 
covenantal relationships.  They argue that organizational governance designed on a 
covenantal approach is more effective in building trust.  Taking the covenantal 
relationship as a specialized form of relational contract, they argue that incentives 
and controls designed through contractual mechanisms can hardly build trust in the 
absence of covenantal relationships.  They find the stewardship model ethically 
superior when compared with the agency model, because it honours the social 
obligations and duties to all stakeholders.  The covenant approach to the stewardship 
model incorporates the ability to look internally within both the self and the 
organization, as well as towards the external environment in terms of organizational 
needs.  This approach is consistent with the traditional management literature that 
recognizes organizational obligations as multi-dimensional, involving multiple 
aspects of economic and social performance.  The covenant model supports a 




 The Two Pillars paradigm on employment arrangement implies a broadening 
of the meaning of work to embrace its rich and complex notions.  Human work is 
instrumental, ontological, relational and more.
 63
  It is fundamental to the daily lives 
of all individuals.  It supports the functioning of society as a whole.  It can be paid or 
unpaid.  Its process and outcome are both invaluable to the participant.  As Meeks 
implies, the meaning of work should be expanded to embrace all aspects of activities 
within a covenantal society.   
The comprehensive meaning of work is active participation in the communal, social 
process.  A new definition of work will have to go beyond the description of work as 
merely productive, wage earning, business, or professional.  When we limit work to 
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 Cam Caldwell and Ranjan Karri, 'Organizational Governance and Ethical Systems: A Covenantal 
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 In the Reformed theology of Barth, work takes on an even broader meaning in terms of human 
action.  Within the freedom of human action in obedience to the Creator, the cosmos reveals the fact 
that it is upheld and governed by the order of creation both in its resourcefulness and limitation.  In 
this cosmic sphere, human persons work to serve the coming of God‟s kingdom in the claim of their 
own existence as human creatures.  Accordingly, human work is intended to be the fulfilment of the 
cosmic unity granted by the Creator.  Rather than assisting in the Creator‟s work in any way, work is 
simply a form of obedience to God‟s command in creation.  It reminds humankind of its creatureliness 
and relational nature.  Through this essential activity, human persons cooperate in promoting their 
own existence.  The basic motive of work is to earn our daily bread.  This must be done in relationship 
with others, and must target genuine needs rather than superabundant desires and wants.  There are 
other limitations in terms of specific needs, capabilities and circumstances.  These mean that work is 
finite and must reside within boundaries such as the Sabbath command.  At the same time, it is a 
positive affirmation of life.  See Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4: 516-51. 
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these definitions, the broader dimensions of work from which society actually lives 
remain invisible or repressed.  Work is falsely defined unless we include 
reproductive or generative work.  This includes all forms of familial and social 
service.  The value of work has to do with increasing relationships among human 




5.6  Further Applications and Insights 
 I have illustrated the mutual dependence and complementary interaction 
between covenant and contract by taking long-term employment arrangements as an 
example.  My purpose of distinguishing between the two concepts is not to segregate 
them independently, but to reveal the characteristics and implications of each 
concept.  It is thus demonstrated that total independence of covenant or contract is 
neither practical nor beneficial to the economy and society as a whole.  The Two 
Pillars elements of fixed duration versus open-endedness, impersonal versus personal 
structures, self-interest versus the common good, institution rules versus personal 
agency, agreement versus commitment, individual ethics versus culture norms, etc., 
are in fact closely knitted together and interact continuously in dynamic ways under a 
given situation and changing economic circumstances.  It is therefore vital that both 
covenant and contract are understood and enacted in economic activities such that 
there can be a healthy balance between objective functionality of economic 
transactions and subjective concerns over the well-being of the individual and of 
humankind. 
The example in this chapter is limited to the overall application and insights 
offered by the Two Pillars paradigm to employment arrangements.  In order to 
implement the Two Pillars in a given employment situation, we need to further 
investigate the specific circumstances of a give job.  These may include specific 
industry, job nature, skills level, organizational structure, management style, wage 
structure, work environment, etc.  In any given situation, an awareness and 
enactment of both covenant and contract characteristics would assist in deriving a 
well-balanced arrangement with a focus towards long-term relationships and mutual 
benefits.  In particular, service industries that focus on the quality of human life  
                                                 
64
 Meeks, God the Economist: The Doctrine of God and Political Economy, 154. 
   170
benefit the most from the awareness and enactment of covenant characteristics.
65
  
These may include medical and healthcare, education, social work, etc.  In any 
typical organization, the covenant concept contributes to reflections over 
organization structure, management style and teamwork.   
Further research is needed to examine alternate forms of employment 
arrangements in the modern market that may or may not be continuous in nature.  
These include nonstandard employment arrangements such as part-time, temporary 
and contract work.
66
  Work arrangements that contain a short-term contractual focus 
and leave an open-ended renewal possibility may trigger additional issues in respect 
of job quality, employer-employee relationships, performance measurements, etc.  
Taking the situation one step further, the issues of employment redundancy and 
unemployment can also be examined through insights from the Two Pillars paradigm.  
In the modern context, employment redundancies may result from business 
relocation, changes in job nature, outsourcing, technological advancement, changes 
in ownership, business closure, etc.  These may result in compulsory redundancies 
that force the early termination of contractual employment.  Fundamental covenantal 
concerns re-emphasize the need for practical assistance and care both from the wider 
society and the employer concerned.  Insights from covenant characteristics provide 
resources for further research into these redundancy situations and the related 
unemployment issues by pointing out the fundamental human need for work, the 
communal need for mutual caring and cooperation, and the possibility to work out 
transitional measures to help those in need of paid employment within the framework 
of covenantal relationship in the wider society.
67
  It calls for greater priority to be 
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placed on the fundamental human needs such as work opportunities and mutual 
cooperation, over and above the human quest for efficiency and profits. 
 As we have seen, the Two Pillars paradigm presents an analytical tool that 
contributes to the observation and analysis of a given economic activity.  The 
employment arrangement is only one of the many contract-based commercial market 
arrangements in modern society.  Others may include property ownership, capital 
deployment, banking arrangements, financial exchange, commodity futures, 
international trade, etc.  Contractual arrangements in all markets require covenantal 
assertions to provide a complementary balance.  As illustrated through the 
employment arrangement, the employment contract alone does not embrace all 
essential elements that are vital to the well-being of the individual and the 
organization.  The contract can safeguard and protect, yet it may also erode to coerce 
and exploit in the absence of covenantal integrity.  Both the contract and covenant 
are there as tools and means to protect common interest and promote the common 
good. 
A perfect economic order is not realizable on earth.  Accordingly, the Two 
Pillars paradigm itself faces limitations and possibilities of distortion due to human 
sinfulness and finitude.  Its effect is difficult to measure and involves many 
unquantifiable elements.  Depending on the economic environment, context and 
issues at hand, the interaction between covenant and contract may differ and needs to 
be carefully worked out.  Nevertheless, a proper Two Pillars structure reminds 
participants of the need to balance utility goals with humanizing elements for the 
well-being of the whole person.  In particular, where modern markets and 
employment arrangements tend towards reliance on the contract, it is essential to 
cultivate the covenantal virtues and norms that complement the development of a 
humanized market.  Using the Two Pillars paradigm as a framework for dialogue 
with the work of economists, I shall now turn to an exploration of fundamental 
market motif, assumption and approach. 
 
   172
Chapter 6 
The Two Pillars Paradigm in Dialogue 
 
 This chapter places the Two Pillars paradigm in public dialogue with the 
work of economists, the economic approach and its assumptions.  I will start by 
returning to the work of Adam Smith, the father of economics, to discuss and draw 
implications from his system that serves as the origin of economic theories.  Moving 
from the original market motif to modern economics, I will then examine the 
assertions of Gary Becker, a renowned Nobel laureate who pioneered application of 
the economic approach to social behaviour.  I will also draw upon the work of 
feminist economists who attempt to go beyond fundamental economic theory and 
econometrics to embrace an evaluation of the economic approach and its alternative 
use.  The issues of market morality and government regulations are then discussed.  
In doing so, I place the Two Pillars paradigm in public discourse with a view to 
presenting ideas and alternatives that may illuminate the decisions and choices we 
make in the modern market. 
I claim that the Smithian market motif originates from a worldview of 
spontaneous order that differs from the revelatory and relational order of the 
covenant.  Accordingly, the motif is deficient in its presuppositions concerning 
humanity and community, these being based on impersonal contract rather than 
personal human qualities.  At the same time, economic models that are applied 
beyond market exchanges to human behaviour degrade the value of nonmarket 
human activities.  I argue that to rediscover and enact human qualities in the market, 
we must be aware of market limits and enact covenant characteristics to balance 
market activities.  This extends to our understanding of morality and government 
policies.  The maintenance of a healthy economic market is a continuous balancing 
act between the interaction and enactment of covenant and contract. 
 
6.1  Market Motif:  The Smithian System of Self-Interest and Sympathy 
The modern market and its complexities are a result of gradual economic 
development throughout human history, affected by the intentional and unintentional 
decisions of society and market participants along the way.  From Adam Smith‟s 
moral philosophy to contemporary mathematical models, the market continues to 
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experience changes in response to the changing structure and needs of society.  Yet 
its primary motivators remain the same.  The market is driven by human needs and 
desires for economic activities, and therefore structured and formed by its 
participants.  The market motif depends upon the enactment of human nature and its 
related values and worldviews.  Theories about economics originate from the 
Smithian worldview of human nature that in itself has undergone continuous 
development in the form of new theories and interpretations.  Where did we start and 
where are we heading?  To find the answer to the underlying market motif of the 
original Smithian system, I examine its worldview and implications on the economic 
market.  My argument is that the Smithian system sees economic activities as a 
natural, spontaneous order, leaving the market to develop naturally into its current 
contract-based structure.  The resultant contract-based market structure is only a 
partial resolution of human need for economic activity and overall well-being.  In 
contrast, the covenant concept presupposes a worldview based on revelation and 
divine providence.  Its relational characteristics capture the essence of true humanity 
as persons in community with each other, and within the original intentional of the 
order of creation.  Accordingly, covenantal concerns are essential parts of economic 
activities that must be rediscovered to promote human well-being in the market. 
There is an underlying perception of the Deity in Smith‟s writings as he grew 
up in a Christian family and church environment.  However, a closer look quickly 
reveals the tendency to stray from an authoritative Creator who actively participates 
in providential care, to an Author who created the natural order and left it in 
continuous natural evolution.  Most scholars identify Smith as a deist, although a few 
question his commitment to belief in God, asserting that elements of the deity in his 
writing may have been there to avoid opposition from the church.
1
  Although 
providence seems to have a part to play in his system, it takes place in a mysterious, 
hidden way widely known as the work of the “invisible hand”. 
                                                 
1
 Deists generally refers to those who belief that God has created a natural order of reason and logic, 
without further revelation or intervention in human life.  Deism is a vague term in itself with deists 
taking many types and forms under no consistent scheme.  Byrne points out that deists have in 
common only their readiness to questions traditional revealed religions.  Since Adam Smith has not 
mentioned religion and only hinted about his beliefs in his writings, his specific view of religion is 
subject to debate.  Nevertheless, Smith‟s philosophical assertions clearly contain an evolutionary 
undertone that leads most to identify him with deism.  For details about natural religion, natural 
theology and deism, see Peter Byrne, Natural Religion and the Nature of Religion: The Legacy of 
Deism (London: Routledge, 1989), 1-79. 
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The all-wise Author of Nation has… taught man to respect the sentiments and 
judgments of his brethren; to be more or less pleased when they approve of his 
conduct, and to be more or less hurt when they disapprove of it.  He has made 
man… the immediate judge of mankind; and has, in this respect, as in many others, 
created him after his own image, and appointed him his vicegerent upon earth, to 
superintend the behaviour of his brethren.
2
  
The extent and nature of Providentialist underspinning Smith‟s system is 
subject to wide debate, but its presupposition of a spontaneous order is evident.
3
  
This means that the origin of economics contains in itself a tendency for a type of 
natural, spontaneous order that is distinct from revelation or the existence of a 
relational God.  Because of this fundamental difference in worldview between 
Smith‟s spontaneous order versus a revelatory and relational order, the covenant 
concept has never been considered by Smith.  The Smithian worldview largely 
promotes a self-regulatory economic order, whether its design is teleological or not.  
As we have seen in chapter 4, the general principles of contract law and contractual 
arrangements developed during the late seventeenth to eighteenth century, leading to 
the gradual formation of the contract-based market.  Covenant characteristics based 
on creation, revelation, community and the regard for personal relationship are 
gradually eroded as markets lean towards a focus for a measurable, contractible 
exchange of goods and services. 
The original Smithian system of human nature starts with “sympathy”, the 
non-experiential comprehension of others‟ feelings.  According to Smith, there is an 
“impartial spectator” within each individual that puts oneself in the situation of the 
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other and forms an imaginary judgment of the situation.  The impartial spectator‟s 
cognitive judgment provides feedback that triggers our feelings or emotions.  This 
results in sympathy, allowing us to see pleasure or pain upon the fortune or 
misfortune of others.   We therefore conceive other people‟s emotions although we 
do not experience them ourselves.  The impartial spectator who approves or 
disapproves of a motive or action also becomes the basis for the moral standards of 
the individual.  As a result, the individual learns and develops from the feedback of 
surrounding people.   
Contrary to common perceptions, Smith‟s view of human nature is not 
entirely egocentric.
4
  He asserts that self-interest itself can become virtuous or evil 
depending on the consequential acts of the individuals.  Smith sees rational self-
interest as an unmitigated social good.  This social good is beneficial for self and 
others because it is derived from the sympathetic feedback of others.  It is supposed 
to be self-correcting as each individual seeks self-command by taking care of the 
“good” of the self under sympathy with one another.  Accordingly, the sympathetic 
concern for others balances the concern for oneself.  This means that a person living 
in a community is not driven solely by self-interest but also considers sympathetic 
feedback from others.  The communal aspect of human life acting as an essential 
balance to self-interest is a core element of Smith‟s system of human nature.   
Smith places the role of morality within the self-interested mechanism.  The 
virtue of self-interest in Smith‟s system is termed as “prudence”.  Prudent individuals 
perform admirable acts for their own well-being.  Smith finds that “concern for our 
own happiness recommends to us the virtue of prudence: concern for that of other 
people, the virtues of justice and beneficence; of which, the one restrains us from 
hurting, the other prompts us to promote that happiness”.
5
  To Smith, one always 
tends to sympathize with the benevolent affections, but at the same time needs to 
maintain a healthy self-interest based on a natural survival instinct.  Society expects 
individuals to pursue their own self-interest, and admire those who strive to do so.  
He sees this as the natural and general order. 
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 Werhane appropriately points out that “according to Smith, human beings are not motivated merely 
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not benevolence but justice”.  See P.H. Werhane, Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 23-4. 
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 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 262. 
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The pursuit of the objects of private interest… ought to flow rather from a regard to 
the general rules which prescribe such conduct, than from any passion for the objects 
themselves… Even a tradesman is thought a poor-spirited fellow among his 
neighbours, who does not bestir himself to get what they call an extraordinary job, or 
some uncommon advantage.  This spirit and keenness constitute the difference 
between the man of enterprise and the man of dull regularity.
6
 
According to Smith, our natural tendency is to sympathize more with joy than 
sorrow, parade riches, and conceal poverty.  Therefore our sentiment is to pursue 
riches and avoid poverty.  We sympathize with the wealthy and powerful, and tend to 
protect their interests in disproportion to those of the poor.  This is because rank and 
wealth represents human desires that we long for and tend to preserve.  In our 
imagination, the pain associated with losses experienced by the wealthy is more 
agonizing than losses by those already in poverty.  Accordingly, we tend to honour 
and respect those of higher social rank.  To Smith, this natural sympathy helps to 
form the order of society.
7
   
The pleasures of wealth and greatness… strike the imagination as something grand 
and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety 
which are so apt to bestow upon it.
8
   
This means that individual self-interest naturally prioritizes the pursuit of 
wealth and power not because of psychological security or self-interest alone, but 
due to our fundamental sentiment of sympathy.  In Smith‟s system, this underlying 
sentiment for sympathy provides a natural order for preservation of humankind. 
Having observed this system of natural order, Smith finds benevolence rather 
idealistic and unnatural in the face of self-interest and sympathy.  This is because 
benevolence alone can neither lead to virtuous acts, nor can it become a primary 
motive for these acts.  Rather than following our benevolence to help the poor, we 
sympathize with ranks and power in the pursuit of self-interest.  This leads to his 




                                                 
6
 Ibid., 172-3. 
7
 Ibid., 50. 
8
 Ibid., 183. 
   177
goods and services, as follows:
9
 
[M]an has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for 
him to expect it from their benevolence only.  He will be more likely to prevail if he 
can interest their self-love in his favour, and shew [sic] them that it is for their own 
advantage to do for him what he requires of them.  Whoever offers to another a 
bargain of any kind, proposes to do this.  Give me that which I want, and you shall 
have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner 
that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we 
stand in need of.  It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.  We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them 
of our own necessities but of their advantages.
10
  
According to Smith, the market is a self-correcting mechanism based on 
human nature, whereby economic agents compete to satisfy market demands for their 
own advantage.  He finds this system self-constraining and mutually beneficial to 
everyone involved, not out of an egocentric self-interest based on greed, but a 
sympathetic self-interest for the preservation of humankind.  Werhane asserts that the 
ideas of maximizing utility, narrow self-interest, individualism and the morally free  
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invisible hand have all been erroneously attributed to Smith.
11
  Smith is more a 
realist, developing the ideal of economic order in harmony with natural order.
12
  He 
places the economic agent pursuing self-interest in the context of the need for 
cooperation.  This means that people help one another so that they can care for 
themselves.  Mutual dependence forms the basis of sympathetic self-interest in 
society.
13
   
Smith admits that admiration and worship of wealth and power are corrupting, 
leading to neglect of the poor.  Appearance and accomplishments become more 
admired than the inner virtues of a warrior.  Underlying Smith‟s system is an 
evolutionary trend presupposing the preservation of humankind as the ultimate goal 
of human nature.  
The self-love of man embraced… his body and all its different members, his mind 
and all its different faculties and powers, and desired the preservation and 
maintenance of them all in their best and most perfect condition.  Whatever tended 
to support this state of existence was, therefore, by nature pointed out to him as fit to 
be chosen; and whatever tended to destroy it, as fit to be rejected.
14
   
To Smith, nature is concerned primarily with the most effective and efficient 
means to ensure survival of the species and of social harmony.  Each individual 
needs to be taken care of in the best way.  The most effective and efficient means to 
do so is for each individual to look after himself or herself because a given individual 
does this better than looking after another individual.   
Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own 
care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and 
right that it should be so.  Every man, therefore, is much more deeply interested in 
whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other man.
15
   
Smith‟s system is optimistic in the sense that prudence based on self-interest 
is seen as one of the virtues itself.  In his system, the pursuit of self-interest by each 
individual in the society will eventually work together and converge to cultivate a 
harmonious and efficient market.  Against this is the pessimists‟ view that the market 
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is viable only if self-interest is restrained by exogenous standards.  To the pessimists, 
the market releases self-interest from moral restraints, erodes social ties, promotes 
individualistic advantages, substitutes cooperation by competition, and favours 
materialistic or hedonistic values.
16
  Is the optimistic convergence of market 
sentiments towards an opulent economy possible?  Paradoxically, the theological 
view of humankind is both pessimistic and optimistic.  It is pessimistic in the sense 
that the human person whose nature of “goodness” has been twisted by sinfulness 
cannot reach perfect goodness by itself.  This assertion stands in direct contrast to the 
optimistic convergence of economic life based on natural evolution.  At the same 
time, the theological worldview is optimistic in that there is providential order in this 
world and eschatological hope in the coming world.  As such, it offers a positive 
outlook directed to the possibility of salvation upon seeking the truth.  Taking a 
stance on natural evolution and relying on rational self-interest to evolve to an 
opulent market on its own is not feasible.  To provide a solution for this deficiency, 
Smith relies on institutional measures to facilitate the market so that society will 
progress and converge into an ethical balance of sentiments, with self-command of 
the individual and a mature government to enforce justice.
17
  Although Smith‟s 
system maintains a positive outlook, in reality the continuing striving for wealth and 
greatness leads to vanity or dead ends rather than the social harmony he proposes.  
The increase in wealth of a small minority does not add to the increase in wealth of 
the average individual, because of the problem of unjust distribution.  The market 
does not naturally lead to an equitable distribution, as is evident from the increase in 
poverty and the disparity of wealth in rich and poor countries alike.  On the other 
hand, institutional policies for re-distribution may hinder economic growth.  The 
contemporary market seems to face a dead end and divergence of interests, rather 
than the convergence that Smith has predicted. 
In Smith‟s system, instead of a moral sense of right and wrong, we use our 
passion and imagination to project what we are to others.  Sympathy becomes the 
primary source of approval or disapproval.  This system, whether truly naturalistic or 
not, is rather dangerous and arbitrary.  Since there is no external standard or 
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reference point for judgment except for our encounter with the other, one can act 
immorally or irrationally according to passionate inclinations.  Smith‟s approach is to 
analyze the human passions in order to channel them to morally beneficial directions 
through social institutions.
18
  This worldview stands in direct contrast with the neo-
Augustinian view that due to original sin, virtues cannot be derived entirely from the 
natural self, but must reside on the possibility of transcending sinful human nature 
through grace.  Accordingly, no natural action is truly virtuous.  Put in Smith‟s terms, 
the impartial spectator can never be impartial but must at least be partially influenced 
by self-interest and desires.  The benevolent act, while already imperfect and 
unnatural under the system of sympathy, would never be truly benevolent.  
Approbation confirms the assertion that human nature only strives for the appearance 
of being virtuous, and that any such act can only be of apparent virtue. 
Smith agrees that religion affords strong motivation for the practice of 
virtues.
19
  Under his system, religious belief is part of the approbation and 
disapprobation process.  Our motives depend on the natural agreeableness of 
sentiments and the precision of the rule imposed upon us in our system of belief.  
Smith‟s sense of the Deity is supported by the motive of self-interest, allowing the 
believer to strive towards the infinite goodness of his Creator. 
The sense of propriety too is here well supported by the strongest motives of self-
interest.  The idea that however we may escape the observation of man, or be placed 
above the reach of human punishment, yet we are always acting under the eye, and 
exposed to the punishment of God, the great avenger of injustice, is a motive capable 
of restraining the most headstrong passions, with those at least who, by constant 
reflection, have rendered it familiar to them.
20
   
This suggests that according to Smith, the most important virtues of self-
command, prudence, benevolence or justice are driven by fear of the Deity.  Perhaps 
this represents Smith‟s awareness of the limitations or even sinfulness within human 
nature.  Yet the mere negative passions of fear are not strong enough in themselves 
to uphold the basic virtues that Smith proposes.  Consequently, Smith himself seems 
to have given up on benevolence when he concludes that self-interest and sympathy  
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within human nature are the major and overriding drivers of the market. 
Self-love is acknowledged in the biblical commandment to “love thy 
neighbour as thyself” (Lev. 19:18).  We are commanded to love others as much as 
ourselves.  Here, the virtue of loving the other is lifted to the level of loving oneself, 
presupposing that by nature one does love oneself predominately and to a great 
extent.  Instead of moving from self-love to a relational notion of loving others, the 
Smithian system moves from an impartial spectator‟s judgement and a non-
experiential sympathetic response to self-interest.  Rather than the biblical, personal, 
relational concept of loving oneself and others, Smithian self-interest and sympathy 
remain impersonal.  This is not to say that Smith‟s view is entirely wrong.  His 
concept of self-interest is very much grounded in sinful human nature, much deeper 
than he would appear to admit himself.  It captures the sinful finitude of humankind 
as the self continues its quest to further its own interest under approval of others.  
Unfortunately, this finite system does not promote awareness of human goodness.  
On the contrary, it directs attention towards the self, leaving room for neo-Smithian 
economists to derive egoistic and individualistic theories that Smith himself never 
proposed.  In fact, Smith‟s system reminds us that within the order of creation, there 
can be an innate goodness in the human person that makes sympathetic self-interest 
beneficial to others.  Such a positive, rational view of self-interest involves 
conducting oneself according to the “goodness” of creation, taking care of oneself in 
a healthy and appropriate way, and putting oneself in the right place under the 
providential order of the Creator.  Rather than continuing to direct such love and 
affection to oneself, we should re-direct our passions to others, working towards the 
virtues of benevolence and justice.  Indeed self-interest is part of human nature.  
However, one of the many elements making humankind more than its mere 
creaturely counterparts is the presence of will or the ability to make choices, which 
makes possible transcendence of mere animal. 
 In Smith‟s system, self-command plays an important role in deriving actions 
of benevolence and justice.
21
  He asserts that the most perfect self-command, when 
exercised in a rational and unstressed manner, allows an individual to attend to the 
distress of others.  This is embedded in a natural order that sustains itself in the form 
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of providence.  He argues that “by acting according to the dictates of our moral 
faculties, we necessarily pursue the most effectual means for promoting the 
happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in some sense, to cooperate with 
the Deity, and to advance as far as in our power the plan of Providence”.
22
  This 
providential self-reliance is in line with prudence, an important virtue based on 
Smith‟s concept of self-interest.  However, prudence comes from the self, while the 
theological assertion of providence comes from the Creator God.  Prudence is limited 
and weak in that it can only be as good as the natural “goodness” of the human 
person.  Providence involves the upholding of the universe, nature and all worldly 
creatures therein.  Many religions preach the importance of self-command and good 
acts.  Asian religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism teach ways to command the 
mind and soul through meditations and good deeds.  In contrast, Christianity points 
out that the self, or the individual, does not have the innate strength to command 
perfect deeds.  There is the need for a higher being, a reliance on God to reign over 
the self and to provide the strength for self-command.  Good acts have to come 
naturally from a willing benevolence based on strength and obedience of the heart to 
God.  Rather than following natural self-interest at all times, the will chooses to 
follow God and thereby opens up the arena of benevolence with the possibility of 
self-giving love.  Smith‟s system is closed, with no exit from the tragedy that sinful 
human nature directs itself towards.  His view of human nature may be somewhat 
optimistic, yet it is pessimistic in the options and possibilities open to the future of 
humankind. 
 Smith is acutely aware of the “helplessness” within human nature.  
Recognizing the innate inclination of human nature, Smith asserts that the impartial 
spectator takes only a partial view before and after action.  He thinks that “when we 
are about to act, the eagerness of passion will seldom allow us to consider what we 
are doing, with the candour of an indifferent person”.
23
  Moreover, Smith has 
anticipated a continuous dynamic change in the standards of the impartial spectator, 
and hence society in general. 
The man of to-day is no longer agitated by the same passions which distracted the 
man of yesterday: and when the paroxysm of emotion, in the same manner as when 
the paroxysm of distress, is fairly over, we can identify ourselves… with the severe 
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eyes of the most impartial spectator.  But our judgments now are often of little 
importance in comparison of what they were before; and can frequently produce 
nothing but vain regret and unavailing repentance; without always securing us from 
the like errors in time to come.
24
   
Although Smith recognizes this deficiency, he is not able to provide any 
solution.  His argument for convergence and natural evolution does not appear to be 
fulfilled.  In Smith‟s system, justice is served through law and order, under which 
individuals are driven by fear and sympathy for the ranks.  The future of humankind 
faces a dead end of fear and chaotic divergence.  To Smith, conscience is rooted in 
self-interest and sympathy.  To be a worthy individual entails looking after ourselves 
and following our sympathetic passions to strive towards shared social standards to 
attain self-approbation and harmonious mutual opulence.  Economic development 
throughout history and the state of the contemporary market point to the fact that 
Smith‟s ideology of convergence appears unrealizable.  Instead of harmony and 
opulence, we are confronted with poverty, inequality and distribution problems.  
Technology and globalization bring new controversies that point towards divergence 
rather than convergence.  The modern individual is driven more and more by market 
forces that lead towards negative manifestations of egocentric self-interest rather 
than the rational self-interest that Smith portrays.  Reconsideration of the market 
needs to start from reconsideration and redirection of human strivings, rather than 
leaving it to a natural, spontaneous order. 
 
6.2  Market Limits: The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour 
While the spontaneous development of the market falls short of promoting 
the overall well-being of economic participants, the problem is coupled by the 
attempt to apply the economic approach to nonmarket human behaviour.  The 
modern human person cannot avoid being a market participant at the same time.  We 
depend on the cooperative exchange of goods and services through the economic 
market to provide for our daily needs.  When economic activities increasingly drive 
the daily lives of market participants, market boundaries become increasingly blurred.  
Some economists have begun to extend the economic approach to nonmarket 
activities and human behaviour.  Is there a limit to the scope and content of the 
market exchange?  I shall examine this through the work of the renowned economist  
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Becker received the Nobel Prize in economics in 1992, for his contribution in 
applying the economic approach to human behaviour and interaction.  His work 
involves capturing nonmarket variables such as human capital, economic 
discrimination, household and family, crime and punishment, etc. in microeconomic 
analysis.  Such analyses attempt to reveal the role of economic variables that more 
realistically reflect reality, and provide insights for policy decisions.  At the same 
time, his approach moves beyond the more fundamental economic assumptions of a 
perfect market and rational human behaviour to include imperfect information and 
irrational decisions.  Becker‟s definition of human capital involves indirect 
household activities that influence the market, such as time invested in care of 
children, training to improve work skills, resources put into education, etc.  For 
example, his model of the family asserts that fertility decisions are made by taking 
families as productive units and children as “durable consumer goods”.
26
  
Accordingly, the value of children is quantified in terms of their qualities and costs 
as defined by resource investment and future income potential.  Although the 
awareness and attempt to consider human behaviour in economic analysis appear 
helpful and essential in the first instance, Becker‟s approach is problematic in the 
way these tools are deployed.  Rather than considering how human behaviour can 
affect economic models, Becker approaches the question from an opposite direction, 
using the economic approach to model human behaviour.  This method unduly 
reduces human behaviour to presupposed economic acts.  The reduction of families 
to production units and children to durable goods imposes a set of calculated norms 
to family life.
27
  This approach shows an extreme use of the contract-based model, 
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whereby human persons become priced and contractible.  I will argue that such an 
approach also defeats its own purpose of concrete scientific analysis because the 
resulting models become abstractions that do not reflect the reality of human living. 
To study how Becker derives his approach, we first examine his definition of 
economics and the market.  Becker derives his definition of economics by comparing 
the scopes of various options.  He finds a focus on allocation of material goods to 
satisfy material wants too narrow because both tangible and intangible goods are 
involved in economic activities.  A further step is then taken to define economics in 
terms of the market sector.
28
  Similar to that proposed by the Two Pillars paradigm, 
this definition places economics within the scope of production and distribution of 
resources through the economic market.  However, Becker finds this too limiting 
also.  Instead, he broadens the scope of economics by extending “the allocation of 
scarce means to satisfy competing ends” beyond the market sector to embrace all 
resources including political decisions and family activities.
29
  This definition allows 
him to extend economics beyond the market sector to embrace scarcity and choice 
that characterize all resources including political decisions and family activities.  




According to Becker, public goods such as welfare, healthcare, education and 
family marriage can all be captured in the economic model through a series of 
tautologies.  For example, the decision to marry is made when expected utility from 
marriage exceeds the alternatives of remaining single or continuing to search for a 
suitable mate.  Family activities such as work decisions, education and child custody 
all fall within the variables of a market in marriages.  Becker contends that such a 
marriage market naturally places people with similar background, intelligence, race, 
education and other factors together.  Demand and supply observed during such a 
market process in turn supply data necessary for decisions on government funding.
31
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Becker asserts that all human behaviour involves utility maximization that results 
from a stable set of preferences, an optimal amount of information accumulated, and 
other market inputs.  Accordingly, he advocates the use of the economic approach as 
a unified framework for understanding human behaviour.
32
  Not all economists agree 
with Becker‟s approach to human behaviour and his use of economic modelling.  
Nevertheless, his recognition by the discipline of economics and the Nobel Prize 
awarded clearly indicate the pursuit towards the recognition of economics as a 
science that embraces all human activities. 
 In contrast to the survey data used in sociological analysis, Becker‟s 
sociological economic approach uses market data to capture social interactions 
within a market paradigm.  Instead of moving from hypothesis and empirical survey 
to derive observed outcomes and phenomena, the economic approach starts with a 
market paradigm and attempt to capture social interaction through modelling of 
market data.  Feminist economist Barbara Bergmann points out that this type of 
“observation-less” theorizing is the most common way economists seek to advance 
the science.
33
  Since the method does not start from empirical observation but from a 
model that abstracts data to substantiate it, the result is an abstraction that may not 
represent reality.  If economics is a science, it should model reality in order to further 
study of the subject.  However, Becker‟s economic approach puts the subject in 
service of the axioms and methods by expanding its scope without contributing to 
our knowledge of the family or other human behaviour.  Such an economic approach 
is more rigorous than alternative methods for modelling human behaviour, but not 
necessarily more authentic.
34
   
The market paradigm and economic modelling are helpful in understanding 
and analysing market behaviour.  However, when these tools are extended to 
nonmarket human behaviour, they lead to abstractions and distortions of reality.  As 
discussed in chapter 4, the modern market has emerged from the development of the 
legal contract that enables its expansion.  The contract serves to safeguard and 
regulate the market exchange through monetary units and agreed-upon terms and 
conditions.  When these contractual relationships are captured through the economic 
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approach, it implies a presupposition of contractual legality, prioritization in the form 
of monetary value, and abstraction of human qualities.  This means that all goods and 
services must take on a price when entering the economic model because of the 
necessity to translate these into monetary units.  When this method is extended to 
nonmarket variables, all sorts of human behaviour are forced to fall into a contractual 
mode, and tagged with a highly abstract price that reflects a social value derived by 
economic constraints.  
 In modern times, the market is continuing to expand globally.  It is 
increasingly important to govern the scope of application of market exchanges and 
their related economic analysis, so that they continue to serve human persons, rather 
than vice versa.  The role of markets must be critically scrutinized and continuously 
evaluated as the market expands and becomes globalized.  To establish the scope and 
role of the market and to give it appropriate boundaries are vital and worthwhile 
tasks for economists.  The Two Pillars paradigm continuously reminds us that 
relationships must not be reduced to contractual terms.  Human relationships must 
remain covenantal.  In this regard, the covenant is a heuristic tool that calls for 
society to acknowledge the need for genuine human relationships that are not price 
driven but based on loving, caring and gifting.  At the same time, human behaviour 
in the market is a Two Pillars process involving both contractual exchange and 
covenantal care.  The economic approach is useful, but its assumptions and 
limitations must be considered when deriving conclusions and making policy 
decisions.  More importantly, economic values should not be exclusively imposed on 
human lives during the process. 
 
6.3  Market Assumptions: Economic Models and Utility Maximization 
After establishing the market limits, I now turn to a review of the market 
itself.  I contend that economic methods are useful analytical tools for the contract-
based exchange, but as with all methods, its underlying assumptions need to be 
continuously re-examined and improved upon.  The market is often considered the 
most effective device known for generating human goods for material well-being.  
However, this emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness does not equate to total 
human well-being.  Consumption is indeed essential to physical life, but it is not final 
and ultimate.  Material or bodily needs serve the very basic requirements for 
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sustaining human life, the essential intermediaries to total human well-being.  Yet 
these intermediaries alone do not ensure well-being. 
Utility theory in economics presupposes utility maximization, efficiency and, 
in many models, perpetual growth.  In this regard, Becker sees the core elements of 
the economic approach as “the combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, 
market equilibrium, and stable preference, used relentlessly and unflinchingly”.
35
  He 
asserts that the economic approach does not assume self-interested individuals, but is 
merely a method of analysis.  At the same time, he admits that the analysis assumes 
that individuals consistently maximize their own perceived welfare, whether they are 
selfish or altruistic.  Such behaviour is forward-looking but rooted in past 
experiences.  The maximizing process occurs within the contracts that quantify 
income, time, resources, social interactions, etc.
36
  Are these economic assumptions 
really neutral, serving merely as analytical tools?  The answer is negative.  All 
maximizing acts necessarily involve maximizing among objectives, whether or not 
these are the same among different individuals.  When these maximizing processes 
are placed within the context of contractual human activities, they become bounded 
by the monetary pricing mechanism that underlies the contracts involved.  Non-
contractible considerations such as caring and charity are abstracted when they are 
turned into contractible monetary units.  When this economic approach is applied to 
human behaviour, the market equilibrium structure and maximizing assumptions are 
superimposed on human life. 
 A closer look at these core economic assumptions further reveals the problem 
of diversified interests in their practical application.  For example, while companies 
work to maximize profits, individual members do not maximize the companies‟ 
profits.  They maximize their own interest in terms of external goods and individual 
circumstances.  Therefore the problem is not the maximization of the “content” of 
individual interests, but the narrow conception of this as income.  There are other 
interests such as community, excellence, loyalty, cooperation, etc. that individuals 
wish to satisfy.  How do we define and measure values within such a wider variety of 
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different interests and utilities?  Economic models use different utility functions to 
capture these diversities and derive market equilibrium.  They also attempt to find 
equilibrium points in utility functions to observe the aggregate, rationalized outcome 
of these diversities.  This is done by a generalization and abstraction based on 
presupposed market objectives in monetary and contractual terms.
37
  Market 
participants are thus led back to the simple motivator that governs market 
behaviour – the notion of self-interest.  While the utility function may take into 
account motives other then self-interest, such qualities tend to lose their personal 
value to a unique human person who does not align with the typical circumstances 
envisaged in the model.
38
 
 Becker includes social interactions in economic analysis by defining them as 
“social income”.  Social income is the sum of the individual‟s income and the 
monetary value of the social environment of the individual.  This means that human 
relationships in Becker‟s economic models are defined by monetary earnings of the 
self, plus the monetary value of others to the self.  For instance, the monetary value 
assigned to a give social environment is higher if social relationships within such an 
environment are more intimate.  In a higher-valued social environment, income 
redistributed to the common good is of a higher value than that in a lower-valued 
social environment.  This is because what benefits the others also benefits the self.  
Examples of such transfers of value can be seen through parental care for their 
children, concern for welfare of members in a community, or environmental care for 
the future generation.  Through these social interactions, the family or wider 
community maximizes a consistent and transitive utility function subject to the given 
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constraints.  At the same time, the utility transfer and redistribution mechanism 
ensure participants are taken care of through the maximizing of social income.
39
  
  In Becker‟s models, the social environment is taken as an argument in a 
stable utility function.  This means that the normal utility function V = V(x, y), 
becomes U = U(x, y, S).  In this function, x and y are goods and services.  The 
variable S represents social influences on utility measured in terms of “social capital”.  
These social influences affect the probability of a given choice, and are considered 
complementary to the goods and services.
40
  For example, the utility from consuming 
beer at a given time may be affected by the social companion or environment.  The 
variable S is strongest when participants are forced to conform to social norms.  
Accordingly, social capital directly enters as a preference factor in the economic 
model.  The variable S can then be extended to include behaviour habits, time 
specification, or summation of other factors.  The marginal utilities or optimal points 
can thus be further analyzed.  Observing these economic models in action reveals the 
limitations of the economic approach.  While the models are useful in analyzing 
market situations by scientifically isolating certain variables and studying their 
interaction under a given set of assumptions, the models do not capture all human 
irrationalities and life elements.  They represent abstractions of reality within their 
own assumptions and limitations.  There can always be features and externalities 
missing in or misrepresented by the variable S that will overwhelmingly affect 
outcome.  In addition, social relationships are dynamic and reflect the personal 
values and choices of the individual at a given time and context.  They can differ 
significantly among persons, families and cultures.  For example, the core feature of 
love among family members refutes any representation as a variable S in the 
economic function because its transcendent potential is infinite.  On the one hand, 
egocentric assumptions can render its value to a minimal.  On the other hand, a 
perfectly self-giving and sacrificial covenantal love yields an infinite value.  The 
social environment presents a wide range of relational elements, human potentials 
and possible irrationalities that cannot be adequately represented by mathematical 
variables alone. 
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Becker finds altruism to be a major factor when tying together family 
interests.  For example, he finds that if children are expected to help their parents in 
old age, even non-loving parents would save less and invest more in the children‟s 
human capital.  On the other hand, altruistic parents prefer increases in their old age 
consumption to equal increases in their children‟s.  Such parents always under-invest 
in their children‟s human capital if they have made their children feel guilty in terms 
of their obligation to provide for their parents.  This is because when they suspect 
that their children provide for them only because of guilt, their expectation of their 
children‟s actual willingness to help is lowered.  They then lower their investment in 
their children to balance this expectation.  Therefore, Becker concludes that guilt is 
an inefficient cost.  To Becker, what he terms as “so-called family values” of 
obligation, duty and love, are greatly affected by public policies and economic 
conditions.  He believes that heads of families who do not plan to leave bequests try 
to create a warm atmosphere in order that members are willing to assist those 
experiencing financial difficulties.  Therefore social security helping the elderly will 
cause family members to drift apart.  The incentive to invest in creating close 
relationships reduces when the related future economic motives decrease.
41
   
Imposing Becker‟s economic worldview on all human behaviour brings about 
a set of economic priorities to human life based on economic assumptions.  When 
individuals and communities are all perceived to maximize their own utilities and 
take full advantage of given opportunities in monetary terms, all items are given an 
economic value that can be difficult to determine.  The notions of value and fairness 
thus become abstract and arbitrary.  Human goodness, morality and conscience are 
allocated a value of null when altruistic acts, family bonds, social relationships and 
pursuit of the common good all require justification in terms of economic benefits.  
This worldview reduces all aspects of human life to contractible units that are 
quantifiable and exchangeable, and all human relationships to contractual 
arrangements that contain their own terms and conditions.  Becker‟s economic 
approach to the family has been praised for its policy-relevance and “researchability”.  
Unfortunately, by adopting a researchable and scientific approach that suits the 
mathematical model, the very essence of the family unit is diminished to a set of 
economic abstractions.  The family is observed as if it is a mechanical consumption 
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and reproduction unit.
42
  Relying on these underlying assumptions to derive policy 
decisions is highly detrimental.  
In the economic family models described by Becker, families no longer retain 
the set of human values that are characterized by self-giving love, responsibility and 
trust.  Human bonding is not considered except in the form of quantified abstraction.  
Taking this one step further, it is easy to conclude that the family structure is no 
longer necessarily the best structure for an investment market in child bearing and 
human capital manufacturing.  If this is the case, individuals have in fact lost their 
true essence of being human persons.  Bergmann criticizes Becker‟s theory of the 
family for its fatally simplistic and misleading assumptions that lead to preposterous 
conclusions.  The use of economic analytical tools on family functions fails to 
appreciate the actual problems by ignoring essential elements of moral, relational and 
emotional natures.  For example, Becker “proves” that women benefit from 
polygamy over monogamy because they get a higher “price” from selling themselves 
into polygamy marriages.  This is based on the assumption that women are willing to 
supply themselves to men when they enjoy a higher value consumption bundle than 
that outside a marriage.  The consumption bundle is in turn defined as the monetary 
purchasing power and utilities from such purchases.
43
  Nelson appropriately points 
out Becker‟s misplaced labelling and misplaced concreteness.
 44
  For example, 
children should not be taken as commodities within a parental utility function.  
Within Becker‟s approach, concepts such as altruism are defined merely in terms of 
monetary and contractible returns.
45
  The organic elements of human life are 
therefore isolated from the economic models.  Seemingly concrete definitions of 
notions such as marital bargaining and divorce threats receive a misplaced 
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concreteness that misrepresents reality.  It is an extreme misuse of scientific 
requirements to derive narrow and restrictive assumptions.
46
 
Economics concerns human life.  Its assumptions and methods should always 
include a concern for human qualities and communal connections.  In the original 
Smithian system, sympathy works within the human person and leads to actions for 
others.  However, sympathy alone is inadequate.  Sen distinguishes between 
sympathy and commitment.  Sympathy is a concern for others when the situation 
affects one‟s own welfare.  When one is affected personally by the other, it is a case 
of sympathy.  If one is not personally worse off but acts in the view of right and 
wrong, it is a case of commitment.  Therefore sympathy is essentially egocentric, 
whereby one‟s own utility can be increased by sympathetic action.  In contrast, 
action based on commitment is non-egocentric.  Sympathetic acts are easier to 
measure because utility is involved.  However, when the choice based on sympathy 
happens to coincide with that of commitment, their relative value and priority are 
more difficult to ascertain.  The presence of uncertainties and judgement further 
complicates the matter.  Sympathy may complicate a Pareto optimum and upset the 
competitive equilibrium.  Nevertheless, the revised economic model will still apply.  
Commitment destroys the model because of the possibility of counter-preferential 
choices, requiring a total revamp of the entire model.
47
  For example, in a repeated 
game such as the Prisoner‟s Dilemma described in chapter 5.3, motives based on 
sympathy and commitment interact to derive different outcomes.  The same decision 
made by two different parties does not necessary result from the same motive.  If 
total commitment is assumed, the model becomes empty because no alternate 
outcomes are possible other than the seemingly irrational choice of committing to the 
other party regardless of potential reward.   
The approach used by Sen is one that draws upon both the usefulness and 
limitations of economic modelling to analyze market activities.  It does not 
superimpose an economic imperialism to human behaviour, but assesses the 
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interaction and impact of nonmarket human variables on economic models.  This 
results in a more in-depth understanding of economic activities, and a new direction 
for policies and decision-making.  A paradigm shift for the economic model needs to 
involve the expertise of economists in analysing and deriving these modelling 
assumptions and techniques, as well as the continuous awareness and reflection on 
market limitations and nonmarket human concerns in conducting economic activities.  
The latter mission is one that is taken up through the Two Pillars paradigm.  The 
former task, together with a concern for the latter, relies on the continuing efforts of 
economists. 
 
6.4  Market Morality: Ethics and the Common Good 
 Perhaps the most easily understood set of market variables that is subject to 
abstraction in the economic models is morality.  The contract alone is inadequate to 
safeguard the ethical standards and to promote the common good that are essential to 
a well-balanced and harmonious society.  In a modern pluralistic society, moral and 
ethical standards become increasingly unclear.  Tradition or common consensus does 
not necessarily promote morality.  The application of economic models to moral 
concerns is another area open to debate.  For example, a paper by Becker and Elísa 
argues for offering monetary incentives to increase the supply of organs for medical 
transplant.  This appears to be an easy and obvious market solution to satisfy the 
supply shortage, if all moral and related concerns can be put aside.  To price the 
value of organs donation, Becker and Elísa take into account the risk factor and time 
lost during recovery from surgical procedures.  The variables considered in assessing 
the elasticity of demand include waiting time, availability and access to the black 
market.  Becker and Elísa argue that the seeming commodification of body parts is 
similar to the use of another woman‟s womb for surrogating, because paying to save 
lives is no different morally than paying to create lives.  They also assert that since 
the workplace compensates workers taking higher physical risks with higher pay, 
physical risks are already priced in the market.  For the financially deprived 
individuals who are more likely to sell their organs, Becker and Elísa argue that they 
should not be deprived of the revenue they can get from wealthy individuals.
48
  From 
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a theological point of view, the buying and selling of living organs present a problem 
grounded in the creation of humankind as unique persons in the image of God.  The 
unique value and significance of each human life is received as a gift from the 
Creator, and therefore cannot be price-tagged.  Even for the non-believer, ethical 
issues such as the value of human life, the priority of organ transplants, etc., should 
be considered rather than merely focusing on economic benefits and market demand.  
The covenant reminds market participants of morality issues such as caring for 
workers taking high risk jobs, urging employers to ensure safety measures are upheld, 
and ensuring workers are not exploited.  It calls for the wider community to help 
improve the overall well-being of those living in poverty, rather than setting up 
markets to exploit what is left of them.  The economic model should not impose its 
priorities to human life, but examine and set the appropriate market boundaries based 
on an awareness of covenant concerns. 
The market has a natural tendency to erode morality because of the corrosive 
effect of individualistic self-interest.  This self-interest concept favours the wealthy 
individuals because its priorities are valued in monetary terms.  Nevertheless, 
whether it is the original notion of Smithian self-interest or the later egocentrism that 
drives the market, the market relies on a basic level of morality that assumes the 
presence of fundamental values such as honesty and fairness.  Nussbaum points out 
that modern economics presupposes homo economicus as a self-interested or 
utilitarian maximizer, and altruism as a type of egocentrism for enhancing individual 
reputation.  Some economists, including Amartya Sen, actively argue that these 
assumptions are inadequate.  Sen offers sympathy and commitment as independent 
sources of motivation.  Nussbaum asserts that this is recently confirmed through 
striking empirical evidence during the times of the Holocaust, when a significant 
number of people risked life, family, comfort and reputation to rescue the Jews.
49
  
Ethical motivators provide courage for deliberate actions in light of the good.  In this 
regard, the contract is inadequate to safeguard the transcendent moral norms and 
ideologies that are valuable parts of human life.  Accordingly, human relationships 
must remain covenantal in essence even though contractual arrangements are entered 
into as means of exchange.  The elimination of covenant elements from human 
relationships is not only a moral problem but affects the very essence of humanity. 
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 Traditionally, morality has always been a core area of focus in Catholic social 
teachings.  In July 2009, Pope Benedict XVI issued the encyclical titled Caritas In 
Veritate, pointing out the importance of truth in our understanding of charity and 
economics.  Charity is the core of Catholic social teachings and must be grounded in 
the love and truth that give authentic substance to human relationships.  Without 
truth, love becomes empty and arbitrary.  Benedict XVI expresses truth in the logos 
that creates dia-logos, the communication and communion of values.  This truth 
enables us to let go of subjective opinions and gather for the assessment of authentic 
substance of all things.  It points us to the charity that resides in Christ, a charity of 
love as a gift, in acceptance and communion.  Truth as the foundation of charity is 
therefore a convergence of faith and reason, of a love that demonstrates this truth.
50
  
Benedict XVI‟s call for the awareness and rediscovery of truth as the foundation of 
charity is highly relevant at a time of financial turmoil and global economic crisis.   
Charity as one of the core elements of morality requires authenticity that is 
based on the truth.  This truth resides in the teachings of Christ.  Benedict XVI 
pronounces his assertions effectively to the believing community, especially on the 
importance of morality and truth in the modern market.  However, mere assertions on 
moral matters require a broader framework to place them in perspective for better 
understanding and enactment, especially for the non-believing community.  I assert 
that for the non-believer, the truth remains hidden but the concepts of covenant, 
conscience and economic agency serve as guidance towards the truth.  The covenant 
process challenges the conscience of human persons as agents to the economic 
activities that in turn require morality for proper functioning.  Indeed Benedict XVI 
discusses useful practical issues such as intellectual property rights, the role of the 
government, and ecological concerns in his encyclical.
51
  To further assert a 
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theological voice that is relevant and understandable to the wider public, a broader 
theological foundation is necessary.
52
  The covenant concept serves as a heuristic 
tool in this regard, and further extends the universality of moral understanding to the 
overall economic framework through the Two Pillars paradigm. 
Values are important in the market because they present the objective goals 
and standards that govern all market activities.  These values that steer the direction 
of economic development must be based on the universal truth.  Benedict XVI 
questions the complexity and definition of “development” in modern times.  
Although the world is increasing its aggregate wealth, there are also increasing 
inequalities.
53
  Economic activities continue to involve corruption and illegality in 
both rich and poor countries.  Multinational companies sometimes fail to respect 
human rights and exploit the poor.  International aid often fails to reach the needy.  
These prevailing economic problems reiterate that mere economic and technological 
progress is insufficient for society.  Economic development must take into account 
the true needs of total well-being to avoid the negative consequences of growth 
marked by irregularities and imbalances.  These market irregularities and imbalances 
pointed out by Benedict XVI coincidentally align with the Two Pillars paradigm‟s 
objective to balance the market. 
 One of the major objectives of the Two Pillars balancing mechanism is a re-
focusing of economic activities on authentic human life and the morality of human 
persons.  Benedict XVI strongly reminds us that the human person is the focus and 
aim of all economic and social life.  He asserts that “the primary capital to be 
safeguarded and valued is man, the human person in his or her integrity”.
54
  
Accordingly, issues such as work, labour mobility, welfare, inequity, freedom, 
marginalization, etc., those that concern human economic life, are the primary 
concerns of government and institutions.  Culture and education must help 
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individuals to define themselves with a nature that transcends the self, carrying the 
truth and morality that are necessary to promote market integrity.  This includes a 
respect for life, the universal right to food and water for all people, as well as the 
right to be freed from all discrimination.
55
  The enactment of human morality is 
presented as fundamental to human development, an integral part of authentic human 
living.  Unfortunately, modern society is driven more by monetary economic motives 
than such unquantifiable human qualities.  These assertions about human morality 
are fundamental because they form the essence of human life and truth.  They are 
part of covenantal living. 
 Benedict XVI points out that “the market is the economic institution that 
permits encounter between persons, inasmuch as they are economic subjects who 
make use of contracts to regulate their relations as they exchange goods and services 
of equivalent value between them, in order to satisfy their needs and desires”.
56
  He 
calls this “commutative justice”.  In contrast, he calls for distributive justice and 
social justice for the market economy, in recognition of the relational nature of the 
market.  One month after its release, a group of 68 evangelical Protestants jointly 
acknowledge their support for the encyclical Caritas in Veritate, inviting discussion 
and responses to its content.  As they indicate, the encyclical sees humankind not as 
the victims of globalization or economic activities, but as protagonists who work for 
solidarity, justice and the common good.  These are norms that transcend and 
transform the economic motives for profits and perpetual growth.
57
  I agree that 
solidarity and mutual trust are vital elements for proper functioning of the market.  
Furthermore, it is up to the market participants to work together to attain balanced 
and healthy economic activities.  During this process, the contract is necessary to 
regulate economic functions, but the contract alone does not produce the social 
cohesion required for proper economic activities.  A proper understanding and 
implementation of the covenant is essential in this regard.  
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While Protestant and Jewish traditions reflect upon the covenant concept, 
Catholic social teachings use the concept of the common good.  My opinion is that 
these are two similar but fundamentally different notions.  The common good 
focuses on community and public goods, representing the conditions or social assets 
that serve the good of all societal participants.
58
  The covenant, on the other hand, is 
a broader concept that is fundamental to human life.  It embraces the common good 
and moves beyond it to penetrate all human relationships.  The common good serves 
alongside other value concepts such as justice, freedom, equality and morality that 
are essential to humanity.  The covenant is a process and means of relating for 
attaining the values common to societal participants, while the common good 
represents one of the covenant characteristics or objectives.  The covenant consists of 
a rich history that highlights connections and solemn promises, communal bonds and 
justice, as well as the possibilities of plurality and hierarchy.  The covenant pillar of 
the Two Pillars market continuously reminds participants of the need to enhance 
human relationship, responsibility, morality and cooperation.  It carries the common 
good as one of its many objectives, together with the quest for caring relationships, 
self-giving love and authentic human living. 
 The common good is recognized and advocated in the development of 
welfare economics.  Lutz understands the common good as “arguments of how to 
organize the social economy so as to allow its members to realize a common interest 
in the provision of certain basic goods to all members of the community”.
59
  He 
points out that social economics recognizes a common good and makes room for a 
social dimension in economic analysis.  Accordingly, it is a critical re-examination of 
the methodology and assumptions of the orthodox individualistic creed.  Indeed not 
all strands of social economics fall into the problematic application of the economic 
approach to human behaviour.  Welfare economics focuses on the volume and 
distribution of welfare in relation to national income.  It works towards the common 
good through analysing societal issues such as unemployment, social costs and  
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equality.
60
  It recognizes the proposition that competitive equilibrium does not lead 
naturally to the common good.  Welfare economics represents an important step 
towards the recognition of alternate economic paradigms, the need for humanizing 
the market, and the involvement of virtuous objectives such as justice, equity and the 
common good in economic analysis.
 61
   
Unfortunately, welfare economics and its assertions are often excluded from 
mainstream economic analysis.  Sen laments the increasing gap between ethics and 
modern economics by pointing out that welfare economics has become increasingly 
dubious because of the suspicion of the use of ethics in economics.  Welfare 
economic assertions are not allowed to influence predictive economic because 
predictive economics insists that human actions are based on self-interest only.
62
  It 
is not my argument that the abstract economic models which exclude ethical 
elements are unproductive.  Abstractions contain some relevance in themselves when 
applied appropriately to the market exchange.  My argument is that to use these 
models positively, we need to analyze the results in light of covenant concerns that 
complement and balance our understanding of economic activities.  This is because 
economic activities have their very fundamental concerns over the human person and 
persons in relationship with each other.  As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, ethics and 
the common good are integral parts of covenant characteristics.  The covenant 
concept goes beyond these moral concerns through its deep roots in human history 
and its rich content regarding human life and essential qualities for the well-being of 
the whole person.  The awareness and rediscovery of covenant values can provide 
insights for the development of economic methodology and assumptions.  These 
interdisciplinary dialogue and reflection are realized through advocating the Two 
                                                 
60
 Welfare economics challenges normative utility-based economics and acknowledges the need for 
rights and freedom.  One example is the capability approach advocated by Amartya Sen, discussed in 
chapter 4.3.  These approaches presuppose the basic norms of material sufficiency and respect for 
human dignity.  For a thorough discussion of the history of social and welfare economics, see Ibid., 
104-45. 
61
 Welfare economics remains a specialization to be interpreted and developed.  Nevertheless, its 
underlying criteria appear to be consistent with Scholastic moral philosophy and a view for the 
common good.  As with all methodologies, it contains its own limitations and need for further 
research.  For discussions about these limitations, see Amartya Sen, 'Personal Utilities and Public 
Judgements: Or What's Wrong With Welfare Economics,' The Economic Journal 89 (1979): 537-58; 
and Stephen Worland, 'Justice and Welfare Economics,' Review of Social Economy 63 (2005): 369-82. 
62
 Amartya Sen, On Ethics and Economics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 27-57. 
   201
Pillars paradigm to promote the covenant as an essential and complementary 
foundation to the existing market that is largely contract-based. 
 According to Benedict XVI, desiring the common good is a requirement of 
justice and charity.
63
  He appropriately asserts that the market does not exist in the 
pure state but is shaped by the configurations that define it and give it direction.
64
  
Economics and financial instruments must be used to serve human life and the 
common good, not vice versa.  In this regard, Catholic social teachings that are often 
seen as an endorsement of the market economy seek to place authentic human social 
relationships within economic activities.  I contend that this notion is indeed an 
essential part of human living and can be positively beneficial when structured and 
carried out in a balanced and moral way.  The covenant captures this notion of the 
common good and further extends it to present a relational process that is 
fundamental to creation and human nature.  An awareness of the common good helps 
shift our focus from the benefit of the individual to the aggregate.  An understanding 
of the covenant links this move for sharing and aggregate benefits to a pre-existing 
foundation of relationships, loyalty and commitment to community.  While the 
common good takes us to the notions of sharing and common concerns, the covenant 
asserts that such sharing and concerns are based on a stronger cosmic bonding that 
ties creation together under the relational order fundamental to humankind.  The 
covenant interacts with the contract in the Two Pillars paradigm to ensure a well-
balanced economic market as advocated in the Catholic social teachings. 
The covenant concept that originates from the very beginning of Yahweh‟s 
relationship with the chosen people of Israel is thoroughly explored in the Jewish 
tradition.  Sacks presents covenant as the politics of the common good, through 
which everyone gathers to ensure the dignity of each other.  The concept of the 
common good gives meaning to a responsible society.  For example, proper 
consumption habits take into consideration the common good of environmental 
protection.  Covenantal concerns for the environment not only direct common 
resources to environmental protection, but also cultivate such responsibility in the 
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daily lives of every citizen.  Covenant binds people together in commitment to future 
interests, such that the related virtues become part of covenantal norms in the 
community.
65
   
Covenant relationships are based on the integrity to preserve freedom and 
individuality.  Therefore covenant necessarily allows for pluralities and differences.  
Sacks asserts that “covenants exist because we are different and seek to preserve that 
difference, even as we come together to bring our several gifts to the common 
good”.
66
  Despite its inadequacy to capture relational processes, the common good 
contributes to the understanding of the covenant.  It enhances secular understanding 
of the covenant concept and serves to define one of the many targets of covenantal 
living.
67
  Indeed human persons function within different levels or relational spheres 
ranging from kinship and social relationships, to commercial acquaintance and 
strangers on the streets.  Nevertheless, communities share common relational 
objectives whether it is in the deepest level of intimacy and sharing, or the wider 
notion of living in justice and harmony.  These basic covenantal spheres are common 
across time and cultures.   
Morality needs to penetrate all aspects and levels of human life, from the 
individual to the communal, from the familial to the global.  As Benedict XVI points 
out, purchasing is always an act beyond simple economics.  It is a moral act through 
the decision of the moral and economic agent.
68
  Social responsibility and other 
moral concerns present another important reason for establishing market limits.  The 
Two Pillars paradigm actively promotes the awareness and necessity of morality in 
the market through its covenant pillar.  The covenant that advocates self-giving love 
and mutual trust in turn interacts with the contract that ensures fairness and prevents 
exploitation.  The market does not automatically look after the needs of those who do 
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not have adequate purchasing power at a given time, e.g. children, the sick or 
disabled.  It does not present equality in distributive allocation or consideration for 
public goods.  More importantly, it neither promotes a natural concern for ethics in 
business, nor equips a standard of morality in individual participants.  The presence 
of market imperfections means that the economic method of organizing production 
and distribution in the market does not adequately promote equity or justice.
69
  
Indeed even perfectly functioning markets cannot ensure equity or justice.  Therefore 
active education and enactment of covenant characteristics must be given high 
priorities and be developed in the form of economic norms. 
The market cannot function properly without morality.  Contracts set out the 
rules and terms of exchange so that participants in a given transaction have 
something to fall back on.  This default mechanism acts as a passive enforcement of 
trust and increases trustworthiness of a stranger in the market.  Consequently, the 
contract in turn enhances the covenant values of justice and responsibility.  These 
moral measures reside with the parties entering into the transaction.  It is up to the 
market participants, at both the individual and communal levels, to derive and enact 
moral standards and humanizing measures for market activities.  There is a highly 
significant role for the government and regulators in this process. 
 
6.5  Market Regulations: Role and Policies of the Government 
The scope and content of state intervention in the economic market has been 
a widely debated subject in politics, law, sociology and economics for many years.  
Even the original Smithian system recognizes the need for legislation in the market. 
Smith identifies three vital roles for the government: defence, justice and public 
works.  Defence is for the protection and security of the commonwealth.  Justice 
should be independent from executive powers because it requires full attention and 
should not be subject to intervention by politics.  Public works means that 
institutions must be established to facilitate commerce through different means such 
as youth education, public instructions, religious teachings, etc.  Accordingly, 
Smith‟s world of commerce is not an ideology or self-sufficient system, but one that 
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requires institutional intervention to direct it towards positive ends.
70
  Society has 
changed in many complex ways since the Smithian times.  Proper governance and 
legislation in the market are not only important but require continuous refinements 
and updates in the dynamic modern market. 
Sacks points out two institutions dominated society in the past half-century – 
the state and the market.  The state refers to people as a nation. “The market relates 
to us as individuals.  We choose, we spend, we buy as we wish and can afford, and in 
so doing we think primarily of ourselves.”
71
  The market undermines loyalties by 
directing an individual‟s attention towards personal monetary gain or the pursuit of 
power.  It constantly introduces new products, better deals and more attractive 
options.
72
  In the modern market, the Smithian notion of self-interest has been 
developed and twisted into egocentrism and individualism.  The human person is 
confronted with an environment that rewards quantifiable gains and individualistic 
pleasures.  Self-preservation and human relationships degenerate into self-protection 
and individual gains.  The challenge to modern economists and policy makers is to 
re-introduce covenantal characteristics in the contractual market to derive a balanced 
platform for economic functions. 
 Sacks identifies the market, the state, and covenant as three different 
approaches to social life and the logic of association.  The state forces people to act 
properly.  The market pays people to do so.  Both of these require treating people 
with dignity and respect.  In contrast, a moral relationship requires treating people as 
ends, not means.  Covenants create cooperation through moral associations that turn 
“you” and “I” into “We”.  “Covenant is a binding commitment, entered into by two 
or more parties, to work and care for one another while respecting the freedom, 
integrity and difference of each.  Covenant is politics without power, economics 
without self-interest.”
73
  I assert that while these are three different approaches to 
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economic life, they need not conflict with each other.  The question is how these 
approaches interact and work together in their respective spheres to promote 
authentic market activities contributing to positive economic life.  The state protects 
human rights, enhances economic justice and educates the participants.  The market 
provides a platform for free and independent exchange.  The covenant creates moral 
associations, promotes trust and enhances human bonding.  In the Two Pillars 
paradigm, the state takes on a vital role to educate, protect and regulate.  It re-iterates 
the need for a covenantal approach to balance the contractual arrangement, and 
monitors the contribution to social capital and common good within the market 
structure. 
How and how much should government intervene in market activities?  Here 
we turn again to the work of some economists who attempt to build indirect variables 
into their models.  Becker recognizes the importance of culture, norms, social 
structure and other indirect factors affecting economic behaviour, but asserts that the 
techniques and approaches used by other disciplines are not powerful enough to 
analyze social influence on behaviour.  Lifestyles, trends, traditions and cultural 
norms greatly influence behaviour and choices.  Becker‟s solution is for parents, 
schools, religions, governments and other institutions to mould the preferences of the 
next generation.  This is done through social markets that capture social forces and 
factors affecting formation of social groups.
74
  I agree that positive norms and 
preferences need to be educated and cultivated in the society.  However, I must add 
that it is not a matter of blind moulding, but a primary concern for educators and 
institutions to promote the morality and covenant characteristics that are vital to a 
well-balanced market and proper understanding of human relationships. 
 I have already demonstrated how the valuable tool of economics takes on a 
negative turn when it exceeds market limits.  Similar problems start to arise when 
Becker applies his approach to analyse matters of public concern such as the 
legitimacy of government spending on terminal care.  In a study by Becker, Murphy 
and Philipson, the value of terminal care is found to be much higher than anticipated, 
and higher than the marginal value of life, by redefining the economic variables 
involved.  First, the patient‟s “willingness to pay” is taken to increase non-linearly 
towards the end of life.  Second, the social value of a life is assumed to be greater 
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than its private value where the extension of a given life has positive external effects 
on others.
75
  Third, the “hope of living” component that is often ignored on end-of-
life care is added to the model.  Fourth, the value of life-extension is taken to be 
independent of the quality of life of the patient.  A mathematical model is then 
constructed based on these assumptions and variables, taking into account other 
factors such as insurance and medical technologies.  The results of this study show 
that there is a high consumer demand for longevity.  This leads to the conclusion that 
high spending on medical care at the end of life is rational.  Based on an economic 
definition of value, the demand for medical technologies and expensive terminal care 
therefore presents a huge potential market for investment purposes.
76
 
 This study of terminal care presents a few points for reflection.  First, the 
concern from funders and policy makers about the “value” of terminal medical care 
is not only an economic one.  It also involves family values, moral considerations 
and philosophical worldviews.  The economic approach presented involves a great 
degree of abstraction and finitude in its observations and policy recommendations.  
Second, the need for re-defining the variables involved in the model represents a 
previously missing awareness of covenant values in family and society.  With the 
covenant assertions of the Two Pillars paradigm, these missing variables and 
alternate assumptions should be easily identifiable.  Third, the econometrics involved 
in the analysis has its own limitations in terms of isolating dependent valuables for 
analysis one at a time.  Consequently, it is difficult to consider all variables in 
aggregate and to observe how they interact.  This is a limitation common to many 
social science methodologies.  Fourth, following on the previous point, the problem 
is not only how these variables are studied, but their definitions that in turn fulfil the 
“requirements” of the models in deriving a given set of results.
77
  For example, the 
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value of hope is defined as the “current utility of future survival” in economic terms.  
The value of life is then found to be an increasing function of hope in a function that 
denotes the marginal value of life.  The positive relationship between hope and 
marginal value of life is therefore placed in the form of mathematical language in the 
model based on definition of the variables and their relationship.  The result appears 
intuitive regardless of the economic language.  Fifth, although the paper concludes 
by pointing towards the social value of life and the importance of hope, these life 
values are affirmed only because of their economic and monetary potential.  
Incentives for larger spending in terminal care exceed the value of life estimates in 
the empirical data, making the value of life towards its end higher than expected.  
The element of hope is thus monetarized, legitimating the allocation of resources into 
terminal care.  Insurance and government policies for enhancing terminal care are 
found necessary because of the inelasticity of demand in this market.  Following this 
trend of thought is dangerous because human life cannot be commodified in 
monetary terms.  The reasons for enhancing terminal care must be derived from a 
covenantal love that cares for and preserves human life and values. 
 Taking points 4 and 5 together, the economic approach to terminal care is 
therefore a discussion of the observed reasons for a high demand for terminal care 
services, and an assertion for placing human qualities such as willingness, hope and 
social value in economic terms.  A monetary value can then be attached to each of 
these elements for empirical purposes.  During this process, human qualities are 
abstracted and observed based on an assigned meaning.  The economic task is to 
observe, analyse and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the caring process, 
rather than making a judgement of its necessity based upon monetary returns.  The 
question of distribution and allocation of resources needs to consider not only the 
economic value to the individual and to society as a whole, but also covenantal 
values such as respect for life and loving care for the others.  As a result of 
abstractions and assumptions, economic analyses of social behaviour disregard 
transcendent life values and can lead to detrimental implications for policy making.
78
  
The value of terminal care for wealthy families able to pay for medical care may be 
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higher in economic terms than those in poverty.  This does not mean that there are 
differences in the value of human life. 
 Benedict XVI appropriately points out the importance of laws and regulations 
and their proper uses, as follows:   
Economic life undoubtedly requires contracts, in order to regulate relations of 
exchange between goods of equivalent value.  But it also needs just laws and forms 
of redistribution governed by politics, and what is more, it needs works redolent of 
the spirit of gift.  The economy in the global era seems to privilege the former logic, 
that of contractual exchange, but directly or indirectly it also demonstrates its need 
for the other two: political logic, and the logic of the unconditional gift.
79
   
Political logic and economic functions are closely knitted together in modern 
society.
80
  Results of monetary policies and the ability to promote economic growth 
significantly influence the result of elections.  The direction and basis for 
government decisions on the economy therefore becomes increasingly important.  
The times for blind faith in a laissez-faire market have passed with the observable 
increases of inequity and failure of the financial markets.
81
  For example the 
resources for higher education are fixed and regulated.  Concerns over social capital 
and public goods are the primary focus of redistribution.  This need has resulted from 
a lack of awareness in the covenantal characteristics that must work to balance the 
contractual motives in the economic market. 
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6.6  Market as a Continuous Balancing Act between Two Pillars 
In an economic experiment called the “Ultimatum Game”, two people are 
asked to share a sum of money.  One person proposes a way of splitting it while the 
other decides whether to accept.  If the second person decides to accept, they split the 
money accordingly.  If the second person does not accept the money, both walk away 
without any money.  According to the self-interest maximizing model, the second 
person should accept any proposed split that gives the second person a positive 
amount by the first person.  Even a 9:1 split will benefit both parties.  However, 
results of the experiment show that the further away the deal is from a 5:5 split, the 
more likely for the deal to be rejected.  When the first person proposes a split that is 
perceived to be unfair or exploitative, the second person is likely to reject the deal so 
that both persons walk away empty-handed.
82
  This interesting experiment points 
towards a reality that transcends a simple self-interested motif for economic activities.  
Economic relationships always take place within a social context.  This places the 
motives of economic agents beyond mere financial interests.  The economic market 
must become a platform that supports both the reciprocity in exchange activities, and 
the human characteristics of relationships and gifting.  A humanized economic 
market involves a continuous balancing act of contractual arrangements and 
covenantal concerns. 
Contract is an instrument of economic order and protection.  Covenant is a 
relational process.  Formal or written parts of contractual relationships are in fact 
constitutions establishing legislative and administrative processes for the 
relationships involved.
83
  Examples of these are collective bargaining agreements and 
corporate charters.  Macneil asserts that these formulations contain dangers of 
hierarchical misuse and coercion.  This is because reliance on such formal 
constitutional terms reduces patterns of communications and behaviour to a 
dysfunctional neoclassicism.
84
  Participants may suffer from the imbalance of power 
or imperfect information within the contractual arrangement.  Discrete and defined 
legalism does not promote a continuing and balanced relational exchange.  A proper 
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balance between the contract and covenant is therefore vital to the market.  Contracts 
define boundaries with legal authority while covenant establishes the values within.  
Covenant denotes a process of gifting while contract requires reciprocity.  Contract 
and covenant interact not to exclude the other, but to establish a mutual bond that 
promotes cooperation in the acts of gifting and receiving.  The covenant process does 
not require reciprocity while the recipient reacts in gratitude and thanksgiving.  The 
act of reciprocity is thus carried out in trust and caring, taking place as a form of 
communication that transcends a simple transactional exchange. 
 Some free-market advocates see the economy as a self-regulating machine 
that can be scientifically analyzed through mathematical modelling.  This metaphor 
is an abstraction that does not reflect reality.  Nelson finds this metaphor damaging 
because it encourages irresponsible neoliberal pro-business policies, as well as the 
development of impractical anti-market alternatives.  When the economy is taken as 
an automatic machine, it is left to run naturally under presupposed self-interest.  
Nelson asserts that the economy should not take on the metaphor of a machine, but a 
living organ that is simultaneously a symbol of bodily functioning and a symbol of 
moral and spiritual life.  The “body” of this living organ involves the economic 
activities of production, employment, financial responsibility, growth and 
opportunities for the enjoyment of life.  The “soul” of this living organ denotes the 
ethical aspects of spiritual development, emotionally healthy relationships, mutual 
respect, care for the weak and needy, as well as ecological sustainability.  A body 
that lacks the soul leads to an exclusive focus on short-term profit, oppressive and 
alienating work relationships, and a fixation on growth and consumerism.  A soul 
that lacks the body becomes passive about the provision of goods and services, 
neglect of practical needs and constraints, financial irresponsibility, and fear of 
money and power.
85
  To Nelson, the solution for injecting life into the body of 
economics is to re-introduce the human soul and ethical concerns into economic 
activities.  This paradigm recognizes the need for the economy to accommodate the 
reality of human life, i.e. human persons as relational beings that have ethical and 
spiritual needs.  In order for the economic market to support the reality of human 
living, it must contain the vital characteristics of spiritual and ethical concerns.  
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These are fully and more appropriately captured in the covenant assertions of the 
Two Pillars paradigm. 
While self-love may include both individual needs and wants, community is a 
basic human need that is unquantifiable in economics and neglected within the 
market.  When human persons form communities that relate to each other under the 
covenant, both quantifiable and unquantifiable needs are optimized.  On the other 
hand, when persons become individualistic and self-protecting in the market under 
contractual terms, the powerful persons dominate with their wants at the expense of 
most other people‟s needs.  Stackhouse identifies “power” as a realistic factor in all 
relationships.  As a more powerful party enters into relationship with a weaker party, 
the question of domination is inevitable.  Within a covenant, each party becomes 
bonded into one another‟s destiny, fully committing under mutually binding 
principles.
86
  Instead of the dehumanizing and impersonal ways of the contract-based 
market, humanity needs to rediscover the covenantal way that is fundamental to 
human nature.  The relationship between the contract and covenant in the Two Pillars 
market is a continuously balancing act that supports the reality of authentic human 
living. 
Identifying the limits of economics and market functions does not reduce the 
value of economic analysis and expertise.  On the contrary, my findings point to a 
better deployment of economic methods and their significance in analysing market 
activities as well as providing vital information for policy decisions.  At the same 
time, economic analysis should retain its focus on contractual market variables while 
maintaining an acute awareness of organic human activities contained in the 
covenant.  The covenant continues to remind us of the need for morality and concern 
for the common good.  An analysis of the Smithian notions of self-interest, 
benevolence and sympathy reveals that the origin of economics does not presuppose 
egocentric self-interest or a self-sufficient free market.  In fact, Smith emphasizes 
efficiency and cooperation in the division of labour, and the need for government 
enactment of defence, justice and public works.  What stands in discourse between 
Smithian economics and theology is the deistic reliance on the natural evolution of 
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the market.  This worldview takes on a positive reliance upon human nature and the 
underlying self-sustaining mechanism conducted through the “invisible hand”.  
Theological anthropology questions these presuppositions.  A total dependence on 
human striving and natural evolution cause the market to become increasingly 
contract-based, eroding covenant characteristics and dehumanizing economic 
activities to impersonal contractual exchanges.  The Two Pillars paradigm is a 
continuous balancing act that upholds a balanced market for both efficient 
cooperation and the well-being of the whole person. 
 




7.1  The Quest for Humanizing the Market 
 In this thesis I have argued for the Two Pillars paradigm, whereby the 
covenant concept acts and interacts with the contract arrangement to uphold a well-
balanced economic market.  The preceding chapters present and illustrate a 
theological response to economics that places theology in public discourse and 
dialogue.  My formulation of this theological response starts from exploring the 
federal or covenantal foundation of society that humankind has originally been 
equipped with.  The covenant concept has been applied to political society in the past 
and forms the basis of the original federal political structure.  The covenantal 
federalism of Johannes Althusius provides insights for the application of covenant to 
society and the economic order.  It points towards the historical significance of the 
covenant concept, as well as its deep roots in the formation of political structures.  At 
the same time, Althusius‟ description of the polity and its consociations provides a 
blueprint for human relationships and the economic order.  It shows that human 
relationships transcend material functionalities and can be facilitated by a covenantal 
social structure to promote covenant values and norms.  Economic order is embedded 
in a covenantal system of codependence and cooperation that not only procures the 
material necessities of life, but also upholds the rights and equality that are vital to 
harmonious living and individual well-being. 
 After identifying the covenant concept as a theological response to society 
and the economic order, I have proceeded to examine the foundation of the modern 
market by exploring the economic assumptions about human nature and the Smithian 
origin of the discipline of economics.  Presuppositions concerning the human nature 
of self-interest, sympathy and benevolence lead to an economic worldview for the 
natural evolution of the market.  This development is in turn promoted and enhanced 
by the development of contract arrangements and contract law.  The result is a 
market mechanism that is increasingly contract-based.  This mechanism carries its 
own priorities including maximization of individual utilities, independent freedom of 
choice, and efficiency in production. It sets rules and boundaries that require 
measurement in monetary terms and fairness in transactions.  The contract-based 
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market contains a tendency for relatively short or fixed exchanges, as well as 
impersonal and obligatory relationships.  Contracts present some benefits such as 
enabling positive competition, expanding scope and horizon of cooperative exchange, 
protecting against exploitation, and providing for third-party mediation and 
arbitration of disputes.  In a contract-based market, morality and ethics are upheld 
through personal decisions and expectations about future benefits or penalties. 
 Analysis of the positive and negative aspects of contractual arrangements 
shows that contracts are useful means of market exchange but must be balanced 
through an alternative measure that captures the organic human aspects of 
cooperative economic activities.  The theological concept of the covenant is 
identified as the original means of relational exchange put forth by the divine Creator 
when He seeks to re-establish an everlasting, loving relationship with His people.  
Characteristics of the covenant such as love, sharing, trust, cooperation, justice, etc., 
have been embedded in the human heart since creation.  The theological task is to 
rediscover and re-introduce this authentic means of relational exchange to the 
modern economic market.  The covenant does not replace the contract, and should 
not be confused with the contract.  It promotes an open-ended, long-lasting 
relationship that is communal.  Participants in the covenant enter willingly into a 
sharing relationship with trust, love and commitment.  The covenant embraces a 
view for social bonding, communal ethics and the common good. 
Modern economics carries a set of presuppositions including utilities 
maximization and rational behaviour.  However, utilities and profits maximization 
are not the sole objectives of individuals and corporations.  In a living and changing 
society of human persons, objectives are necessarily multiple and dynamic in nature.  
Individuals not only maximize utilities but also consider overall well-being, social 
bonding, family needs and community interests.  Corporations attempt to maximize 
profits while continuing to run their business as going concerns.  They aim to 
develop their business in the long-run, and to protect the interests of multiple 
participants including shareholders, consumers, suppliers and employees.  Economic 
activities are at the same time balancing acts within a complex multitude of 
individual, family, social and community considerations.  Competition stimulates 
productivity and efficiency.  A perfect market coordinates an optimal allocation of 
resources.  Unfortunately, no market is perfect and its imperfections or defects are 
highly detrimental to human life.  Following the self-regulating route of natural 
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market development presents an increasing over-reliance on the contractual 
arrangement and monetary mechanism.  Moreover, even the market in its perfect 
form fails to account for the social capital and the common good that are essential to 
communal living.  Cooperation and community must take on covenantal 
characteristics to enable authentic human living. 
 I have shown that some economists such as Amartya Sen, feminist 
economists and others are aware of the limitations of the modern economic paradigm.  
They show that a paradigm shift is not only necessary but possible by questioning 
fundamental assumptions in econometrics, or introducing alternative concepts such 
as the capabilities approach.  Such a paradigm shift needs to be actively promoted for 
the formation of a set of healthy and balanced market norms that recognize both the 
need for market efficiency and human morality.  In response to the need for 
alternative economic paradigms, I have introduced the theological concept of the 
covenant, analyzed its contents and its relationship with the contract, and illustrated 
how it can interact positively with the contract to ensure a well-balanced economic 
market.  A market that overly relies on the contract as a means of transaction leads to 
detrimental effects such as individualism, commodification and dehumanization.  A 
perfect covenantal market of gifting and sharing can only reside in the end of time.  I 
argue for a Two Pillars paradigm whereby covenant and contract act and interact 
simultaneously to uphold the economic market.  The practical application of this 
paradigm has been illustrated through an examination of the relational contract and 
long-term employment arrangement in chapter 5.  Although relational contracts and 
game theory serve an alternate view of observing economic activities and attempt to 
present the relational aspects of economic activities, they fall short of fully capturing 
certain covenant characteristics that are essential to an employment arrangement.  
The covenant reminds us that trust, respect, loyalty, integrity, identity and 
commitment, among others, must be present.  These characteristics interact with the 
contract that protects fairness and equality in the workplace. 
 The covenantal way of life is strongly rooted in every aspect of the 
complexities that make up human life and its multiple spheres of social interaction.  
It embraces an origin dating back to the anthropology of creation, a historical process 
from the very beginning of Israel as a people of God, and a continuing significance 
as the very foundation of human relationships.  It is a process that enables the 
continuing quest of humankind in its search for the truth and relational well-being.  
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In covenantal economic relationships human persons finally set aside all fear and 
doubt to share and cooperate for mutual enjoyment of the gifts from creation.  This 
ultimate economy of grace and gifting presents an eschatological hope that is the 
longing of every human heart.  A perfectly covenantal market is an economy of 
sharing, gift and grace that can only be realized in the eschaton.  The economy of 
grace requires no contract or legality.  It thereby exerts a particular freedom that can 
be understood as freedom from obligations and necessities.  In voluntary giving, the 
provider gives freely out of love and care while the receiver receives in gratitude and 
thanksgiving.  The participants are free from the burden of reciprocity, sharing in the 
abundance of resources and communal relationship that underlie the acts of giving 
and receiving.  A true gift does not demand a gift in return.  It is a voluntary exertion 
of a loving act. 
 A shift from the contract-based approach to the Two Pillars paradigm 
requires an understanding of the covenant characteristics and development of 
covenant norms through promotion and education.  To promote a paradigm shift by 
balancing contractual inclinations with relevant covenantal elements, egocentric self-
interest must be redirected to relational needs and common interest.  Efficiency and 
competition are balanced with sharing and cooperation.  Private rights and 
ownerships need to take into account social capital and the common good.  The 
market should embrace both the universality and particularity of individual and 
communal participants.  Both personal agency and legal regulations are required as 
part of the authoritative measures of economic order.  Freedom in the market does 
not involve freedom of choice alone, but also freedom in obedience to authoritative 
measures, and freedom in terms of caring and sharing.  Finally, our quest for 
perpetual economic growth can be balanced with the covenantal elements of 
satisfaction, security and thanksgiving.  Presentation of the covenant characteristics 
and the paradigm shift reveals an alternate worldview to the market that at the same 
time remains feasible and realistic. 
 The economic market provides a platform of interaction and interdependence 
for human persons to communicate and cooperate.  It serves a positive and important 
function in society.  However, the market also tends to create unintended 
consequences when left unattended.  Distorted human nature causes a natural erosion 
of human goodness and creates individualistic, coercive or unethical misuse of 
market functions.  A healthy market relies on individuals to act in trust and good 
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faith with a concern for the common good and overall human well-being.  These 
covenant characteristics cannot be discarded in the name of efficiency and economic 
modelling.  Under a purely contractual arrangement, love is reduced to material 
exchange based on human feelings and will.  Losing its transcendent form, pleasure 
or pain becomes the sole measure of love.  Material gains and losses take over as the 
measurements for relationships, down to those within the family and marital 
relations.
1
  The satisfaction of human needs and wants form the basis of the 
economic market.  The contract that involves consent from the parties involved 
entering into a mutually agreed upon arrangement appears similar to a covenant, yet 
without any external normative structure.  The human experience involved in such 
commercial dealings is based on egocentric self-interest where the interests or value 
of external entities do not enter into the model for maximization of personal gains.  
To the modern economist and social contract advocates, the motivator is self-interest.  
To the covenanters, the motivator is the realization of the need for bonding.  The 
covenant connects the individual to fellow human persons to create mutual 
dependence based on trust and cooperation.  The covenant concept lifts the 
individual‟s horizons above and beyond the contractual market to an economic order 
based on concern for others rather than interest for oneself. 
 Covenantal communities are bonded in forms of covenantal love rather than 
transactions of power as in politics, or of wealth.
2
  Sacks sees human relationship 
with God residing in human hearts, while the relationship between two human 
persons necessitates enactment.  Therefore loving kindness need to be practised.  He 
asserts that “we must love strangers as well as neighbours, in the simple sense of 
human solidarity, and in a national context, from the covenant of citizenship.”
3
  This 
assertion reminds the economic agent not to forget the morality and kindness that 
should always be practised even when dealing with strangers in the market.  
Contract-based transactions should still be grounded upon a covenant undertone of 
ethical dealings.  Rather than the contract being a partial covenant that loses its 
                                                 
1
 Stackhouse describes a marriage under contract to be “a perspective in which the satisfaction of the 
felt needs of individuals is sovereign, with doubt as to whether any normative order exists for such 
relationships”.  See Stackhouse, Covenant and Commitments: Faith, Family, and Economic Life, 32. 
2
 Sacks describes these as “places where we learn the intimate grammar of reciprocity, the delicate 
choreography of ethical intelligence, the knowledge that love given is not given in vain, and that by 
sharing our vulnerabilities we discover strength”.  See Sacks, To Heal a Fractured World: The Ethics 
of Responsibility, 54. 
3
 Sacks, The Home We Build Together: Recreating Society, 180. 
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covenantal essence, the covenant embraces the contract as part of a simple encounter 
with neighbours even when it is with a stranger in a possibly one-off market 
transaction. 
 Brueggemann identifies “covenant” as a subversive paradigm highly relevant 
to contemporary living.  He asserts that “the central affirmations of covenant stand 
against and subvert the dominant forms, patterns and presuppositions of our culture 
and of cultural Christianity… the covenant theme offers an alternative perception of 
how things are in heaven and how they could be on earth”.
4
  The concept of covenant 
reminds us of renewal and community.  It points towards a new ecclesiology and 
solidarity in a culture of division and isolation.  Lamenting the failure of sociology in 
providing possibilities of community, Brueggemann proclaims the most unlikely 
thing of a community of solidarity on earth, simply because God moves towards 
solidarity in heaven.  Therefore solidarity is possible on earth, through human 
covenanting, making all things new.
5
  The covenant is one of the major forms of 
providential ordering.  It institutionalizes the scriptural models presented in the 
relationship between God and human persons, providing a model for the formation of 
civil societies.
6
  The covenant concept rides above other patterns of human 
relationships because it embeds the purposes of the divine order, will and care.  The 
Jewish community is one that has a strong tradition of the covenantal way of life.  
Human beings have an inherent propensity for contractual relationships that protect 
the interests of the relevant parties, whether from a standpoint of self-interest or 
mutual interests.  These mutually agreed upon contracts can include a covenantal 
dimension, or a gradation of covenantalism.
7
    
 Stackhouse points out that the modern person is confounded with multiple 
vocations to multiple covenants.  Everybody faces their own sets of complex 
experiences within areas of work, family, economics, education, recreation, politics, 
religious commitments, etc.  In order to retain integrity through these mazes, we 
                                                 
4




 Stackhouse, Globalization and Grace, 163. 
7
 The Jewish political scientist Daniel J. Elazar puts forth the idea of “gradations of covenantalism” 
from a tendency of human persons to carry out contractual transactions based on mutual agreement.  
These gradations are to be found in between the concepts of covenant and contract.  See Daniel J. 
Elazar, Covenant & Commonwealth: From Christian Separation through the Protestant Reformation 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 8. 
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must recognize our authentic nature in the image of God, and the covenantal nature 
of our vocations in the pluralisms of life.  We must hold tight to a sense of calling 
and empowerment by God in our service, so that the kingdom of God can be enacted 
starting from within ourselves.  The doctrine of vocation was extended and applied to 
all believers during the Reformation.  This converges with the concept of covenant in 
all the arenas of life, including material market exchanges.  The covenant concept 
stands over and above impersonal contractual dealings to provide meaningful human 
relationships.  Covenants ought to be seen as means of grace and service that start 
from the self-giving love of Christians who act to realize their authentic human 
nature in the image of God.  These are Christians who understand the calling to live 
rich and full lives in each of the complex areas of human life, taking them as possible 
means of grace.  These areas can and may breakdown, be distorted, fail, and even 
become destructive.  Nevertheless, Christians must hold tight to the faith that these 
destructive trends are reversible and reconcilable upon God‟s redemptive power in 
Christ.
8
  As such, it is the task of the community of faith to seek covenantal renewals 
in all aspects of life on earth.  Being one of the most fundamental desires of human 
nature, the material aspects of economics remain at the very forefront of this 
battlefield between the self-interested, impersonal contract, and the self-giving moral 
covenant. 
 
7.2  Further Research, Dialogue and Limitations 
The covenantal polity is deeply rooted in the historical development of 
political structures.  As discussed in chapter 3, the covenant is known to humankind 
as part of human nature in the order of creation.  Covenant characteristics are 
embedded in human goodness and are revealed through the human quest for truth.  
The covenant is not a new invention, but a rediscovery of the original intention of 
creation and relational order.  It marks the process and means of relationship between 
humankind and the Divine, as well as among human persons.  Through the quest for 
knowledge and truth, we can discover and apply humanistic alternatives to the 
market that reflect human goodness and promote total well-being.  Interdisciplinary 
dialogue contributes significantly to this quest.  The analysis of fundamental 
                                                 
8
 Stackhouse, Covenant and Commitments: Faith, Family, and Economic Life, 155-7. 
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worldviews, discussion of alternate approaches, and openness in the exchange of 
knowledge, all help to contribute to this purpose. 
Modern society consists of a multitude of communal spheres, each with its 
own covenantal objectives and contractual rules.  The Two Pillars paradigm does not 
offer a perfect solution to economic problems.  In fact, even the perfect market 
cannot ensure perfect solutions because of the finitude and sinful tendency within 
human nature.  The Two Pillars paradigm offers a frame of reference in order to 
observe, analyse and reflect upon economic situations.  It promotes the need for 
humanizing the market for overall well-being, and presents this possibility through 
the enactment of covenant values.  It contributes to the awareness and understanding 
of the interdependence and necessary interactions between contractual legalities and 
covenantal characteristics in the market.  Based on this framework, individual market 
participants are constantly reminded of the importance of both contract and covenant 
in economic activities.  The market in aggregate is reminded of the need for a 
balanced set of values and norms to enhance overall human well-being.   
The Two Pillars paradigm is only a starting point.  Its application and 
relevance have been demonstrated in chapter 5.  Similar to the employment 
arrangements and relational contracts discussed in chapter 5, the framework can be 
further applied to analyze other similar topics such as property purchase or rental 
arrangement, debts and financial instruments, wealth and monetary units, welfare and 
public goods, ecological concerns, education and healthcare, etc.  It is a starting point 
for further application to specific economic issues as they arise.  The strength of this 
paradigm lies both in its practical applicability to economic issues, as well as its 
universality and relevance for both believers and non-believers alike.  It serves as a 
continuous reminder that covenant characteristics are valuable and vital to human life, 
while the contract serves a parallel and equally important role in the modern market 
exchange. 
The Two Pillars paradigm follows the ethical-practical theological approach 
presented by Herman Bavinck.  This approach places the Two Pillars paradigm in the 
arena of public theology in response to society.  Since economic life resides within 
the context of the political and sociological environment, we can be facing a number 
of different issues at the same time during the attempt to regulate economic life, 
making the situation highly complex and rather unpredictable.  Political problems 
such as government instability, terrorism and international strife are highly 
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detrimental to economic activities.  Attempts to control these effects involve dealing 
with different worldviews, interest groups and cultures beyond the capability of an 
economic paradigm alone.  Other issues such as global climate change or ecological 
preservation involve both political and economic decisions that require covenantal 
cooperation among different nations.  These are all big issues that challenge the 
application of both covenant values and contractual legalities through complicated 
processes of negotiation.  For example, climate and ecology are areas more 
fundamental to human life then political and economic interests.  They concern the 
place and responsibility of humanity within the cosmic creation, as well as the 
ontological existence of the whole cosmos.  Covenant awareness contributes to 
reflection on these issues by pointing out the theological worldview and by calling 
for the pursuit of the divine order embedded in creation.  The Two Pillars paradigm 
remains far from providing easy solutions to these complex economic issues, but 
serves to remind decision-makers about the need for enactment of covenant values. 
 As a theological response to the market, the scope of this thesis is limited to a 
fundamental reflection on the underlying economic worldview, assumptions and 
approach.  The notions of covenant and contract explored are limited to the scriptural 
and theological covenants, and the legal and economic contracts.  It does not explore 
alternate views on human nature and development of the social contract.  Since 
economic order necessarily resides within the context of political structures, the 
organization of society and the mechanism of coordination among communities and 
individuals have a significant impact on economic activities.  The role of the state 
and institutions, societal structures, social welfare considerations and the influence of 
the constitutional political economy are further areas of research suggested by the 
Two Pillars paradigm in its context within the polis. 
 My study on the behavioural economics of Gary Becker shows that market 
and nonmarket activities must be segregated and treated appropriately according to 
their genuine nature.  Commodification of nonmarket human qualities induces 
distortions and unintended negative consequences.  A proper worldview starts with a 
thorough understanding of and reflection upon human nature, rather than an attempt 
to impose the worldview of economics into all walks of life.  Economic security and 
equality result from a concern for community life, love and sharing.  In Scripture, 
such qualities result from a dependence on the Creator, giver of all life and material 
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abundance.  In the human community, these same qualities result from a communal 
effort to enact the covenant principles of loving, sharing and gifting. 
 Economics is a discipline that necessarily involves debates regarding 
fundamental values, political decisions, sociological concerns and psychological 
responses.  It affects so many aspects of human life at both the individual and 
societal levels that warrant not only interdisciplinary, but multidisciplinary exchange 
of information and insights.  There is a close relationship between economics and 
politics, especially in modern times when financial policies and economic outcomes 
greatly influence public votes.  Indeed the market is a vital part of human life, 
serving as a means for cooperation and codependence.  The close relationship of 
economics, politics and society further reiterates the importance of upholding 
covenantal values through education and development of social norms.  As the 
market broadens its scope to become globalized, understanding and enactment of 
covenant characteristics are increasingly significant since these characteristics 
remain fundamental and essential to the overall well-being of both individuals and 
communities. 
My critique of the economic approach and behavioural models does not 
suggest a diminished role for economists.  Contrary to this, I find the discipline of 
economics increasingly important in the modern world when markets expand 
globally and economic activities continue to flourish.  The economists of this age 
carry the vital mission of research and reflection on the means and ends in promoting 
healthy economic activities that support cooperation, moral and harmonious living.  
Young economists should be equipped not only with the science of econometrics, but 
a broader worldview of sharing, caring, trust and cooperation necessary for societal 
living.  The importance of economic philosophy that marks the roots and origin of 
the discipline should not be overlooked.  Econometric models need to be enhanced 
through new mathematical approaches, as well as supplemented by philosophical 
reflections.  The rapidly changing modern times call for continuous re-examination 
of basic economic approaches and assumptions, and challenges the economists to 
derive methods tailored to the age of globalization and dynamic change. 
The Two Pillars paradigm puts forth a motion that draws upon the missing 
covenantal characteristic essential to human nature in order to balance the contractual 
inclination of the market exchange.  The role of the government and institutions is 
equally important in the modern economy.  The market can serve as an efficient and 
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effective means of exchange, but it must contain the proper standards and limits.  
There are also nonmarket aspects of human life that need to be addressed as such.  
These include the activities of family units, social welfare, public goods and societal 
norms.  Theology provides fragments of fundamental truth to facilitate reflection and 
development of individuals as well as of human society.  Economists are the experts 
in observing and analyzing market information.  Government and institutions serve 
to deploy the findings of the experts and enact the regulations and common interest 
that serves society as a whole. 
From a wider perspective, this thesis presents an interdisciplinary study 
between theology and the humanities, in particular the discipline of economics.  It 
extends towards a multidiscipline essence as the study also draws upon the work of 
sociologists and legal scholars where appropriate.  It offers a comprehensive 
paradigm in contrast to the traditional piecemeal discussion of ethical issues in 
economics.  The paradigm is realistic and relevant rather than ideological in nature.  
To understand the complex human person and the dynamic economic activities in 
modern times, it is necessary to integrate the variety of knowledge and resources 
offered across academic disciplines.  Such integrative analysis can provide results 
and recommendations that are not attainable from a single academic discipline alone. 
 Modern economic problems and the financial crisis remind us of the need for 
a deeper understanding of human nature and the human situation with greater 
humility and open-mindedness.  This understanding can be further promoted through 
an integration of knowledge and input from multiple disciplines.  In this regard, 
theological anthropology and the Christian worldview present valuable insights.  The 
economic issues confronting us today are multiple and complex.  The Two Pillars 
paradigm asserts a covenant balance that contributes to observations, analysis and 
decision-making both at the individual and communal levels.  This does not mean 
that problems become easily resolved.  In reality, covenant concerns add to the 
complexity of economic models and may complicate the decision-making process.  
This is because if only a monetary, impersonal and egocentric focus is maintained, 
our models and decisions can be abstracted and simplified.  The covenant values of 
charity, love, commitment, etc. carry risks and undesirable consequences.  Within 
human finitude and sinfulness, free gifting may induce disappointment and loss.  At 
the same time, it is only through the exertion of covenant values that humankind may 
find its identity, truth, and the goodness of human life. 
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It is neither implied, not is it necessary that all parties to a covenant are 
converted believers.  The existential importance of the covenant in Christian 
experience is that believers reside in the hope of God‟s people, with the virtues, 
strength and eschatological context of living a life of faith.  The promise of perfect 
agape love is given to the believer, who is protected and empowered to act 
accordingly.
9
  Covenant is about narratives and renewal.  The story-telling nature of 
covenantal narratives allows persons in community to form societies with memory 
and identity.  A society of free persons enters into covenantal relationships to work 
together for a gracious, just and compassionate world.  Such a society is moral, 
future-oriented and goal-directed, with each person being a participant on a journey 
towards a destination.  A covenantal society democratizes responsibility, allows 
pluralistic freedom, and empowers its citizens.
10
  This covenantal way of living is 
risky because one does not enter into covenants on the basis that others are 
trustworthy.  As Cronin points out, we are always engaged in the process of putting 
ourselves in the hands of others – doctors, car mechanics, teachers, parents, etc.  
Accordingly, what is most often conveyed in human relationships is a sense of 
responsibility rather than gift, although the gift or grace element remains in the 
background.  Through participation in covenantal relationships, the human person 
expresses participation in the inclusive covenant that embraces all humanity.  
Covenant takes the notion of human nature as the image of God from its 
metaphysical discussion to concrete interpersonal relationships.  In this light, the 
Torah of Israel is not merely law and order, but loving guidance that enacts the 




7.3  The Call for Covenantal Living 
 I have drawn upon the covenant concept and covenant theology from the 
Protestant tradition and as a scriptural theme in this thesis.  In line with this 
Protestant approach, I have deployed a theological notion of human nature that 
follows the Calvinist tradition.  On certain occasions, I have engaged with Catholic 
social teachings to illustrate the particular concepts of labour and morality.  The 
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 Horton, Covenant and Eschatology: The Divine Drama, 17-8. 
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 Sacks, The Home We Build Together: Recreating Society, 120-5. 
11
 Cronin, Rights and Christian Ethics, 210-6. 
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starting point of my argument is that economics begins from assumptions about 
human nature.  In formulating a theological response to the modern economic market, 
I have drawn from theological sources as well as multiple disciplines including 
economics, law and sociology.  I sympathize with the Christian personalism 
approach that engages with the existing human situation, acknowledges the need for 
an economic system to satisfy human needs, and advocates the need for development 
of the human person.  This approach recognizes liberty in terms of authentic value 
and in the context of community with others.  At the same time, my covenant 
standpoint differs from Christian personalism in that it places a higher priority on the 
relationship between God and humanity.  I find Christian personalism overly 
optimistic about human morality and the capacity to know the Creator.  Accordingly, 
an economy of sharing and personal responsibility is an ultimate goodness that one 
strives for but remains partially unrealizable for the moment.  The contract serves an 
interim purpose of governance and protection in this regard.  In the modern world 
where a multitude of different value systems claim allegiance, Christian covenantal 
living serves to witness the presence of the kingdom of God in an already-but-not-yet 
manner.  At the same time, the boundaries between spiritual and secular may not be 
as concrete as advocated in the past.  The Creator God remains the God of 
providence whose sovereignty embraces the natural and the secular while injecting 
fragments of truth in the self-giving love that He reveals to humankind. 
 A covenantal culture of trust, cooperation and community life is vital to 
genuine human life.  The covenant pillar of the Two Pillars paradigm continuously 
reminds us of the need to protect morality, foster communal life, and to act as good 
stewards to all creation.  It reminds us that proper concepts of freedom and morality 
must be educated and communicated.  The contract necessitates and enables 
commodities to take on a common monetary value.  The covenant acknowledges the 
values of gifting and sharing.  A relational contract binds the participants to the 
voluntary legal obligations concerned.  A covenantal relationship transcends the 
formal agreement to embody implicit human qualities of caring and sharing.  The 
covenant provides for intimacy and bonding while the contract protects again 
exploitation. 
 To the Christian who is residing in this already-but-not-yet life on earth, all 
human persons are fully submerged in market activities and economic life.  To live 
the full Christian life includes taking up the covenantal responsibilities and 
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stewardship of economic pursuits.  As earthly economic agents, we abide by the rules 
of the contract and the legal regulations of the market.  At the same time, we must 
remain fully aware of the covenant characteristics that we exert through a deep 
longing of the spiritual in our hearts.  Covenant and contract serve together to uphold 
market activities for authentic human living that treats persons as organic individuals 
and communal beings who act in relation to each other.  In this regard, it is up to the 
Christians in all walks of life to carry the mission of Christ in witnessing and 
demonstrating the love of God through covenantal living. 
 The Christian community is called to act as “light of the world” in every 
aspect of daily living.  Dealing primarily with the allocation of material resources, 
economics appears to be the least significant area when it comes to spiritual concerns.  
Perhaps this is partly the reason for its neglect by Christian scholars throughout the 
ages.  Paradoxically, economics is also the most influential sphere of life affecting 
both believers and non-believers whether they are concerned with the spiritual or not.  
It is indeed the very frontline of the battlefield for issues affecting contemporary 
living.  Nowadays, economic concerns have extended beyond trade and commerce to 
penetrate areas such as healthcare, education, welfare services, etc.  The modern day 
Christian is finding it harder to uphold Christian values when confronted with 
economic priorities.  In light of such difficulties, a covenantal paradigm provides 
energy and courage afresh for Christian mission.  As Brueggemann suggests, “the 
world is intended by God to be a community that covenants, that distributes its 
produce equally, that values all its members, and that brings the strong and the weak 
together in common work and common joy”.
12
  It is the mission of the believing 
community to articulate, anticipate and practise this covenantal renewal and 
transformation. 
To the non-Christian who naturally resides in economic market, we must 
understand and be aware of the market values that in turn affect our overall well-
being.  The covenant concept is a basic fundamental paradigm for human 
relationships and community life.  It embraces the morality, responsibility and 
commitment that have been eroded in modern society.  A rediscovery and renewal of 
the covenant way of living is essential not only to economic order, but to all spheres 
of society.  As Niebuhr asserts, “the world has this fundamental moral structure of a 
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 Brueggemann, 'Covenant as a Subversive Paradigm,' 1097. 
   227
covenant society and that what is possible and required in the political realm is the 
affirmation and reaffirmation of man‟s responsibility as a promise-maker, promise-
keeper, a covenanter in universal community.”
13
 
An understanding of the significance, characteristics and interactions of the 
contract and covenant is only a starting point.  It is the first step towards balancing 
market activities within the Two Pillars paradigm.  Social sciences can present mega 
theories and models that analyse societal living.  Theology can suggest fragments of 
truth to provide insights and reflections.  However, it is up to each and every 
individual economic agent to decide and enact human values that transcend mere 
contractual or monetary concerns.  The covenant is the mean that helps us achieve 
this end together.  It is the essential tool to attain a well-balanced economy, a tool 
that is known to humankind from the beginning of time but gradually eroded as we 
over-rely on contract-based activities. 
 The call for covenantal living is a redemptive call for rediscovery of and 
return to an authentic human life in relation to the Divine, other human persons, and 
the whole cosmos.  It draws the participants to a transcendent truth that embraces the 
goodness of creation and the ability to enjoy the abundance received as gift.  It 
asserts that genuine morality should be nurtured in the human heart so that it 
becomes an intrinsic motivator for the economic agent to carry out moral acts.  The 
terms of the covenant echo the requirement of a contractual arrangement.  However, 
it is not a mere contract of exchange.  It is a covenantal contract in which a 
reciprocity of justice, compassion and humility is called for not in obligation, but in 
gratitude to the steadfast love of God as the prophet Micah proclaims, “He has 
showed you, O man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you but to do 
justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?”  (Micah 6:8) 
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